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Abstract 
The rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) as major emerging 
powers has challenged existing important structures in the global economy. For this reason, 
there is an expectation that this restructuring may also occur in the international tax regime. In 
this respect, transfer pricing is one potential area for cooperation between the BRICS, which 
have faced challenges in applying the existing international standard – the traditional arm’s 
length approach as established by the OECD – in practice. Therefore, this thesis investigates 
the differences between the transfer pricing regulations of the BRICS and those of the OECD, 
examining the potential for cooperation between these countries and their impact on the 
international tax debate. The author concludes that the substantial differences among the 
BRICS prevent them from developing a unified and cohesive transfer pricing policy. However, 
the BRICS have demonstrated an ability to individually influence the international transfer 
pricing regime. 
Keywords 
Transfer Pricing, Arm’s Length Principle, BRICS, International Taxation, OECD, 
Cooperation, Law. 
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
Globalization has given rise to a great number of multinational enterprises1 (MNEs), which 
have the capacity to place their businesses and activities anywhere in the world. Through 
advances in technology, transportation and communications, companies operating their 
business abroad may choose to do so by collaborating with independent enterprises or with 
associated enterprises. In the first case, as the independent enterprises carry on their 
business in their own interests by trying to maximise profits, transaction prices are 
determined by market forces2. However, in the second circumstance, given the connections 
between the companies and, consequently, the absence of market forces in their relations, 
their intra-group transaction prices may deviate from what would have been negotiated 
between independent parties. 
Transactions within MNEs groups currently account for a significant volume of global 
trade: there is evidence that more than 30 per cent of all international transactions consist 
of intra-group transactions3. This means that a growing number of the existing international 
transactions are no longer completely ruled by market forces, but by the interests of MNE 
groups. For these reasons, establishing the appropriate price – the “transfer price” – for 
intra-group transfers of goods, services and intangibles becomes an important global issue. 
In the international tax area, transfer pricing assumes particular relevance as it determines 
                                                
1 For the purposes of this thesis, the adopted concept of multinational enterprises is the one 
established by Lorraine Eden, who defines MNEs as “two or more firms under common control, 
with a common pool of resources and common goals, where the units of enterprise are located in 
more than one country”. Lorraine Eden, Taxing Multinationals: Transfer Pricing and Corporate 
Income Taxation in North America (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000) at 126. 
2 The Oxford Dictionary of Economics provides the following definition for market forces: “the 
forces of supply and demand, that determine equilibrium quantities and prices in markets. These 
are contrasted with the government and monetary authorities, which are able to some extent to 
influence market forces”. John Black, Nigar Hashimzade and Gareth Myles. "market forces." In A 
Dictionary of Economics. Oxford University Press, 2012.  
3 Department of Economic & Social Affairs, United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing 
for Developing Countries (New York: United Nations, 2013) at 1 [UN Practical Manual]. 
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the income of each entity of the MNE group, influencing the tax base of the countries where 
these entities are residents. This happens because, although business is increasingly global 
and unlimited by national borders, taxation of MNE’s profits continues to be based on the 
domestic laws of each country4, which use the independent enterprise approach5. Therefore, 
if the pricing of intra-firm transactions is not effectively regulated, MNE’s profits can be 
shifted to low or no tax jurisdictions, minimizing taxes and harmfully affecting the 
revenues of the countries where the real economic activities occur. 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)6 has led efforts 
to create measures to regulate transfer pricing matters. In its Model Tax Convention on 
Income and on Capital7 (the “OECD Model Treaty”), the organization establishes the 
Arm’s Length Principle (ALP) as the international standard to determine the reasonable 
transfer price for international intra-group transactions. Nevertheless, Article 9 of the 
OECD Model Treaty does not specify the methods for determining the arm’s length prices 
and, when necessary, reallocating profits. A detailed application of the principle is provided 
by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which, although not considered a formal source 
of law, may have influences on customary norms and general principles of law. In this 
sense, the OECD defines itself as a “market leader in developing standards and guidelines 
in the core of International Taxation, such as the Model Tax Convention and Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines (…) These standards are applied on a global basis”8.  
                                                
4 John Henshall, Global Transfer Pricing: Principles and Practice. 2nd ed (Haywards Heath: 
Bloomsbury Professional, 2013) at 3. 
5 The independent enterprise approach recognizes the separate legal identity of corporations, even 
when they are owned or controlled by the same group or person. Jinyan Li, Arthur Cockfield & J. 
Scott Wilkie, International Taxation in Canada, 3rd ed (Markham: LexisNexis Canada) at 27. 
6 The OECD is an advisory organization for economic cooperation established in 1961. According 
to Article 5 of the organization’s convention, the OECD can take decisions that are binding on all 
member countries, make recommendations, enter into agreements with members, non-members 
countries and international organizations. OECD, Convention on the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (Paris: 14 December 1960). 
7 OECD, Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (Full 
Version) (2014) [OECD Model Tax Convention]. 
8 OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, Focus on Africa, online: Centre for Tax Policy 
and Administration < http://www.oecd.org/ctp/40998413.pdf>. 
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Considering that membership to the OECD is generally limited to developed countries, it 
is important to investigate the role and limitations of its standards and governance methods 
on a worldwide scale. With regard to OECD Member States, there is a well-defined 
expectation of compliance with the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines9; however, the 
influence and scope of this instrument in non-member countries are not so clear, 
notwithstanding the OECD’s argument that it represents “internationally agreed principles 
and provides valid guidelines for the application of the arm’s length principle”10.  
In this regard, the economic rise of emerging countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa (BRICS) – none of them members of the OECD – may represent a 
challenge to the narrative that international tax law, particularly as it is defined by the 
OECD, has reached international consensus. The economic performance and the growth of 
the BRICS countries in the last decade has remodeled important structures in the global 
economy. Thus, there is an expectation that this remodelling may also occur in the 
international tax regime, in which the BRICS institutionalization and closer cooperation 
may counterbalance the current dominant powers and contribute to redefining the existing 
system. The area of transfer pricing seems to be promising in this respect as the BRICS 
countries transfer pricing laws and practices present significant deviations from the OECD 
traditional approach.  
Therefore, this thesis will compare the BRICS transfer pricing practices in order to identify 
the differences between each of them and between them and the international transfer 
pricing standards established by the OECD. To the extent that these differences are 
identified, this thesis will analyze their impact on the BRICS collective effect on the 
existing transfer pricing system.   
                                                
9 In its “Recommendation of the Council on the Determination of Transfer Pricing between 
Associated Enterprises”, Amendment C (2016)79, the OECD instructs its Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs to monitor the implementation of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines as amended in 
cooperation with the authorities of Member countries. OECD, Recommendation of the Council on 
the Determination of Transfer Pricing between Associated Enterprises (2016), online: OECD < 
http://webnet.oecd.org/oecdacts/Instruments>. 
10 OECD, Committee on Fiscal Affairs, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrations (Paris: OECD, 2014) [OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines]. 
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1.1 Research Objectives 
This thesis has two main objectives. The first objective is to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the existing international transfer pricing regime and of the BRICS countries 
transfer pricing laws. According to this research objective, this thesis will examine if there 
are differences between the transfer pricing regulations of the OECD and those of the 
BRICS countries and, to the extent that there are differences, this thesis will study their 
impacts on the international transfer pricing regime. The second objective is to analyze the 
potential for cooperation among the BRICS countries regarding their international transfer 
pricing policies. 
1.2 Methodology 
In developing the research, this thesis will employ a comparative methodology between 
the tax systems of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa concerning the treatment 
given by these countries to transfer pricing issues as well as the convergences and 
divergences among each of them, and in regards to the international standards established 
by the OECD. According to the research objectives that guide this thesis, it will be firstly 
necessary to diagnose what subjects and issues will be relevant for the comparison between 
the legal systems.  
Therefore, in order to establish the international standard on transfer pricing and how it has 
evolved, this thesis will analyze relevant documents produced by the OECD regarding the 
application of the ALP as an international principle to regulate transfer pricing. Then, the 
transfer pricing laws11 and double taxation treaties currently in force in the BRICS 
countries will be examined, limiting the scope of this analysis to Article 9 provisions of tax 
treaties, which specifically deal with transfer pricing. Considering the importance of the 
                                                
11 The study of laws integrating the legal systems of countries with such a cultural divergence, 
geographic distance and linguistic variation limits the access to the information of the BRICS. For 
these reasons, data collection for this thesis will be based on materials available on the World Wide 
Web through international organizations, governments and institutions websites in which translated 
primary legal sources are available. Additionally, this thesis will rely on secondary sources, such 
as government documents, books, journals and periodicals. 
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positions and practices of the tax authorities in transfer pricing issues, special focus will be 
directed to an examination of the BRICS representatives participation in international 
organizations and initiatives. 
1.3 Organization of Thesis 
Apart from this introductory chapter and from the conclusion chapter, this thesis has four 
main chapters. Chapter 2 will provide insight into the existing international transfer pricing 
regime, examining the ALP and its relevant sources, such as the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines. Chapter 3 will set the stage for the subsequent study of the BRICS transfer 
pricing rules, providing and overall analysis of these countries and explaining why they 
may represent challenges to the international tax regime. Chapter 4 will individually 
examine the transfer pricing laws of the BRICS countries. This chapter will describe 
important factors such as the historical development of the BRICS transfer pricing 
regulations, their current transfer pricing methods and their challenges and peculiarities in 
applying the arm’s length principle. Chapter 5 will focus on the potential for cooperation 
between the BRICS and discuss these countries influences on the international transfer 
pricing regime.  
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Chapter 2  
2 Transfer Pricing Concepts and International Standards 
Transfer pricing is one of the most difficult challenges in international taxation. As 
governments strive to preserve their tax bases in an increasingly integrated global 
economy, establishing appropriate prices for related party cross-border transactions has 
become a complex issue for taxpayers and tax administrations. The issue of transfer pricing 
is relevant not only because of its complexity but also because it usually involves large 
sums of taxes. Transfer pricing rules were developed to address problems related to the 
mispricing of related party transactions. In this respect, the ALP is the international 
standard included in Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty and UN Model Treaty, and 
applied by several domestic legislations around the world. 
This chapter offers an overview of the transfer pricing issue, which involves its 
conceptualization, the ALP and other relevant international guidelines regulating the 
matter. The objective of this chapter is to establish what are the international standards 
regarding transfer pricing and how the standards operate in a global context. An 
understanding of these international transfer pricing standards is fundamental in order to 
compare them with and comprehend their influences on the BRICS transfer pricing 
practices, which will be described in Chapter 4.  
2.1 Transfer Pricing 
Transfer pricing is the appropriate pricing of cross-border transactions between related 
parties12, i.e., the amount that is charged between associated enterprises in their transfers 
of goods, services or intangibles13. One simple way of understanding this concept and its 
                                                
12 Eden, supra note 1 at 2. 
13 Providing a broader definition for transfer pricing, the International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation (IBFD) International Tax Glossary describes it as “the area of tax law and 
economics that is concerned with ensuring that prices charged between associated enterprises for 
the transfer of goods, services and intangible property accord with the arm’s length principle”. Julie 
Glabush, IBFD International Tax Glossary, 7th ed (IBFD, 2015). 
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implications in international tax law is to imagine the global profits of a Multinational 
Enterprise (“MNE”) as a pie that needs to be divided, in a principled and fair manner, 
between the different countries involved14. As modern MNEs are generally structured with 
the parent company controlling directly or indirectly its subsidiaries, it can be extremely 
complex to appropriately allocate profits among members of a multinational group15.  
The main concern is that these intra-group prices may be different from the prices that 
would have been agreed between two unrelated parties operating at arm’s length. This 
difference, from a fiscal perspective, affects the amount of taxable income of the associated 
enterprises involved in the transactions and hence the level of corporate income tax paid in 
each country16. For instance, if the parent company of an MNE is resident in a high tax 
jurisdiction and has a subsidiary in another country with a lower tax rate, the parent may 
have an incentive to be over-charged in its transactions with its subsidiary, shifting profits 
to a low tax jurisdiction in order to reduce the overall tax liability of the group17. In this 
case, when the parent company pays above normal market prices to its subsidiary, it may 
appear to be in financial difficulty; even though the MNE group as a whole is probably 
achieving good profit margins. After all, although MNEs usually carry on their activities 
through different corporations – treated by law as separate from each other and from their 
owners – they usually operate as a single business in economic and financial respects18. In 
the example above, the pricing manipulation is problematic to the country where the parent 
                                                
14 Henshall, supra note 4 at 3. 
15 Reuven Avi-Yonah, Advanced Introduction to International Tax Law (Northampton: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2015) at 28 [Avi-Yonah, “Advanced Introduction to International Tax Law”]. 
16 Jérôme Monsenego, Introduction to Transfer Pricing (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law 
International, 2015) at 3. 
17 The United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing provides the following example to 
illustrate transfer pricing issues: “A profitable computer group in Country A buys “solid state 
drives” from its own subsidiary in Country B. The price the parent company in Country A pays its 
subsidiary company in Country B (the “transfer price”) will determinate how much profit the 
Country B unit reports and how much local tax it pays. If the parent pays the subsidiary a price that 
is lower than the appropriate arm’s length price, the Country B unit may appear to be in financial 
difficulty, even if the group as a whole shows a reasonable profit margin when the completed 
computer is sold”. UN Practical Manual, supra note 3 at 1. 
18 Li, Cockfield & Wilkie, supra note 18 at 105. 
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company is resident, which will not have the expected profits to tax as most of the income 
will be allocated to the subsidiary company, resident in a country with lower taxes. 
Therefore, transfer pricing assumes particular importance when the tax rates of the 
jurisdictions involved in intra-group transactions are different, since MNEs have a genuine 
interest in shifting profits through their transfer prices to low-tax countries19. In this respect, 
the manipulation of transfer prices can cause two main negative consequences. First, it may 
generate a harmful tax competition among countries because, as MNEs have the incentive 
to increase their after-tax profits by allocating their taxable income to low-tax jurisdictions, 
countries may progressively reduce their tax rates in order to attract MNEs, resulting in 
what some have called a ‘race to the bottom’20. Second, since international transfer pricing 
manipulation is a strategy only available for MNEs, it also provides them a 
disproportionate advantage in relation to their domestic counterparts.  
This manipulation of transfer prices has led governments and international organizations 
to create ways of controlling transfer pricing under domestic and international tax law. 
Since the United Kingdom implemented its first transfer pricing regulation in 1915, 
countries have been exploring ways in which the manipulation of transfer prices and its 
aforementioned consequences can be minimized21. The ultimate result is a broad 
international consensus that transfer prices have to follow the “arm’s length” standard, 
which comprises a hypothetical analysis of how the related enterprises would have 
negotiated if they were independent from each other. 
2.2 The Arm’s Length Principle 
The Arm’s Length Principle (“ALP”) – incorporated into the domestic law of 
approximately 100 countries22 –  is codified by Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty, which 
                                                
19 Ibid. 
20 Eduardo Baistrocchi, “The Transfer Pricing Problem” in Eduardo Baistrocchi and Ian Roxan, 
eds, Resolving Transfer Pricing Disputes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 10 at 11 
[Baistrocchi, “The Transfer Pricing Problem”].  
21 Ibid. 
22 UN Practical Manual, supra note 3 at 31. 
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is the framework for bilateral tax treaties between OECD members and many non-member 
governments, as follows: 
Article 9 “Associated Enterprises”: 1. Where: a) an enterprise of a 
Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the management, 
control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State, or b) the 
same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control 
or capital of an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the 
other Contracting State, and in either case conditions are made or imposed 
between the two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which 
differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, 
then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one 
of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, 
may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly23. 
According to Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty, also incorporated in the UN Model Tax 
Convention, profits may be reallocated when conditions in commercial and financial 
transactions between related enterprises are different from those which would have been 
made between independent enterprises25. The underlying assumption is that independent 
parties performing a business transaction always seek to maximize their own profits and, 
through this negotiation process, a fair profit – proportional to the functions performed, 
                                                
2323 OECD Model Tax Convention, supra note 7. 
25 Article 9 “Associated Enterprises”: 1. Where: (a) an enterprise of a Contracting State participates 
directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting 
State, or (b) the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital 
of an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other Contracting State, and in either 
case conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or financial 
relations which differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any 
profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason 
of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed 
accordingly. Department of Economic & Social Affairs, United Nations Model Double Taxation 
Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries (New York: United Nations, 2011) [UN 
Model Convention]. 
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assets employed and risks assumed – is achieved by each enterprise26. Therefore, the ALP 
establishes that “the division of income among companies within a commonly controlled 
group should be based on estimates of how the income would be divided if the commonly 
controlled companies were instead unrelated companies, acting with respect to one another 
at arm’s length”27. Consequently, in order to determine the reasonable transfer price, it is 
necessary to compare intra-group transactions to transactions between unrelated entities28.  
The OECD argues that the ALP is the preferred basis for pricing related-party transactions 
because it provides a more equal treatment for tax purposes between associated and 
independent enterprises; avoiding the creation of tax advantages or disadvantages that 
would otherwise distort the competitive positions of each type of entity29. The OECD, 
nonetheless, recognizes some problems in the application of the ALP, particularly when 
there are no readily available comparable transactions, when relevant comparable data is 
difficult to find or when the MNE’s transaction would not be entered into by independent 
enterprises30. In this respect, Jeffrey Owens, a former official of the OECD, also recognizes 
a number of problems in applying the ALP, especially because of the absence of 
comparable transactions and because of the burden it creates for taxpayers and tax 
administrations31.  
These difficulties arise mainly because MNEs perform their businesses in a different way 
from independent enterprises in terms of the allocation of risks and structure of 
                                                
26 Henshall, supra note 4 at 5. 
27 Avi-Yonah, “Advanced Introduction to International Tax Law” supra note 15 at 28. 
28 “The role of the ALP is to compare an intra-firm transaction with a crucial element, a comparable 
from the open market. The ALP assumes that there will always be an available comparable. Thus, 
if a given intra-firm transaction is inconsistent with the comparable, tax authorities are generally 
empowered to adjust the relevant transfer price in order to achieve consistency with that 
comparable”. Baistrocchi, “The Transfer Pricing Problem” supra note 20 at 12.  
29 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines supra note 8. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Despite of the difficulties in its application, the author believes that the arm’s length principle 
“will survive as the principle on which the necessary international consensus is based”. Jeffrey 
Owens, “Should the arm’s Length Principle Retire?” (2005) 12 International Transfer Pricing 
Journal 99. 
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transactions32. Indeed, in multinational transactions, “parties are not ‘independent’ 
economic actors even though they have separate legal existences, and do not really bargain 
with each other in the sense typical for parties that have genuinely independent, and 
accordingly adverse or competitive interests”33. This makes the assumption of establishing 
an objective price by comparing MNEs with independent enterprises somewhat artificial34. 
However, despite these problems, the OECD concludes that the ALP is still better than any 
other approach35 so far presented36.  
The theory underlying the ALP is based on market forces: according to the supply and 
demand of a certain good or service, the market forces will usually result in a price that is 
acceptable to both parties at a given point in time37. Following this theory, when the prices 
paid for international transactions between independent parties are acceptable to both 
parties, there is an assumption that their income, as well as their resulting income taxes, 
will also be acceptable to the tax administrations of the countries where their business 
activities are located38. From a theoretical perspective, the ALP is an essentially neutral 
standard, as it is applied in transactions between associated enterprises regardless of their 
country of residence. There are, nevertheless, arguments against the applicability of the 
ALP in developing and emerging countries, especially with respect to the absence of 
comparable transactions, which will be further explored in the following chapters.  
                                                
32 John Neighbour and Jeffrey Owens, “Transfer Pricing in the New Millennium: Will the Arm’s 
Length Principle Survive?” (2002) 10:4 George Mason Law Review 951 at 954. 
33 Li, Cockfield & Wilkie, supra note 5 at 110. 
34 Ibid. 
35 The ALP is usually contrasted with unitary or formulary apportionment methods, under which a 
formula – e.g., based on each party’s assets, payroll or sales – is used to allocate the entire profit of 
a MNE among its constituent entities. The main distinction between the ALP and formulary 
apportionment is that, while the latter starts with treating the entire affiliated group as one unitary 
enterprise, the ALP treat each entity in the group as a separate taxpayer, who hypothetically deals 
with each of the other MNE’s entities at arm’s length. Reuven Avi-Yonah, “The Rise and Fall of 
Arm’s Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation” (1995) 15:1 Virginia Tax 
Review 89 at 92. 
36 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra note 10. 
37 Monsenego, supra note 16 at 16. 
38 “Most countries consider that the arm’s length price, determined by the market forces, is the 
fairest way to set prices between associated enterprises and ultimately divide the tax base of 
multinational enterprises”. Ibid at 17. 
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2.2.1 The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
Although the ALP concept provided in Article 9 is straightforward, its application in 
practice is much more complex. First, it is necessary to ascertain whether or not prices and, 
consequently, taxable profits have been influenced by the connection between the parties 
and, second, if so, how these profits should be recalculated to achieve the appropriate 
transfer price39. In this context, the OECD has been active40 in recommending how to 
correctly assess arm’s length pricing by producing its Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations41, referred in this thesis as the “OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines”. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are the “most 
comprehensive model of legal regulation of transfer pricing to date since the inception of 
corporate income tax systems at the beginning of the twentieth century”42. 
Since neither Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty nor Article 9 of the UN Model Treaty 
provide specific procedures for determining arm’s length prices or allocating profits, the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines provide guidance to MNEs and tax administrations in 
the application of the ALP. The guidelines represent a revision and compilation of previous 
transfer pricing reports published by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs and focus on 
helping “tax administrations (of both OECD member countries and non-member countries) 
and MNEs by indicating ways to find mutually satisfactory solutions to transfer pricing 
cases, thereby minimizing conflict among tax administrations and between tax 
administrations and MNEs”43. 
                                                
39 Henshall, supra note 4 at 11. 
40 According to Allison Christians, “rich countries have long sought to overcome tax jurisdiction 
gaps and overlaps by engaging in consensus building over nonbinding soft law norms via the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)”. Allison Christians, “BEPS 
and the New International Tax Order” (2016) 6 Brigham Young University Law Review 1603. 
41 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra note 10. 
42 Baistrocchi, “The Transfer Pricing Problem” supra note 20 at 17. 
43 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra note 10 at para 15. 
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2.2.1.1 Transfer Pricing Methods 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines stipulate five methods for assessing the appropriate 
transfer price in transactions between associated enterprises. The traditional transactional 
pricing methods are: a) the comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method; b) the resale 
price method; and c) the cost plus method. The transactional profit methods are: a) the 
profit split method; and b) the transactional net margin method44. 
Under the CUP method, there is a comparison between the price charged for property or 
services in a controlled transaction and the price charged for property or services in a 
comparable uncontrolled transaction in comparable circumstances45. If this assessment 
demonstrates a difference between the two prices, there may be an indication that the intra-
group transaction price is not at arm’s length46. The application of this method is indicated 
for cases in which the associated enterprise buys or sells a product or service and there are 
comparable non-arm’s length transactions in similar quantities and similar terms47. 
The resale price methodology involves the subtraction of a gross profit margin from the 
price that would have been sold to an independent enterprise. The OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines describe the application of this method as follows: 
The resale price method begins with the price at which a product that has 
been purchased from an associated enterprise is resold to an independent 
enterprise. This price (resale price) is then reduced by an appropriate gross 
margin on this price (“resale price margin”) representing the amount out of 
which the reseller would seek to cover its selling and other operating 
expenses and, in the light of the functions performed (taking into account 
assets used and risks assumed), make an appropriate profit. What is left after 
subtracting the gross margin can be regarded, after adjustment for other 
                                                
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid at 63. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Li, Cockfield & Wilkie, supra note 18 at 122. 
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costs associated with the purchase of the product (e.g. customs duties), as 
an arm’s length price for the original transfer of property between the 
associated enterprises48. 
The cost-plus method begins with the costs incurred by the supplier of property or services 
in a controlled transaction with a related purchaser. Then, an appropriate mark-up – 
calculated based on similar and comparable transactions – is added to remunerate the 
supplier for its functions, assets used and risks assumed49.  
Under the transactional profit split method, the total taxable income between the related 
enterprises is allocated to each party in accordance with its contribution to the profit50. This 
methodology is suitable to situations where the roles of the associated enterprises in an 
international transaction are so interconnected that it becomes very difficult to evaluate 
them in a separate fashion51. The transactional net margin method has a similar application 
to the profit split method: the difference is that, while the latter is applied to all participants 
in the intra-group transaction, the former is applied to one participant, by comparing the 
“net profit margins derived from a transaction involving related parties with net profit 
margins realized by unrelated parties from similar transactions52”. 
2.2.1.2 Legal Status of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are the international standard adopted by member 
and some non-members countries of the OECD in their domestic legislation and double 
tax conventions53. In this context, some scholars argue that the OECD Guidelines are the 
main legal source of an international transfer pricing regime, which is one of the 
                                                
48 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra note 10 at 65. 
49 Henshall, supra note 4 at 28. 
50 Li, Cockfield & Wilkie, supra note 18 at 125. 
51 Henshall, supra note 4 at 29. 
52 Li, Cockfield & Wilkie, supra note 5 at 127. 
53 Calderón, “The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as a Source of Tax Law: Is Globalization 
Reaching the Tax Law?” (2007) 35:1 Intertax 4. 
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fundamental structures of an international tax regime54.  According to this conception, 
there is an international understanding that these guidelines are the agreed interpretation of 
the ALP established in Article 9 in regards to the application of tax treaties that follow the 
OECD Model Treaty55. 
The application of the ALP and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines has also expanded 
into the legal systems of countries that are not members of the OECD. There is a trend 
towards the reshaping of domestic transfer pricing rules in order to align them with the 
standards established in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. This process is 
significantly influenced by the negotiation of a great number of treaties according to Article 
9 of the OECD Model Treaty56. In other words, an effective application of Article 9 may 
demand a coordinated interpretation in line with the OECD Guidelines, as explained by 
José Calderón: 
The Transfer Pricing Guidelines have been used to uniform, harmonize or 
to even “standardize” the configuration, interpretation and application of 
the arm's length principle and all the legislation on transfer pricing at an 
international level. The OECD soon noticed that the only way to eliminate 
the serious conflicts that can arise from an asymmetrical interpretation or 
application of this principle by the different states was through the 
articulation of guidelines that would shape the arm's length principle in a 
uniformed and internationally agreed form. That is to say, through an 
instrument of soft law, flexible and dynamic as the Guidelines are58.  
                                                
54 Scholars like Avi-Yonah argue that an international tax regime (ITR) exists, which is embodied 
in both the tax treaty network and domestic law, and that it forms a significant part of customary 
international law. The same position is adopted by Richard Vann, who observes an international 
consensus in the structure and content of tax treaties in a way that no country, except possibly the 
United States, can depart substantially from the ITR and its tax norms. See Avi-Yonah, “Advanced 
Introduction to International Tax Law”, supra note 15 and Richard Vann, “International Aspects 
of Income Tax” in Victor Thuronyi, ed, Tax Law Design and Drafting (International Monetary 
Fund, 1998). 
55 Calderón, supra note 53 at 10. 
56 Ibid. 
58 Ibid at 14. 
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In this context, a soft law59 approach to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines seems to 
offer a third way between describing these rules as “law” – which would mean that states 
are legally bound by it – and describing them as “not law at all” – which would overlook 
the evidence that countries do comply with the rules, frequently against their self-interest60. 
After all, the mere fact that recommendations from international organizations are not 
legally binding does not mean that they have no effect because a legal obligation is just 
one of the reasons for complying with a rule, particularly in international law, where 
sanctions are often illusory61. Indeed, Hugh Ault, examining the role of OECD’s 
commentaries in the interpretation of tax treaties, affirms that, although treaty parties are 
free to deviate from the guidance suggested by the organization, the presumption is that 
their interpretation represents the intention of the parties62. 
It is important to emphasize, nonetheless, that although the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines are broadly relied on, there are still different interpretations regarding transfer 
pricing issues from MNEs and countries’ tax administrations. Despite intending to 
represent internationally agreed principles, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are not 
fully accepted by all countries, particularly by those developing and emerging countries 
that are not members of the organization, as evidenced by the following comment of China 
in the UN Practical Manual: 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and 
Tax Administrations (the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines) have been the 
                                                
59 “Soft law is most commonly defined to include hortatory, rather than legally binding, obligations. 
The focus of this definition is usually on whether or not something that looks like a legal obligation 
in some ways (e.g., it is a written exchange of promises between states) nevertheless falls short of 
what is required to formally bind states”. Andrew Guzman & Timothy Meyer, “International Soft 
Law” (2010) 2:1 Journal of Legal Analysis 171 at 172. 
60 Allison Christians, “Hard Law, Soft Law, and International Taxation” (2007) 25:2 Wisconsin 
International Law Journal 325. 
61 Frank Engelen, “Some Observations on the Legal Statues of the Commentaries on the OECD 
Model” (2006) 60:3 Bulletin for International Taxations 105. 
62 The author used the framework of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, especially in 
its Articles 31 and 32, to suggest that the Commentaries represent a default setting for the treaties 
based on the OECD Model. Hugh Ault, “The role of the OECD commentaries in the interpretation 
of tax treaties” in Herbert Albert and Kees van Raad, eds, Essays on International Taxation 
(Devender: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993) 61. 
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“gold standard” for tax administrations and taxpayers to apply the “arm’s 
length principle” for the valuation, for tax purposes, of cross-border 
transactions between related parties for much of the period since the original 
version of the guidelines was first issued in 1995. As the world economy 
becomes increasingly globalized, transfer pricing is an issue faced not only 
by developed countries, but is increasingly a critical matter for developing 
countries. Such nations face a set of unique issues that have not been 
addressed, or at least not sufficiently or practically addressed by the OECD 
Guidelines. Therefore, while much of the OECD guidelines may still be 
applicable to developing countries, the UN Practical Manual should put a 
special focus on offering practical solutions to issues faced by developing 
countries63.  
In order to create a more balanced relationship between developed and developing 
countries in terms of transfer pricing regulations and interpretations, the UN Committee of 
Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters has published a manual specifically 
for developing countries, further analyzed in the next section. 
2.2.2 The UN Practical Manual 
The United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries (the 
“UN Practical Manual”) –  whose first version was approved by the UN Tax Committee 
on October 2012 and launched publicly in the Economic and Social Council Chamber of 
the United Nations on May 2013 – is intended to be a “living document”, to be modified 
and updated, based on the OECD’s Guidelines and on the ALP64. The UN Practical Manual, 
thus, was drafted “as a response to the need, often expressed by developing countries, for 
clearer guidance on the policy and administrative aspects of applying transfer pricing 
analysis to some of the transactions of multinational enterprises (MNEs)”66.  
                                                
63 UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 374-375. 
64 David Spencer, “BRICS, BEPS and the U.N. Transfer Pricing Manual (Part 1)” (2013) 24:5 
Journal of International Taxation 28 at 37 [Spencer, “BRICS, BEPS and the UN Manual Part 1”]. 
66 UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at VI. 
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On April 2017, the United Nations Committee of Experts in International Cooperation in 
Tax Matters released a revised UN Practical Manual. The revised Manual was drafted 
alongside the OECD/Group of Twenty (G20) Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS) to reflect the developments in the area of transfer pricing analysis and 
administration since the Manual’s first edition, especially regarding developments in 
developing countries67. 
Having representatives of Brazil, India, China and South Africa – four of the five BRICS68 
–  participating in the development of the document, the UN Practical Manual evidences 
the growing importance of the BRICS in the area of international taxation. In Parts A 
through C, the Manual often follows the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, reflecting the 
operation of Article 9 of the UN Model Treaty and the ALP embodied in it69. The 
significant difference of the Manual is in Part D, where Brazil, China, India, Mexico and 
South Africa individually described their viewpoints and experiences in dealing with 
transfer pricing. These country practices, nonetheless, do not necessarily reflect the UN 
Subcommittee’s views on transfer pricing as it was stated in the forewords to both the 2013 
and 2017 UN Practical Manual editions: 
While consensus has been sought as far as possible, it was considered most 
in accord with a practical manual to include some elements where consensus 
could not be reached, and it follows that specific views expressed in this 
Manual should not be ascribed to any particular persons involved in its 
drafting. [Part D] is different from other chapters in its conception, however. 
It represents an outline of particular country administrative practices as 
described in some detail by representatives from those countries, and it was 
                                                
67 Ibid. 
68 Russia does not have a representative member in the U.N. Committee of Experts on International 
Cooperation in Tax Matters and, for this reason, the views of the country are not highlighted in 
Chapter 10 of the Transfer Pricing Manual. 
69 The UN Manual is divided in four parts. Part A refers to transfer pricing in a global environment; 
Part B explores the arm’s length principle, providing guidance on principle and policy aspects; Part 
C relates to the practical implementation of a transfer pricing system in developing countries; and 
Part D contains country’s transfer pricing practices. UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at VI-V. 
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not considered feasible or appropriate to seek a consensus on how such 
country practices were described. [Part D] should be read with that 
difference in mind70. 
 Although not reflecting an official position from the United Nations, the countries’ 
practices exposed in Part D of the UN Practical Manual demonstrate some common 
challenges and themes in the area of transfer pricing between the BRICS countries. China, 
India and South Africa, for instance, used the document to emphasize the importance of 
considering location-specific advantages (“LSAs”) in the determination of the arm’s length 
prices of the companies resident in its territories. The UN Practical Manual also reveals 
some unique approaches, such as the Brazilian transfer pricing system, which does not rely 
on comparable transactions but rather on predetermined margins to achieve the adequate 
transfer price71. 
2.3 The Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action 
Plan 
Following the financial crisis of 2008 – when many countries faced high levels of public 
debt and pressure to generate more tax revenue – governments across the world became 
much more vocal about their concerns regarding international tax avoidance schemes, 
acknowledging how traditional tax policies and principles have not kept pace with the 
advances in cross-border trade generated by the rise of information and communication 
technology72. Since 2008, media reports and the empirical literature73 have also highlighted 
how highly profitable MNEs appeared to pay comparatively little income taxes in the 
countries where their income was effectively earned. In this respect, although some authors 
                                                
70 Ibid at V. 
71 Spencer, “BRICS, BEPS and the UN Manual Part 1”, supra note 65 at 37. 
72 Joy Hail, “An overview of the OECD Action Plan on BEPS” (2016) 94:2 Taxes: The tax 
Magazine 47. 
73 Dhammika Dharmapala, “What do We Know About Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A Review 
of the Empirical Literature” (2014) 35:4 Fiscal Studies 421. 
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argue that the impact of BEPS on tax revenues is only modest in magnitude74, there is 
significant evidence that MNEs arrange their affairs in a tax-sensitive manner and usually 
report higher profit rates in low-tax jurisdictions than in high-tax jurisdictions, from which 
it is possible to infer that BEPS is a relevant problem75. 
Therefore, in 2013, following the political G20 mandate76, the OECD published the Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) Report77 and its Action Plan78. According to the 
OECD, BEPS refers to tax avoidance schemes that manipulate gaps and differences in tax 
regulations to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax jurisdictions79. In this respect, 
considering the common awareness that governments are losing substantial corporate tax 
revenue because of MNE’s strategies aimed at shifting profits to countries where they are 
subject to more favourable tax treatments80, the BEPS Report recognizes and openly 
                                                
74 James Hines Jr. argues that “it appears that even a complete solution to the problem of BEPS, 
were one available and implementable, would have little direct impact on government finances” 
and that “the level of concern expressed about the problem of BEPS is inconsistent with the 
implications of the available statistical evidence”. James Hines Jr, “Policy Forum: How Serious Is 
the Problem of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting?” (2014) 62:2 Canadian Tax Journal 443 at 444. 
75 Ibid at 443-444. 
76 The “need to prevent base erosion and profit shifting” was explicitly referred in the G20 meeting 
in Mexico in 2012 in the meeting’s final declaration. G20 Information Centre, “G20 Leaders 
Declaration, Los Cabos, Mexico, June 19, 2012” (2012) University of Toronto, online: < 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2012/2012-0619-loscabos.html>. In the 2013 G20 meeting in Russia, 
the G20 Leaders endorsed the BEPS project, declaring that “in a context of severe fiscal 
consolidation and social hardship, in many countries ensuring that all taxpayers pay their fair share 
of taxes more than ever a priority. Tax avoidance, harmful practices and aggressive tax planning 
have to be tackled. (…) We fully endorse the ambitious and comprehensive Action Plan – 
originated in the OECD – aimed at addressing base erosion and profit shifting with mechanism to 
enrich the Plan as appropriate. We welcome the establishment of the G20/OECD BEPS project and 
we encourage all interested countries to participate. Profits should be taxed where economic 
activities deriving the profits are performed and where value is created”.  G20 Information Centre, 
“G20 Leaders Declaration, St. Petersburg, Russia, September 6, 2013” (2013) University of 
Toronto, online: < http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013-0906-declaration.html>. 
77 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013) [OECD, “Addressing BEPS”]. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting”, 
online: <http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/>.  
80 According to David Spencer, “this increased attention and the inherent challenge of dealing 
comprehensively with such a complex subject has encouraged a perception that the domestic and 
international rules on the taxation of cross-border profits are now broken and taxes are only paid 
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discusses the weaknesses in the international tax architecture designed by the OECD and 
by its member-countries81.  
The BEPS Action Plan calls for essential changes in the existent tax system mechanisms 
as well as the adoption of new ‘consensus-based’ approaches designed to prevent base 
erosion and profit shifting82. Thus, the Action Plan establishes the following fifteen actions 
that, when implemented internationally and domestically, will have an impact on current 
tax avoidance issues. 
1. Address the tax challenges arising from the digital economy. 
2. Neutralize the effect of hybrid mismatch arrangements. 
3.  Strengthen CFC rules.  
4. Limit base erosion through interest deductions and other financial payments such 
as insurance arrangements and derivatives. 
5.  Improve transparency and ensure transactions have substance. 
6. Prevent tax treaty abuse. 
7.  Prevent artificial avoidance through permanent establishments. 
8.  Prevent BEPS created by moving intangible assets among group members. 
9.  Prevent BEPS created by allocating risk or excessive capital to group members. 
10. Prevent BEPS created through high-risk transactions that would not occur between 
unrelated parties. 
11. Establish methodologies to collect and analyze data on BEPS. 
                                                
by the naive. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are being accused of do dodging taxes worldwide, 
and in particular in developing countries, where tax revenue is critical to foster long term 
development”. David Spencer, “OECD BEPS Project: Transfer Pricing” (2013) 24:11 Journal of 
International Taxation 23. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Action Plan on Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013) at 13 [OECD, “Action Plan on BEPS”]. 
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12. Require taxpayers to disclose aggressive tax planning arrangements. 
13. Re-examine documentation requirements. 
14. Make dispute resolution through the mutual agreement procedure more effective. 
15. Develop a multilateral instrument under tax and public international law to enable 
jurisdictions to implement measures to combat BEPS83. 
After two years of work within the OECD and after public consultation, the BEPS final 
reports on the actions were published in October 201584. In February 2016, during the G20 
meeting in China, the group leaders endorsed the BEPS final reports, supporting a 
consistent implementation of the BEPS package85.  
One of the typical profit shifting opportunities generated by the interaction of international 
and domestic taxation rules is in the area of transfer pricing. One fundamental assumption 
of the arm’s length standard is that the more extensive are the functions, assets and risks of 
one party in a transaction, the greater this party is expected to be remunerated and vice 
versa86. According to this logic, MNEs have the incentive to shift their functions, assets 
and risks to jurisdictions where they will receive a more favourable tax treatment. Although 
central functions may be difficult to be shifted, the risks and the ownership of intangible 
assets may be more easily contractually allocated to low-tax jurisdictions87. This shifting 
of income through such transfer pricing arrangements –  particularly those related to risks 
– was not effectively regulated in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which “are 
perceived by some as putting too much emphasis on legal structures (as reflected, for 
                                                
83 Ibid. 
84 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, “BEPS Final Reports” online: < 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-2015-final-reports.htm>. 
85 G20 Information Centre, “Communiqué, G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
Meeting, Shangai, February 27, 2016” (2016) University of Toronto, online: < 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2016/160227-finance-en.html >. 
86 OECD, “Addressing BEPS” supra note 77 at 42. 
87 Ibid. 
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example, in contractual risk allocations) rather than on the underlying reality of the 
economically integrated group”88, contributing to BEPS.  
In this sense, the BEPS Action Plan demands improvements in the current transfer pricing 
rules89 in order to “put more emphasis on value creation in highly integrated groups, 
tackling the use of intangibles, risks, capital and other high-risk transactions to shift 
profits”. The OECD's principal recommendations regarding transfer pricing are for 
countries to: a) revise allocation rules to attribute risks to related parties according to their 
control and financial capacity; b) revise allocation rules to avoid that the legal ownership 
of intangibles represents the only determinant of the source of their income; c) revise 
allocation rules to attribute value to associate enterprises performing important functions 
and; d) limit non-controlling companies to risk-free return on financial transactions90.  
Overall, it is possible to observe that transfer pricing and the ALP constitute the basis of a 
number of actions developed by the OECD under the BEPS project, being one fundamental 
aspect in avoiding base erosion and profit shifting.  
2.4 Conclusion 
Transfer pricing, which refers to the appropriate allocation of global profits between group 
members of MNEs, is an extremely complex issue, affecting governments and taxpayers 
from across the world. In order to address this issue, the ALP attempts to ensure that an 
appropriate price is charged between related parties in their cross-border transactions. 
However, notwithstanding the widespread adoption of this principle, its application 
remains challenging when there are no comparable transactions available, especially in the 
                                                
88 Ibid at 43. 
89 “In many instances, the existing transfer pricing rules, based on the arm’s length principle, 
effectively and efficiently allocate the income of multinationals among taxing jurisdictions. In other 
instances, however, multinationals have been able to use and/or misapply those rules to separate 
income from the economic activities that produce that income and to shift it into low-tax 
environments. This most often results from transfers of intangibles and other mobile assets for less 
than full value, the over-capitalization of lowly taxed group companies and from contractual 
allocations of risk to low-tax environments in transactions that would be unlikely to occur between 
unrelated parties”. OECD, “Action Plan on BEPS” supra note 77 at 19-20. 
90 Christians, supra note 37. 
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cases of developing and emerging countries. There are two important legal sources in the 
international transfer pricing area that provide recommendations on the application of the 
ALP: the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the UN Practical Manual. The first, 
although recognized by some scholars and countries as a representation of internationally 
agreed principles, is increasingly questioned by developing and emerging countries. The 
latter, on the other hand, attempts to provide specific guidance for developing countries in 
dealing with transfer pricing. None of these two seem to effectively and globally addressed 
the issue of transfer pricing, which, among other factors, motivated the creation of the 
OECD/G20 BEPS initiative in 2013.  
This new international tax and transfer pricing stage started with the BEPS initiative marks 
the beginning of the participation of more countries in creating international transfer 
pricing standards. Among these countries, one influential group is formed by the BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), which is examined in the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter 3  
3 The BRICS Countries 
The acronym BRICs was formulated by Jim O’Neill, former chief economist of Goldman 
Sachs, in a paper written in 2001 where the author proposed that, considering their 
economic performance in the 1990s, Brazil, Russia, India and China could be the drivers 
of the world economic growth in the next decade91. O’Neill’s reason for grouping together 
these countries was that they were all experiencing fast economic growth and becoming 
important emerging economic powers92.  
Following the global economic crisis of 2007-2008, while the world suffered a severe slow-
down in its economy, the BRICs countries engaged in a rapid recovery93. According to 
Goldman Sachs, the consequences of the 2008 crisis essentially enhanced the relevance of 
the rise of the BRICs countries94. Indeed, the growth in the domestic demand among the 
BRICs had a significant role in achieving global economic recovery, especially considering 
the need of developed countries for new export markets in face of the decreased demand 
in their domestic economies95.  
                                                
91 Jim O’Neill, “Building Better Global Economic BRICs” (2001) Paper no. 66 Goldman Sachs 
Global Economics. 
92 The BRICS are considered to be emerging economies, a term used to describe economies that 
“first […] are regional economic powerhouses with large populations, large resource bases and 
large markets. Their economic success will spur development in the countries around them; but if 
they experience an economic crisis, they can bring their neighbors down with them. Second, they 
are transitional societies that are undertaking domestic economic and political reforms. They adopt 
open-door policies to replace their traditional state interventionist policies that failed to produce 
sustainable economic growth. Third, they are the world's fastest growing economies, contributing 
to a great deal of the world's explosive growth of trade”. Chuan Li, “What are Emerging Markets?” 
The University of Iowa Center for International Finance and Development, online: 
<http://www.mrshultz.com/webpages/emergingmarkets.shtml>. 
93 However, Goldman Sachs reports caution that, although the BRICs have emerged as major 
players in the international economic order, “living standards in the BRICs continue to lag far 
behind the developed world”, particularly considering that none of the BRICs “have yet to break 
into even the top 50 richest economies in terms of PPP-based GDP per capita”. Dominic Wilson, 
Constantin Burgi and Stacy Carlson, “BRICs Monthly” (2011) 11:6 Goldman Sachs Global 
Economics, Commodities and Strategy Research 1 at 3. 
94 Ibid at 2.  
95 Ibid. 
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More than a decade after the formulation of the acronym BRICs, the discussion over the 
real possibility of a change of roles in the global economy, as predicted by O’Neill, gains 
new chapters every day. The BRICs – now BRICS with the inclusion of South Africa 
membership in 201196 – continue to promote the rapprochement between its members. 
Also, in recent years, there has been a dramatic growth in the importance of emerging 
countries in the global economic development and, consequently, the BRICS countries may 
affect the current international taxation scenario. 
This chapter discusses how and why the BRICS may be viewed as a globally influential 
group in the international tax area. The objective is to provide an overall perspective of the 
BRICS as individual countries – analyzing their main differences and similarities – and as 
an institution, establishing a framework for understanding the way in which they present 
challenges for the international transfer pricing regime.  
3.1 Globalization and the BRICS 
The BRICs countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) were not grouped together because 
of natural, historical, cultural, political or linguistic reasons. It is an economic concept that 
connect these countries as “the choice of Brazil, Russia, India and China is nothing but a 
focus on the four emerging markets with the largest GDP (at purchasing power parity) and 
on their four big populations becoming more productive”97. The grouping of these countries 
represents a transformation in the international order, in which “the world’s economic 
center of gravity has moved towards the east and south, from OECD members to emerging 
economies […] This realignment of the world economy […] represents a structural change 
of historical significance”98. 
                                                
96 In December 2010, based on mutual consent, South Africa received an official invitation from 
the BRICs members to become a member of the group. South Africa Ministry of International 
Relations and Cooperation, “About BRICS”, BRICS, online: <http://www.brics5.co.za/about-
brics/>. 
97 Francesca Beausang, Globalization and the BRICs: Why the BRICs Will Not Rule the World for 
Long (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 2. 
98 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Perspectives on Global 
Development 2010: Shifting Wealth (Paris: OECD Development Centre, 2010) at 15. 
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One important similarity among the BRICS economic development is the fact that, over 
the last three decades, these countries adopted decisive policies towards opening up their 
economies to the international market. Brazil, following a long period of military 
dictatorship, has, since the beginning of the 1990s, extended the opening of its internal 
market to imports, stabilized its economy and experienced significant improvements in its 
trade balance. Concurrently, Russia, after the end of the communist system – which had 
been in place since 1917 – began to substitute its economic model focused on domestic 
production for a system with greater international trade openness99. India, in response to 
the country’s low rates of development as well as inflation problems since the 1960s, also 
started its commercial opening in the early 1990s. Some scholars argue that this change 
was fundamental for India to reach the levels of growth the country has been experiencing 
since the first decade of this century100. China, having restructured and expanded private 
participation in national economic activity since 1978, experienced an unprecedented rural 
exodus in the 1990s, resulting in millions of people moving to cities in search for jobs in 
the large private enterprises established in Shanghai and Beijing101. At this point, the 
Chinese government promoted the gradual opening of its market to foreign companies and 
investors, also seeking better access to western markets. South Africa, after its democratic 
reform in 1994, moved away from international isolation towards greater integration with 
the world economy, beginning to attract capital inflows and to reduce its restrictions on 
capital outflows102. 
The 1990s was a decade when all BRICs economies were restructured according to a new 
world reality, which was being opened to new players through what was then called 
globalization. Unsurprisingly, the opening up of these countries’ economies to 
                                                
99 Anatoly Zhuplev, “Economic Internationalization of Russia: Roots, Trends, and Scenarios” 
(2008) 29:1 International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique. 
100 Chanchal Sharma, “A Discursive Dominance Theory of Economic Reforms Sustainability: The 
Case of India” (2011) 10:2 India Review.  
101 Sun Sheng Han and Clifton Pannell, “The Geography of Privatization in China, 1978-1996” 
(1999) 75:3 Economic Geography 272 at 279.  
102 Yashvir Algu and Kenneth Creamer, “Evaluating South Africa’s Open Economy” (2017) 85:2 
South African Journal of Economics 196. 
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international trade forced their enterprises, governments and institutions to adapt 
themselves in order to improve their insertion to the global market. This is a fundamental 
aspect in understanding why the BRICS, in that period, took the initiative to develop or 
update, among other things, domestic transfer pricing provisions.  
The accelerated pace of globalization is also leading to a “rebalancing of economic 
influence, with political power shifting from the West to the East”103. In this context, the 
BRICS, where new consumer markets are opening up and where a middle class is 
emerging, also arise as significant sources of foreign direct investment, especially into 
developing countries104.  
3.2 Overall Perspective 
The BRICS countries account for about one fourth of the world’s Gross National Product 
(GNP), their population corresponds to 40% of the world’s total and, together, they occupy 
more than 25% of the world’s land area105. The economies of these countries vary 
considerably106: China is a strong manufacturer and service provider, being the most 
populous country in the world, the second largest economy (after the United States of 
America) in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and occupying the second largest 
land area (after Russia); India is a leading country in the service supply category, being the 
10th largest economy in the world; Russia and Brazil are relevant raw material suppliers, 
                                                
103 This rebalancing is supported by significant changes in GDP rankings: “China […] has 
overtaken Brazil, Japan and the United Kingdom”, for example. However, it is not realistic to 
foresee that, in the near future, China will outpace the United States in terms of political, military 
or economic power. Jeffrey Owens, “The BRICS: An Overall Perspective” in Yariv Brauner and 
Pasquale Pistone, eds, BRICS and the Emergence of International Tax Coordination (Amsterdam: 
IBFD, 2015) 353 at 355 [Owens, “The BRICS: An Overall Perspective”]. 
104 Ibid at 356. 
105 Yariv Brauner and Pasquale Pistone, eds, BRICS and the Emergence of International Tax 
Coordination (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2015) 5. 
106 According to Jeffrey Owens, GDP, GDP per capita and GDP growth rates of the BRICS 
countries demonstrate how these countries diverge in the size of their economies. According to the 
author, due to these differences, although the BRICS seek a greater influence in the global debate, 
it has been difficult for them to coordinate positions in the tax area. See Owens, “The BRICS: An 
Overall Perspective” supra note 103 at 353. 
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although Brazil is also a provider of manufactured goods and services and; South Africa – 
the most recent BRICS member – has a smaller economy107, serving as a strategic African 
partner in the group108. 
Essentially, the main political and economic common characteristic between the BRICS is 
that they are all rapidly emerging economies, most of them having had direct experiences 
as colonies under European imperialism109. On the other hand, one of the main 
dissimilarities among these countries is the division existent between the democratic 
members of the group (Brazil, India and South Africa) and Russia and China110. The 
inclusion of South Africa in the BRICS, some authors argue, has also created more 
difficulties in developing a collective BRICS identity, since the African country is a 
democracy with close relations to Western economies and it is supposed to represent all 54 
diverse nations of Africa111, having less common causes with Brazil, Russia, India and 
China.    
Regardless of the differences between their tax systems and international tax policies, the 
BRICS countries share common aspects that are important for the contemporary 
international tax policy debate. First, all of them see themselves as emerging and 
developing powers, as explained by Niall Duggan: 
                                                
107 South Africa is the largest economy in Africa and its economy holds the 33rd place in the world 
GDP ranking. In terms of population, it is the 25th largest country in the world. However, compared 
to the other BRICS, South Africa has a much smaller economy: Its GDP is only a third of Brazil’s 
and Russia’s GDP and a tiny portion of China’s and India’s GDP. Niall Duggan, “BRICS and the 
Evolution of a New Agenda Within Global Governance” in Marek Rewizorski, ed, The European 
Union and the BRICS (Switzerland: Springer, 2015) 11 at 16. 
108 According to Niall Duggan, “South Africa’s claims for membership were driven and justified 
by political rather than economic factors. South Africa, as Africa’s only member of the G20, is an 
important political actor among developing nations. South Africa itself was attempting to gain 
greater influence in global affairs. Increased influence in global governance is one of the most 
important aspects of BRICS membership. As Africa is the continent with the largest number of 
developing states, its largest economy, South Africa, was seen by the BRIC states as a 
representative of the entire continent”. Ibid. 
109 John Kirton, “Explaining the BRICS Summit Solid, Strengthening Success” (2015) 10:2 
International Organizations Research Journal 1 at 9. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Duggan, supra note 102 at 16-17. 
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The BRICS have developed a large network of interactions and have 
institutionalised areas of cooperation. The basis for the development of 
these interactions has been a common self-identity as an emerging and 
developing power. Within this self-identity is a commonly held perception 
that the current system of global governance does not represent the interests 
of emerging powers and that without reform or the development of an 
alternative system, emerging powers would fail to develop fully112. 
Besides that, all the BRICS countries have been capital importers – and consequently 
source-based countries – that are progressively becoming capital exporters and assuming 
residence country roles113. This duality is revealed by the BRICS countries tax treaty 
history, which reflects a path of increasing economic power and decreasing dependence on 
attracting foreign investments114.  According to Diane Ring, “this duality is important in 
shaping their influence on the OECD, their ability to act as a unified group and their 
likelihood of representing the interests of developing groups outside the BRICS group”115. 
The necessity of the BRICS countries in improving their domestic tax laws and tax treaty 
networks – essentially because of their unique position as emerging economies – is also 
one commonality between them. This mutual necessity reflects in the interest these 
countries have in cooperating with each other:  
There are significant differences in [the BRICS] economic position, as 
reflected in their tax treaty policy. There are, however, also commonalities, 
such as rapidly growing economies which require major public investments 
in education and infrastructure to continue realizing the planned growth for 
the benefit of more groups among their large – and often, still very poor – 
                                                
112 Ibid at 22. 
113 Diane Ring explains that the BRICS countries connect two economic realities: one where outside 
investment is still the most defining economic feature, and another ne where tax policy decisions 
are also base on the ability to invest abroad. Diane Ring, “Institutional Aspects” in Yariv Brauner 
and Pasquale Pistone, eds, BRICS and the Emergence of International Tax Coordination 
(Amsterdam: IBFD, 2015) 469. 
114 Ibid at 475. 
115 Ibid at 471. 
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populations. Thus, there is a shared interest in improving domestic and 
international tax law and treaties so as to facilitate such growth, as well as 
in capacity building within tax administrations to effectively deal with more 
complicated tax rules and to achieve the needed increase in government 
revenue. In view of this, there is no doubt a shared interest for the BRICS 
countries to exchange experiences and to support each other in these 
areas116.  
Therefore, although it is not clear whether the BRICS countries could act as an unified 
group, the way their economies have developed over time may give rise to common 
interests and understandings regarding international tax policies, which may be different 
from the perspectives of OECD countries117. The main concern is that, if the BRICS 
dissonant positions from the OECD are the principal link between them, then it will always 
be easier for them to merely express their opposition to ‘Western’ policies and institutions 
than to develop a cohesive international tax policy agenda or concrete proposals on 
reforming the existing system. 
3.3 The Tax Systems of the BRICS: Similarities and 
Differences 
The tax systems of the BRICS, reflecting their economic, political and social 
characteristics, have considerable differences between them. Regarding the BRICS 
countries’ tax burdens, for instance, it is possible to note a significant dissimilarity between 
India, which has the lowest tax burden of approximately 12% of GDP and Brazil, which 
has the highest tax burden of around 38% of the GDP. In general, the BRICS tax burdens 
are below the OECD average level, except for Brazil and South Africa118. The tax structures 
                                                
116 Jan J.P. de Goede, “The BRICS Countries in the Context of the Work on the UN Model” in 
Yariv Brauner and Pasquale Pistone, eds, BRICS and the Emergence of International Tax 
Coordination (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2015) 421 at 442-443. 
117 Eva Eberhartinger and Matthias Petutschnig, “The Dissenting Opinion of BRICS Practitioners 
on the BEPS Agenda” (2017) 32 Australian Tax Forum 1 at 7. 
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of the BRICS countries are also contrasting: Brazil gives greater importance to taxes on 
consumption, while Russia and South Africa rely more heavily on taxes on income and 
profits119.  
These dissimilarities can be attributed mainly to the different economic roles played by 
each of the BRICS countries in the global market. In terms of foreign direct investment, 
for example, China is a major FDI recipient whereas India receives smaller amounts120, 
which may influence the variations in how these countries deal with the competitiveness 
of their tax systems. The level of informality is also notably different in the BRICS 
countries – India has the largest informal economy between them and Russia has the 
smallest121 – affecting the range of their tax bases as well as the level of simplicity and 
practicability of their tax systems. 
One similarity between the BRICS countries in their tax systems is that all five countries 
are more likely to prioritize source-taxation than more developed countries, where the 
OECD Model Tax Treaty is usually strictly followed. According to Kim Brooks: 
They [the BRICS] stake this ground in different ways in negotiating their 
bilateral tax treaties: sometimes by raising the threshold for the taxation of 
business income, sometimes by negotiating to increase the amount of 
income that might be allocated to a permanent establishment, sometimes by 
pushing for higher withholding tax rates on interest returns, often by trying 
to explicitly ensure that technical services may be taxed at sources, and 
usually by preserving source taxation of other income122. 
Nevertheless, comparing the BRICS countries’ present international tax policies to the 
policies they had in the past – before 2001, when the Goldman Sachs’ paper grouped them 
                                                
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid at 359. 
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122 Kim Brooks, “International Tax Policy: The Counter-Story Presented by the BRICS” in Yariv 
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– it is possible to note that all of them are advancing towards reducing taxation at source123. 
The extent of this reduction varies between the BRICS countries because, since each one 
of them has reached a different stage of development in becoming a capital exporting 
country, their tax policies are also different. In this sense, while China and India encourage 
its resident companies to invest abroad, Brazil still sees itself as a capital importing country 
and Russia, until recently, saw the possibility of investing abroad with suspicion124. 
3.4 BRICS Institutional Aspects 
Economic power does not always convert to influence in international politics; however, 
in the case of the BRICS, it is possible to see how these countries are being able to 
transform their economic potential into political influence in some areas of international 
governance. All the BRICS countries are currently members of relevant international 
institutions, such as the UN, the World Trade Organization and the G20, being active 
participants in their meetings and initiatives. In parallel, the BRICS have also been growing 
their international influence as a pluralistic summit institution.  
Thus, this section studies the institutional aspects of the BRICS in the international tax and 
transfer pricing arena, analyzing its performance as a group and its interaction and 
influence among new institutions and initiatives, namely the International Tax Dialogue, 
the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes and the 
G20125. 
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3.4.1 The BRICS as a Group 
The BRICS are a group of countries that seek to strengthen the relations of its members 
among themselves and, at the same time, to exert an international influence on matters 
where they have a common interest. In 2006, Brazil, Russia, India and China held – in 
parallel to a UN General Assembly meeting in New York – their first meeting as the group 
BRIC. Nevertheless, the group’s first joint document was only published after the First 
Ministerial Meeting of the BRICs held in Russia in 2008. In this communiqué, the BRICs 
representatives declared the need for a more democratic international system, including 
through the expansion of the UN Security Council and incorporation of Brazil and India as 
permanent members126. In this first communiqué, it is already possible to observe the 
BRICs intention of transforming global governance in favour of a greater sharing in the 
decision-making process of global matters. 
In 2009, the BRICs had another meeting, in which the group’s main discussion was the 
2008 financial crisis and its repercussions in the world economy. Although the crisis had 
originated in developed countries, its effects were also suffered in a greater extent by poorer 
nations127. For this reason, the BRICs reiterated the discussion during the G20 meeting in 
April 2009, emphasizing the need for the international system to improve on: a) democratic 
and transparent decision-making in international financial organizations; b) 
implementation of a more solid legal basis; c) compatibility between activities of national 
regulatory institutions and international standards-setting bodies; and d) strengthening risk 
management and supervisory practices128. 
                                                
126 BRICS Information Centre, “BRICs Foreign Affairs Minister’s Meeting Joint Communiqué” 
(2008) University of Toronto, online: <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2012/2012-0619-
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127 BRICS Information Centre, “Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries’ Leaders, Yekaterinburg, 
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In 2010, the BRICs meeting occurred in Brazil and the countries’ representatives continued 
to address the 2008 economic crisis in their final communiqué, resonating the previous 
year's discussion on the management and participation of emerging and developing nations 
in the Bretton Woods institutions (The International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank)129. In 2011, in their annual meeting held in China, the BRICS were joined by South 
Africa. In this meeting communiqué, the BRICS emphasized the need to coordinate their 
multilateral agendas, both in economic matters as well as in the areas of international 
security and human rights protection130. 
In 2012, the BRICS annual meeting took place in India, where, essentially, all the 
commitments made during the other meeting were reaffirmed131. The 2013 BRICS summit 
was one of the most productive meetings of the group. The BRICS investigated the 
feasibility of establishing a Development Bank focused on financing infrastructure projects 
in emerging countries, with an initial quota of $ 100 billion USD. In this meeting, the 
BRICS Development Banks signed the "Multilateral Agreement on Cooperation and Co-
financing for Sustainable Development" and the "Multilateral Agreement on Infrastructure 
and Co-financing for Africa”132. 
With respect to tax cooperation, in 2012, BRICS finance ministers and central bank 
governors held a meeting in the United States, in which they agreed to develop a 
cooperative approach on international taxation, transfer pricing, exchange of information, 
tax evasion and tax avoidance matters133. This lead to a first meeting, occurred in 2013, 
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Statement, Brasília, April 15, 2010” (2010) University of Toronto, online: < 
http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/100415-leaders.html>. 
130 BRICS Information Centre, “BRICS Reports” (2011) University of Toronto, online: < 
http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/reports/index.html>. 
131 BRICS Information Centre, “Fourth BRICS Sumit: Delhi Declaration, New Delhi, March 29, 
2012” (2012) University of Toronto, online: <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/120329-delhi-
declaration.html>. 
132 BRICS Information Centre, “Statement by BRICS Leaders on the Establishment of the BRICS-
Led Development Bank” (2013) University of Toronto, online: < 
http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/130327-brics-bank.html>. 
133 South Africa Ministry of International Relations and Cooperation, “First Meeting of Finance 
  
36 
between the BRICS heads of revenue, during which they deliberated on issues of common 
concern regarding tax administration, international taxation, transfer pricing, cross-border 
tax evasion and tax dispute mechanisms134. One of the identified areas of tax policy and tax 
administration for extending the BRICS mutual cooperation was "contributing to the 
“development of international standards on international taxation and transfer pricing 
taking into account the aspirations of developing countries in general and BRICS countries 
in particular”135. According to David Spencer, the choice of the words “international 
standards on transfer pricing” was not coincidental, as the OECD claims that the ALP and 
its guidelines are both the “international standard”136.  
A multilateral cooperation approach was also deliberated in this meeting, as stated by the 
BRICS heads of revenue in their 2013 communiqué: 
We also agree to establish a central point of contact in each of the BRICS 
Countries for coordination of issues relating to taxation. The central points 
of contacts will identify issues of common interest in areas of International 
Taxation and Transfer Pricing and will develop a common response, 
interact and meet regularly, including pre-meeting before important 
multilateral meetings.  The agreed common response of the BRICS 
countries would be communicated to international organisations engaged in 
development of standards on International Taxation and Transfer Pricing137. 
                                                
Ministers”, BRICS, online: <http://brics5.co.za/about-brics/sectorial-declaration/financial-
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134 BRICS Information Centre, “Communiqué of BRICS Heads of Revenue Meeting, Delhi, 
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In 2015, the BRICS heads of revenue met again to discuss potential areas of cooperation 
in reaching a “globally fair and modern tax system”138. In this regard, the BRICS 
representatives welcomed the final package of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) 
Action Plan measures, acknowledging transfer pricing as one of the areas of priority139. 
3.4.1.1 The Debate Regarding the BRICS Performance as an 
International Institution 
There is a continuing discussion regarding the BRICS performance as a group, particularly 
about how and why their summits occurred and have been developed. Some authors, such 
as O’Neill, view the BRICS as a group with little importance to its countries or to the global 
community in general140. This school of thought highlights the political and economic 
differences141 among the countries and the lack of mutual interests as obstacles to achieving 
some relevant developments, such as a reform in the UN Security Council, advocated by 
the group in their 2008 summit142. In a similar sense, some authors have the understanding 
that the BRICS are only one of the many groups of emerging economies that arose in the 
last decades, with these other groups having more possibilities of providing better global 
governance and influence because of their more reliable democratic political systems143.  
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Other authors argue that, although the BRICS are increasingly becoming more influential, 
they are still far from forming a “unified political alliance”144. Therefore, even though the 
BRICS represent a challenge to many aspects of the current international system 
“functionality, scope, legitimacy and authority”, the interests and differences between their 
members impede that they effectively change the “structural power” of the existing 
international order145. 
A different position is adopted by Nikonov, who sees the BRICS as an expression of the 
unified political will of these emerging countries to create a new international institutional 
balance. For the author, the BRICS act as a developing and emerging country coalition that 
tries to shift the existing balance of global political influence – which is undemocratic and 
unipolar, failing to offer opportunities for all countries – from the West to the developing 
world146. Identifying the BRICS similarities as large, emerging post-colonial powers as 
well as the failure of the G7 in adequately accommodating their power and interests, this 
school of thought understands the BRICS as competitors to the G8 and G20. 
A more moderate view is taken by Kirton147 and Luckhurst148 who see the BRICS as a 
cooperator with the international system and its leading industrialized states. Considering 
the membership of all BRICS countries in the G20, these authors note the tendency of the 
BRICS to voice their dissent positions in reasonable and diplomatic terms: 
                                                
144 According to Xing Li, the BRICS “still have a long way to go before they can manage to find 
the common ground necessary to act as a unified geopolitical alliance”. Xing Li, “Introduction: 
Understanding the Hegemony and the Dialetics of the Emerging World Order” in Xing Li, ed, The 
BRICS and Beyond: The International Political Economy of the Emergence of a New Order 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2014) 1.  
145 Xing Li and Oscar Agustín, “Constructing and Conceptualizing ‘Interdependent Hegemony’ in 
an Era of the Rise of the BRICS and Beyond” in Xing Li, ed, The BRICS and Beyond: The 
International Political Economy of the Emergence of a New Order (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014) 53. 
146 Vyacheslav Nikonov, “BRICS Represents a Challenge to Western Domination” (2015) Russkiy 
Mir Foundation, online: < http://www.russkiymir.ru/en/publications/140423/>. 
147 John Kirton, “Prospects for the BRICS and G20 summits through China’s contribution” (2013) 
University of Toronto, online: < http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/commentary/130322-kirton-
peoplesdaily.html>. 
148 Jonathan Luckhurst, “Building Cooperation between the BRICS and Leading Industrialized 
States” (2013) 4:2 Latin America Policy 251 at 264. 
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Strategic, political, and economic differences between the BRICS make it 
unlikely they will constitute an anti-western alliance and try to transform 
inter- national economic norms, for example, by undermining the United 
States and other wealthy states. Their preference for enhancing 
multilateralism in international relations is not a radical new political–
economic agenda, but simply intended to gain leverage within existing 
mechanisms. Increasing incorporation of the BRICS in key institutions and 
forums such as the WTO, IMF, G20, and FSB indicates that their focus is 
to become more influential through dialogue and cooperation, not 
confrontation. Despite occasional evidence from Russia and Brazil that 
contestation could increase, the Chinese government has consistently 
prioritized multilateral cooperation and leadership through existing 
institutions and practices in international and Asian regional contexts. This 
is a consequence of their appreciation of the nonzero-sum effects of 
complex interdependence, especially in relations with the United States149. 
3.4.2 The International Tax Dialogue 
The International Tax Dialogue (ITD) is an initiative of the European Commission, the 
Inter-American Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the OECD, 
the World Bank and the Inter-American Center of Tax Administrations150. The ITD 
organizes periodic global and regional conferences to discuss policy and administration 
issues, aiming to encourage and facilitate the debate of tax matters among tax officials, 
regional tax organizations, international organizations and other key stakeholders151. 
                                                
149 Ibid. 
150 The International Tax Dialogue, “International Tax Dialogue”, online: < 
http://www.itdweb.org>. 
151 Ibid. 
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The ITD has held five global conferences to date, two of them being hosted in BRICS 
countries152. Each of these global conferences were attended by senior representatives from 
approximately 90 countries, having focused on matters such as “Tax and 
Intergovernmental Relations”, “Tax and Inequality” and “Financial Institutions and 
Instruments”153. This initiative, by promoting the strengthening of cooperation between tax 
administrations at the global level, expands the opportunity to participate in the 
international tax debate to more countries, including the BRICS. The ITD, therefore, is one 
more forum where the BRICS countries can coordinate tax policies, share their best 
practices and contribute to the development of information tools. 
3.4.3 The Platform for Collaboration on Tax 
The Platform for Collaboration on Tax (PCT) was launched in April 2016 as a joint effort 
between the IMF, the OECD, the UN and the World Bank Group154. The members of the 
PCT have regular meetings with representatives from developing countries, regional tax 
organizations and banks155. The PCT aims to intensify the cooperation between these 
international organizations on tax matters in order to better support governments in 
addressing the challenges they face in the area of international taxation156. Therefore, the 
Platform provides a framework for: 
1. Producing concrete joint outputs and deliverables under an agreed work 
plan, implemented in collaboration by all or selected IOs, and leveraging 
each institution’s own work program and comparative advantage. The 
outputs may cover a variety of domestic and international tax matters. 2. 
Strengthening dynamic interactions between standard setting, capacity 
building and technical assistance (experience and knowledge from capacity 
                                                
152 The five global conferences were held in Italy (2005), Argentina (2007), China (2009), India 
(2011) and Morocco (2013). Ibid. 
153 Ibid. 
154 OECD, “Platform for Collaboration on Tax”, online: <http://www.oecd.org/ctp/platform-for-
collaboration-on-tax.htm>. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid. 
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building work feeding into standard setting and vice-versa, including timing 
of implementation). 3. Sharing information on activities more 
systematically, including on country level activities157.  
One of the main activities performed by the PCT is the development of appropriate tools 
for developing countries regarding international tax matters, including those dealt under 
the BEPS initiative158. Recognizing that the taxation of MNEs covers a number of issues, 
which affect all countries, the PCT develops toolkits to assist developing countries to 
address a set of these issues and to protect their tax bases.  
In June 2017, the PCT published a toolkit in the area of transfer pricing named “Addressing 
Difficulties in Accessing Comparables Data for Transfer Pricing Analyses”, which 
specifically addresses how developing countries can overcome the lack of data necessary 
to apply transfer pricing rules159. 
3.4.4 The Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of 
Information 
The Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information (“The Global Forum”) 
was formed in the early 2000s as an OECD initiative to address the obstacles to tax 
compliance created by non-cooperative countries. Originally, the Global Forum members 
were OECD countries and other countries that had agreed to implement transparency and 
exchange of information measures. In 2009, the Global Forum was restructured and now 
has 143 members – including all of the BRICS countries – on equal footing, being the 
“premier international body for ensuring the implementation of transparency and exchange 
of information in the tax area”160. 
                                                
157 International Monetary Fund, “The Platform for Collaboration on Tax: Concept Note”, online: 
< https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2016/pdf/pr16176.pdf>. 
158 Ibid. 
159 For an analysis of the BRICS countries’ influence on the PCT Toolkit for Addressing Difficulties 
in Accessing Comparables Data for Transfer Pricing Analyses, see Section 5.1.1. 
160 OECD, “Global Forum on Transparency and exchange of Information for Tax Purposes”, online: 
< http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/>.  
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According to F. Alfredo Prats, The Global Forum is an example of institution that 
represents the new international tax order that is being developed. This new order is based 
on two principles: a) effective taxation of cross-border income; and b) transparency and 
cooperation (in order to enable the effective application of the previous principle). For the 
author, the new international tax order relies on the cooperation of the whole international 
community and, to achieve this, international consensus is essential161. It is in this context 
that the BRICS may play an important role in helping to conciliate the tax policies and 
demands of developed and developing countries to achieve global consensus on 
international tax matters. 
3.4.5 The G20 
The Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, or G20, is a forum 
for international cooperation composed by 19 members from the 25 largest national 
economies plus one member representing the European Union162. The current members of 
the G20 are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union163. The G20 is a 
pivotal group in the creation of cooperation mechanisms and international standards. Thus, 
the development of international tax policies is one of the main issues in its political 
agenda164. 
                                                
161 Prats, supra note 125. 
162 “The 19 countries represented individually are not necessarily the top 19 economies in any given 
year, and there are additional members beyond that 19+1: the CEOs of the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank, the International Monetary and Finance Committee, the Development 
Committee of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, and the European Central Bank. 
G20 has been a convenient shorthand emphasizing the number of member-states (plus the European 
Union), and succeeding the G33 and G22 in 1999”. Bill Kte’Pi, Encyclopedia of Business in 
Today’s World (2009) sub verbo “G20”, online: 
<http://sk.sagepub.com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/reference/businesstoday/n456.xml>. 
163 OECD, “G20 Members”, OECD and the G20, online: <http://www.oecd.org/g20/g20-
members.htm>. 
164 Prats, supra note 125. 
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The political influence of the BRICS can be observed not only in the group’s increasing 
institutionalization – developed throughout their annual summits – but also in their 
participation in the G20 summits. The G20 provides an opportunity for the BRICS to “have 
a leading role in addressing the issues and linking the legitimate demands of developed and 
developing countries, while recognizing the position of economic drivers and operators”165. 
China, for instance, has been acting as a cautious but always essential and effective global 
leader in G20 governance, advocating for incremental reforms rather than a radical 
replacement of the existing institutionalized system and operating in co-leadership with 
other members, especially the BRICS166.  
Notwithstanding their influential positions as individual countries, according to Kristen 
Hopewell167 and Stefan Schrim168, the BRICS countries have not coherently acted together 
to create and drive a BRICS agenda in global governance in the context of the G20. 
However, when there are common interests, the BRICS have a record of coordination, such 
as when they had a uniform position opposing the bank taxes proposed by the IMF in the 
2010 G20 meeting169. Their participation in the G20, therefore, may be an indication of the 
group’s choice to operate “inside the system as a loosely coordinated bargaining group”170, 
focusing on their common interests and, more regularly, on particular interests of the 
individual BRICS countries and not counterbalancing current dominant countries and 
institutions. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter explored the economic, legal and institutional aspects involved in the 
establishment of the BRICS as an association between fast-growing emerging countries. 
                                                
165 Prats, supra note 125 at 418-419. 
166 John Kirton, China’s G20 Leadership (New York, Routledge, 2016) at 9. 
167 Kristen Hopewell, “Different paths to power: The rise of Brazil, India and China at the World 
Trade Organization (2015) 22:2 Review of International Political Economy 311.  
168 Stefan Schirm, “Leaders in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance” 
(2009)16:2 European Journal of International Relations 197.  
169 Salman Shaheen, “The Future for BRICS Tax Policy Coordination” (2012) International Tax 
Review. 
170 Pistone and Brauner, supra 100 at 4. 
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The reason for grouping the BRICS countries is not obvious, as their policies and politics 
diverge; they are not geographically close; their economies do not necessarily supplement 
each other; and some of their interests diverge. However, they are all large emerging 
economies who share economic and politic concerns, one of them being the dominance of 
Western powers over the international tax agenda. This dominance is reflected, in the area 
of transfer pricing, in the OECD’s perceived authority in developing international transfer 
pricing standards, such as the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, as discussed in Chapter 
2. Thus, the next chapter will analyze the transfer pricing rules of the BRICS countries and 
how they differ from the standard approach established by the OECD and from each other.  
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Chapter 4  
4 Transfer Pricing Rules in the BRICS Countries 
Establishing a suitable regulation for transfer pricing issues is extremely important for the 
BRICS countries as the manipulation of prices by MNEs can be an even more damaging 
problem for developing and emerging economies171. In this sense, considering that the 
BRICS have developed their international tax policies “with an eye to the approach 
suggested by the OECD, but not necessarily in conformity with its structures”172, this 
chapter discuss the transfer pricing regulations of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa. Each of these countries is analyzed in a separate section, comprehending the 
historical development of their transfer pricing rules, their current transfer pricing law as 
well as peculiarities and challenges they face in its application. 
4.1 Brazil 
The legal treatment of transfer pricing in Brazil is a highly complex and relatively 
new matter which, although demonstrating the concern of adapting itself to the 
international scenario, has departed significantly from it, giving excessive attention 
to the preservation of the national tax base, although in disagreement with the 
arm’s length principle itself and with the international parameters173. 
4.1.1 Introduction 
Brazilian transfer pricing legislation was only enacted in 1996, following an important 
legal reform that moved Brazil’s tax system from a territorial system to taxing MNE’s 
                                                
171 Transfer pricing is “among the most compelling explanations” for the lack of a correlation 
between foreign capital flows and poverty alleviation, since the combination of transfer pricing and 
tax havens has put developing and emerging countries into a very difficult position. Edmund 
Malesky, “Transfer Pricing and Global Poverty” (2015) International Studies Review 669. 
172 Brooks, supra note 117 at 447. 
173 Rodrigo Bernardes Braga, “Preços de Transferência: Novas Regras Estão Fora da Realidade 
Econômica” (2009) Consultor Jurídico, online: <http://www.conjur.com.br/2009-jul-01/regras-
precos-transferencia-fora-realidade-economica>. 
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worldwide income, according to a residence-based taxation. The country has received 
substantial amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the past years and it is considered 
– as other developing and emerging economies – a capital importing country, since its 
inward FDI stocks exceed its outward FDI stocks174. In this context, considering the 
increasing importance of foreign income to the Brazilian economy, the development of 
Brazil’s transfer pricing rules was an important stage in preventing the allocation of taxable 
income abroad. The country’s transfer pricing peculiarity, nonetheless, is that Brazilian 
rules were established with significant deviations from the international standards 
implemented by the OECD’s member countries. 
The objective of this section is to review some aspects of the Brazilian transfer pricing 
regime and to demonstrate how some positions deviating from the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines are commonly found in Brazil’s transfer pricing law. This section is structured 
as follows: a) historical background and the development of transfer pricing rules in Brazil; 
b) transfer pricing regulations in Brazil, in which Brazilian transfer pricing methods for 
import and export transactions will be analyzed; and c) peculiarities and challenges in 
Brazil’s transfer pricing practices, in which the use of predetermined margins, location-
specific advantages and intangible regulations in the country will be reviewed. 
4.1.2 Historical Background: The development of Transfer Pricing 
Rules in Brazil 
Until 1995, Brazil adopted a territorial approach175 regarding the taxation of MNEs, 
according to which only income earned from sources located inside its territory could be 
                                                
174 Isabel Calich and João Dácio Rolim, “Transfer Pricing Disputes in Brazil” in Eduardo 
Baistrocchi and Ian Roxan, eds, Resolving Transfer Pricing Disputes (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015) 519 at 520. 
175 According to the territorial principle, there is a taxation only of the income derived from sources 
located in the territory of the taxing State, irrespective of other characteristics which may be 
involved, such as nationality or residence. In order to apply a territorial taxation of MNEs, the 
criterion for the delimitation of tax jurisdiction used was that of material connection, that is, the 
effective source of income. Therefore, Brazil only allowed the taxation of the income sources that 
were originated within its territorial limits. Alberto Xavier, Direito Tributário Internacional do 
Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2010) 20-21.  
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taxed, excluding any foreign income earned by an enterprise – either directly by performing 
activities abroad or indirectly through associated enterprises – from liability for Brazilian 
tax176. However, because of the increasing importance of foreign income to the Brazilian 
economy and to its tax system, in December 1995, Brazil moved to the worldwide taxation 
of MNEs income with the promulgation of Law no. 9,249, which established the 
requirement to include profits, income and capital gains earned abroad in the Brazilian tax 
basis177. Thus, Brazil changed its previous position and began to tax not only the income 
produced inside its territory but also the income produced abroad by resident enterprises. 
Following this change in its tax system, Brazil enacted its first transfer pricing legislation 
(Law no. 9,430)178 in 1996. Until 1996, the manipulation of prices in transactions between 
related persons was regulated in Articles 72 and 73 of Law no. 4,506, promulgated in 
1964179. According to Article 72, transactions could be considered ‘disguised distribution 
of profits’ when they involved the sale or acquisition of goods in the domestic market for 
a notoriously lower or above market value, meaning that the enterprise was acting in the 
interest of the other related party rather than according to its own interest180. In these cases, 
unless the taxpayer proved that the business was carried out in the interest of the enterprise 
and under the same conditions in which the enterprise would contract with third parties, a 
50% tax rate was applied by Brazilian tax authorities181. Although it could be possible to 
argue that Law 4,506 was enough to prevent international transfer pricing schemes, in 
                                                
176 Calich and Rolim, supra note 163 at 523. 
177 Article 25: “Profits, income and capital gains earned abroad shall be included in the 
determination of the corporate profits corresponding to the balance sheet as of December 31 of 
each year”. Law 9,249, Brazil 1995, Article 25. 
178 Law 9,430, Brazil 1996. 
179 Law 4,506, Brazil 1964. 
180 The original objective of Law 4,506 was to avoid that, using some hypotheses casuistically 
defined in Article 72, the partner or shareholder (or some other related person) and the company 
would receive some advantages due to the practice of ‘disguised distribution of profit’. Law 4,506, 
Brazil 1964, Article 72. 
181 Law 4,506, Brazil 1964, Article 73. 
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practice, these rules were never substantially applied by Brazilian tax authorities in the 
context of international transactions between related companies182. 
While Brazil did not develop specific transfer pricing legislation until 1996, the country’s 
double taxation agreement network183 reproduced the provision contained in paragraph 1 
of Article 9 of the OECD and UN Model Conventions. Article 9 established the possibility 
of an adjustment in the transfer prices of transactions between related companies resident 
in the contracting countries, according to the arm's length standard. Nonetheless, this treaty 
provision –  even with the domestic regulation regarding ‘disguised distribution of profits’ 
– was not considered to be applicable by Brazilian tax authorities without the existence of 
an internal transfer pricing law that expressly authorized any adjustments. Another relevant 
aspect regarding Brazilian double taxation agreements is that the country, without 
exception, did not include the provision contained in paragraph 2 of Article 9, i.e., the 
country did not commit itself to the obligation of granting the correlative adjustment, 
revealing the apparent disregard of Brazil for economic double taxation184. 
It was against this background that Law 9,430 introduced a more decisive and precise 
control regarding international transfer pricing in Brazil. The enactment of the Brazilian 
transfer pricing legislation aimed to avoid the manipulation of prices by MNEs on imports 
and exports between associated companies and the consequent allocation of taxable income 
abroad185. Hence, while the OECD’s transfer pricing rules have the goal of identifying the 
                                                
182 Ricardo Gregorio, Arm’s Length e Praticabilidade nos Preços de Transferência  (DCL Thesis, 
Universidade de São Paulo, Faculty of Law, 2010) [unpublished]. 
183 Until the enactment of its transfer pricing legislation (Law 9,430) in 1996, Brazil had signed 21 
double taxation agreements. This number increased and, currently, Brazil has 28 double taxation 
agreements in force. Receita Federal do Brasil, Acordos Internacionais, online: 
<www.receita.fazenda.gov.br>.  
184 Brazilian disregard for economic double taxation consequences in its transfer pricing 
adjustments was emphasized when Brazil, acting as an observer non-member country, included an 
observation in the OECD Model Convention on Income and on Capital Commentaries, in which it 
reserved the right not to insert paragraph 2 in its conventions. See “OECD Model Tax Convention” 
supra note 23 at 1225. 
185 Calich and Rolim, supra note 163 at 525. 
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price that would have been agreed between independent enterprises186, Brazilian rules were 
introduced as mechanisms to control and combat tax avoidance schemes187, which explains 
why the transfer pricing legislation in Brazil determines a maximum price for deductible 
expenses on imports and a minimum profit rate on exports in transactions between 
associated enterprises188, as will be discussed below. 
4.1.3 Transfer Pricing Rules in Brazil 
Transfer pricing is currently regulated in Brazil by Law 9,430 – recently updated by Law 
12,715/2012189 – and other administrative regulations issued by the Brazilian Federal 
Revenue Office (BFRO)190, among which, one of the most significant regulations is 
Normative Instruction no. 243/02191. Aiming to deal with tax avoidance through transfer 
pricing arrangements, these provisions cover transactions between “associated persons”, 
transactions between a Brazilian resident and corporations or individuals resident in low-
tax jurisdictions (countries with no income taxes or with income tax rates lower than 
20%)192 and preferential tax regime’s transactions193, irrespective of whether the two parties 
                                                
186 The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines argue that “the consideration of transfer pricing should 
not be confused with the consideration of problems of tax fraud or tax avoidance, even though 
transfer pricing policies may be used for such purpose”. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines supra 
note 10. 
187 According to Heleno Tôrres, at the time of the development of Law 9,430, Brazilian tax 
authorities had the perception that foreign enterprises operating in Brazil were not officially 
remitting their profits abroad, which made them believe that the manipulation of prices was the 
way these enterprises found to remit their profits to its parent companies. Heleno Tôrres, Direito 
Tributário Internacional: Planejamento Tributário e Operações Transnacionais (São Paulo: 
Revista dos Tribunais, 2001) 165-166. 
188 Calich and Rolim, supra note 163 at 525. 
189 Law 9,430/1996 was modified by Law 9,959/2000, Law 10,451/2002, Law 11,727/2008, 
Provisional Measure 478/2009, and more recently by Law 12,715 of September 2012. 
190 The Brazilian Federal Revenue Office is a specific body, subordinate to the Ministry of Finance, 
performing essential functions so that the State can fulfill its objectives. It is responsible for the 
administration of federal taxes, including those incidents on foreign trade, covering a significant 
part of the country's social contributions. Receita Federal do Brasil, Institucional, online: 
<www.receita.fazenda.gov.br>.  
191 Normative Instruction no. 243, Brazil 2002. 
192 In order to facilitate the identification – for taxpayers and for tax authorities – of low-tax 
jurisdictions, these countries are listed in administrative regulations published by the BFRO. 
193 Preferential tax regime’s transactions are those performed with persons resident or domiciled 
abroad benefiting from: a) favored taxation of income earned within or outside its territory; b) tax 
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qualify as associated enterprises. According to the Brazilian rules, specifically in Articles 
18 and 19 of Law no. 9,430, the association between parties acts as an absolute presumption 
of the transfer price’s manipulation194, i.e., there is an assumption that all intra-group 
transactions necessarily attribute unreal prices for its goods as a way of shifting profits to 
other jurisdictions. This assumption goes against OECD’s Guidelines understanding, 
according to which “tax administrations should not automatically assume that associated 
enterprises have sought to manipulate their profits”195. 
Regarding the transactions covered by Brazilian transfer pricing rules, Law no. 9.430 is 
applied to goods, services and rights, imported or exported196. The idea is to establish a 
generic definition able to encompass all transactions carried out between related enterprises 
that involve the payment of a price as compensation for the advantage obtained with the 
acquisition of ownership of a good, a service or the enjoyment of a right. In this context, 
goods include tangible and intangible property; services include those provided between 
related parties (intra-group) and those established in cost-sharing contracts; and rights 
include different rights to use other parties’ properties, which entail different forms of 
remuneration, such as rents, interest and premiums. Although similar to the international 
standards, the scope of transactions controlled by Brazilian law has one important 
peculiarity: transactions involving royalty payments and technology transfers to a foreign 
country are expressly excluded from transfer pricing rules197. 
                                                
advantages independent of the performance of a substantive economic activity or; c) non-disclosure 
of information of a corporate, commercial or economic nature. Law 9,430, Brazil 1996, Article 24. 
194 According to Article 18 of Law 9,430/1996, all the “costs, expenses and charges related to 
goods, services and rights, contained in the import or acquisition documents, in operations carried 
out with a related person, will only be deductible in determining the actual profit up to the amount 
that does not exceed the price determined through the methods”.  Law 9,430, Brazil 1996, Article 
18. 
195 Supra 11 at 25. 
196 Law 9,430, Brazil 1996, Article 18. 
197 Law 9,430, Brazil 1996, Article 18, para 9. These transactions must be registered with the 
Brazilian Intellectual Property Agency and the Brazilian Central Bank. Alina Miyake and Fernando 
Tonanni, Brazil - Corporate Taxation sec. 7.2, Country Surveys IBFD. 
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Despite following the ALP198 and the elementary methodology suggested by the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines – Brazil has 32 income tax treaties currently in force and all 
of them reiterate Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty’s dispositions – Brazilian transfer 
pricing rules deviate from OECD’s conventional methods, which are primarily based on 
comparison, and adopt predetermined profit margins199. In this context, it is possible to 
observe that the Brazilian transfer pricing law created a legal fiction, according to which, 
if the “price practiced”200 is higher on imports or lower on exports than the “parameter 
price”201, the first must be adjusted in accordance to the latter202. In other words, the transfer 
pricing law establishes limits of maximum prices for import transactions and minimum 
prices for export transactions203. 
Therefore, there are two main aspects in which Brazilian transfer pricing law departs from 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. First, Brazil subjects to a unitary regulation cross-
border transactions between related enterprises – exclusive object of most international 
                                                
198 The influence of the OECD and its arm’s length principle was expressly recognized in the 
Explanatory Memorandum following the enactment of Law 9,430/1996, which stated that: “the 
rules contained in Articles 18 to 24 represent a significant advance in national legislation in face of 
the relevant process of globalization experienced by contemporary economies. In this specific case, 
in accordance with the rules adopted in the member countries of the OECD, there is a proposition 
of norms that allow the regulation of the so called “Transfer Prices” in order to avoid the damaging 
practice of transferring resources abroad by manipulating prices agreed upon in the importation and 
exportation of goods, services or rights, in transactions with related persons, residents abroad”. 
Explanatory Memorandum, Law 9,430, Brazil 1996. 
199 Luís Schoueri, “Brazil” in Yariv Brauner and Pasquale Pistone, eds, BRICS and the Emergence 
of International Tax Coordination (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2015) 41 at 63 [Schoueri, “Brazil”]. 
200 According to Normative Instruction no. 243/02, the price practiced refers to the weighted 
arithmetic mean of the prices effectively practiced in controlled transactions during the taxation 
period. 
201 The parameter price, as established by Normative Instruction no. 243/02, is the price calculated 
according to one of the transfer pricing methods established in the legislation. 
202 Therefore, according to the Brazilian legal fiction, when a normative hypothesis established in 
the transfer pricing legislation is verified, it must give consequence to the normative prescription 
contained in taxation law, giving rise to an adjustment. Luís Eduardo Schoueri, Preços de 
Transferência no Direito Brasileiro, 2ed (São Paulo: Dialética, 2006) 73. 
203 Ricardo Mariz de Oliveira, “Métodos de Apuração dos Preços de Transferência no Brasil: 
Efeitos da Escolha de um Método e Possibilidade de Indicação de Métodos Diversos. 
Consequências da Falta de Indicaçnao de Métodos” in Luís Eduardo Schoueri, ed, Tributos e 
Preços de Transferência (São Paulo: Dialética, 2009) 156 at 159. 
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transfer pricing regulations – and cross-border transactions between independent 
enterprises when one of them is located in countries of favored taxation204. The other 
divergence is that, while the transfer pricing policy adopted on the basis of the OECD 
recommendations and the US experience is not based on a presumption of artificiality of 
prices between related enterprises, Brazilian law establishes the automatic prevalence of 
the "parameter price" – calculated by legally predetermined methods – regardless of an 
administrative investigation of the case205.  
4.1.3.1 Brazilian Transfer Pricing Methods 
As mentioned, "parameter price" is an idea created by Brazilian transfer pricing law to 
indicate the appropriate transfer price – determined by the methods provided in Law 9,430 
–  which must be compared with the "practiced price" effectively carried out in controlled 
transactions during the tax assessment period. The methods provided in Law 9,430 were 
allegedly inspired by the traditional methods to determine the arm's length price employed 
in the international discipline of transfer pricing. However, while the focus of traditional 
international methods is on price comparability (CUP method) or gross margins (cost plus 
and resale price methods), in Brazil, the comparability is maintained only for CUP-inspired 
methods. As for the methods inspired by cost plus and resale price, the Brazilian legislator 
innovated by predetermining the gross margins that should be applied.  
Regarding the application of the CUP method, the procedures are similar to the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines; however, in regards to the cost plus and the resale price 
methods, Brazilian law establishes fixed margins for gross profit and mark-up instead of 
finding and using comparable transactions206. In addition, although the approach introduced 
by Brazilian transfer pricing law encompasses procedures inspired in traditional transaction 
                                                
204 Xavier, supra note 164 at 367.  
205 Ibis at 368.  
206 UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 358. 
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methods (CUP, cost plus and resale price methods), it does not prescribe the use of 
transactional profit methods (profit split and transactional net margin methods)207. 
Brazilian law has designated the methods differently depending on whether they apply to 
import or export operations208. Accordingly, the transfer pricing methods established by the 
Brazilian law, as well as their corresponding international methods, are analyzed separately 
below. 
4.1.3.1.1 Transfer Pricing Methods for Import Transactions 
Brazilian transfer pricing law provides four methods for establishing the price limit for 
products, services or rights imported by Brazilian resident enterprises.  
Inspired by the CUP method, Article 18, Item I of Law no. 9,430 establishes the 
“Independent Compared Prices” method (Preços Independentes Comparados - PIC), 
according to which the “transfer price is based on the average price of identical or similar 
products or services in purchase and sale transactions carried out in either the internal or 
external market under similar payment conditions”209. 
The “Resale Price Less Margin” method (Preço de Revenda Menos Lucro – PRL), 
established in Article 18, Item II of Law 9,430 and inspired by the resale price method, 
prescribes the determination of the transfer price according to the average resale price of 
                                                
207 Regarding the decision of not allowing the use of profit-based methods or any other transactional 
methods, it results from the perception that the Brazilian legislator exhaustively stated the possible 
methods for the transfer pricing control in the law. The Brazilian Federal Revenue Office (BFRO) 
has already categorically stated its interpretation in this sense, including in cases of transactions 
with companies located in countries with which Brazil has a double taxation agreement. Receita 
Federal do Brasil, Perguntas e Respostas – Pessoa Jurídica – PIR 2009, online: 
<www.receita.fazenda.gov.br>.  
208 “Despite of the fact that Brazilian methodology basically adopts the three traditional transaction 
methods, i.e., CUP, RPM, and CPM, the law differentiates between imports and exports operations, 
by establishing separate sets of rules for imports and exports. It is important because Brazilian 
methodology adopts fixed margins, which are different for import and export operations” Marcos 
Aurélio Pereira Valadão, “Transfer Pricing: Arm’s Length Principle Versus Worldwide Unitary 
Taxation’ Correlative and Secondary Adjustments, and Domestic Legislation Under Brazilian 
Methodology” (2017) Revista Direito Tributário Internacional Atual 270 at 272. 
209 Miyake and Tonanni, supra note 186. 
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goods, services or rights applied by the importer in transactions with independent parties, 
less unconditional discounts, taxes, brokerage fees and profit margins210. These profit 
margins are determined in Article 18, para 12 (recently updated by Law no. 12,725 of 
2012)211 and calculated in accordance with the enterprise’s industrial sector: 
Article 18, Paragraph 12: The margins referred to in item “d” of section II 
shall be applied according to the sector of economic activity of the Brazilian 
legal entity subject to transfer price controls and shall be subject, regardless 
of having a productive process in Brazil or not, in the following percentages: 
I - 40% for the sectors of: A) pharma-chemical and pharmaceutical 
products; B) tobacco products; C) optical, photographic and 
cinematographic equipment and instruments; D) machines, apparatus and 
equipment for medical and hospital dental use; E) extraction of oil and 
natural gas; and F) petroleum products; II - 30% for the sectors of: A) 
chemical products; B) glass and glass products; C) pulp, paper and paper 
products; and D) metallurgy; and III - 20% for the other sectors212.  
The third transfer pricing method for import transactions, according to Article 18, Item III 
of Law 9,430, is the “Production Cost Plus Margin” (Custo de Produção Mais Lucro - 
CPL). As well as its international correspondent method – the cost plus method – this 
Brazilian procedure bases the transfer price on the average of production cost of identical 
or similar products, services or rights in the jurisdiction where they were originally 
produced, increased by taxes paid in such jurisdiction and by a profit margin. The 
particularity is that, unlike the traditional (non-predetermined) cost plus method, the 
Brazilian law establishes a fixed profit margin of 20% rather than determining it based on 
comparables 213 . 
                                                
210 Law 9,430, Brazil 1996, Article 18, Item II. 
211 The fixed margin for the PRL method used to be 20%, which was then altered to provide for 
either 20% or 60% margins, depending on whether the imports were subject to manufacturing in 
Brazil. In 2012, Law no. 12,725 established different margins for certain specific sectors, but in 
general maintained 20% as the prescribed margin. UN Practical Manual, supra note 3 at 358. 
212 Law 9,430, Brazil 1996, Article 18, Para 12. 
213 Law 9,430, Brazil 1996, Article 18, Item III. 
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Finally, Law 12,715 introduced in 2012 the “Quote Price for Imports” method (Preço sob 
Cotação da Importação – PCI), which is mandatorily applicable to import transactions of 
commodities between related companies. In these cases, Brazilian law determines that the 
benchmark is the average price of the daily medium quotes of the commodities negotiated 
in internationally known commodities and future exchanges, adjusted by applicable 
premiums and other variables. In cases where there is an absence of a trading pricing in 
commodities and future exchanges, it is permissible to compare prices to those obtained 
from independent data sources provided by internationally known research institutes. The 
goal of this new method is to avoid discussions regarding the comparability of transactions 
between related parties when there is a defined market that sets the price internationally, 
as it is the case of commodities214. 
A transfer pricing adjustment is required whenever the “practiced price”, i.e., the average 
price paid by the Brazilian importer, exceeds the “parameter price”, i.e., the average price 
determined under transfer pricing methods for import transactions215. Nevertheless, if the 
practiced price paid by the Brazilian importer is less than the parameter price, no tax 
adjustment is necessary. 
4.1.3.1.2 Transfer Pricing Methods for Export Transactions 
Regarding export transactions, Brazilian transfer pricing rules determine that, whenever 
the average sales price of goods, services or rights exported by a Brazilian company in a 
taxable year corresponds to less than 90% of the average price of the same goods, services 
or rights sold in the domestic market, the price of the export transactions shall be defined 
under one of the five methods established by Brazilian law216, which are detailed below. 
The “Comparable Uncontrolled Price for Export Transactions” (Preço de Venda nas 
Exportações – PVEs), described in Article 19, Paragraph 3, Item I of Law 9,430 and based 
                                                
214 Valadão, supra note 197 at 276. 
215 As a consequence of the transfer price adjustment, the excess amount paid will be added to the 
taxable base of the importer. Miyake and Tonanni, supra note 186. 
216 Ibid. 
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on the CUP method, establishes the transfer price according to the average price of identical 
or similar goods, services or rights exported by a Brazilian company to foreign independent 
parties, under similar payment conditions217. 
Inspired by the resale price method, Brazilian transfer pricing rules created two methods 
with the application of fixed profit margins: the “Wholesale Price in the Country of 
Destination Less Profit Margin” method (Preço de Venda por Atacado no País de Destino 
Diminuído de Lucro – PVA) and the “Retail Price in the Country of Destination Less Profit 
Margin” method (Preço de Venda a Varejo no País de Destino Diminuído do Lucro – 
PVV), described in Article 19, Paragraph 3, Items II and III of Law 9,430 as follows: 
Article 19. Paragraph 3, Item II: Wholesale Price in the Country of 
Destination Less Profit Margin Method: defined as the average of the selling 
prices of identical or similar goods in the wholesale market of the country 
of destination, under similar payment terms, reduced from the taxes 
included in the price, charged in that country, and a profit margin of fifteen 
percent on the wholesale price; 
Article 19. Paragraph 3, Item III: Retail Price in the Country of Destination 
Less Profit Margin: defined as the average of the selling prices of identical 
or similar goods in the retail market of the country of destination, under 
similar payment terms, less the taxes included in the price, charged in that 
country, and a profit margin of thirty percent on the retail sale price218. 
The “Acquisition or Production Cost Plus Taxes and Profit Margin” method (Custo de 
Aquisição ou de Produção Mais Tributos e Lucro – CAP) is based on the cost plus method 
and establishes the transfer price of a transactions based on the average acquisition or 
production costs of the exported products, services or rights, increased by taxes and with a 
15% profit margin, calculated on costs and taxes219. 
                                                
217 Law 9,430, Brazil 1996, Article 19, Para 3, Item I. 
218 Law 9,430, Brazil 1996, Article 19, Para 3, Item II and III. 
219 Law 9,430, Brazil 1996, Article 19, Para 3, Item IV. 
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As well as in the Brazilian transfer pricing rules for import transactions, Law 12,715 has 
also introduced a “Quota Price” method (Preço sob Cotação da Exportação – PECEX) for 
export transactions. This method is applied in transactions of commodities between related 
enterprises and its benchmark is the average price of the daily medium quotes of 
commodities negotiated in internationally known commodities and future exchanges, 
adjusted by the applicable premiums and other variables. In cases of absence of a trading 
price in commodities and future exchanges, prices can be compared to those obtained from 
independent data sources provided by internationally known research institutes. 
Regardless of the method adopted220, if the average price applied by the Brazilian enterprise 
in its export transactions (“the actual price”) exceeds the average price obtained under the 
above-mentioned methods (“the parameter price”), no adjustment is required. When the 
actual price is lower than the parameter price, Brazilian tax authorities are entitled to 
perform a transfer pricing adjustment and to add the difference in the price to the taxable 
base221. 
4.1.4 Peculiarities and Challenges in Brazil’s Transfer Pricing 
Practices 
4.1.4.1 The Use of Predetermined Margins and the Arm’s Length 
Principle: A Practical Approach Regarding the Lack of 
Comparables and the Complexity Present in the OECD 
Methodology 
As mentioned above, the idea of a comparability analysis – present in all methods 
developed at the international level – was only maintained in Brazil for CUP inspired 
methods: the “Independent Compared Prices” (PIC)222, the “Comparable Uncontrolled 
                                                
220 If more than one method can be applied, Brazilian Law allows the taxpayer to adopt the method 
which will result in the lower export price. Miyake and Tonanni, supra note 186. 
221 Ibid. 
222 According to the PIC method, comparable prices should be sought in transactions involving 
goods, services or rights, identical or similar, made in the Brazilian or other markets under similar 
payment terms. Law 9,430, Brazil 1996, Article 18, Item I. 
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Price for Export Transactions” (PVE)223, the “Quota Price for Imports” (PCI) and the 
“Quota Price for Exports” (PECEX) methods. As for other transfer pricing methods, there 
is a departure from the international comparability approach as a consequence of the 
Brazilian legislator’s preference for the predetermination of profit margins in fixed 
percentage values224. The following table describes the Brazilian transfer pricing rules in 
comparison with the international methods, particularly those provided in the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines and in the UN Practical Manual: 
Table 1 - Brazilian Transfer Pricing Methods and its International Correspondents 
BRAZILIAN TRANSFER PRICING METHODS 
INTERNATIONAL 
CORRESPONDENT 
METHODS (OECD TP 
GUIDELINES AND UN TP 
MANUAL) Import Transactions Export Transactions 
Independent Compared 
Prices (PIC) 
Comparable Uncontrolled 
Price for Export Transactions 
(PVE) Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) Quota Price for Imports 
(PCI) 
Quota Price for Exports 
(PECEX) 
Resale Price Less Margin 
(PRL)  
20% and other margins 
Wholesale Price in the 
Country of Destination Less 
Profit Margin (PVA) 
15% margins Resale Price Method Retail Price in the Country of 
Destination Less Profit Margin 
(PVV) 
30% margins 
                                                
223 In the PVE method, comparable prices should be sought in transactions involving goods, 
services or rights, identical or similar, made by the company itself to other customers or by another 
domestic exporter, during the same period and under similar payment terms. Law 9,430, Brazil 
1996, Article 19, Para 3, Item I. 
224 As explained by Marcos Aurélio Pereira Valadão (Brazilian Member of the UN Committee of 
Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters), “the methodology introduced by the law 
listed the traditional transaction methods (Cost Plus Method and Resale Price Method) but denied 
the use of transactional profit methods (the Profit Split Method and Transactional Net Margin 
Method) and formulary apportionment. Regarding the CUP Method, for export or imports, the law 
introduced a methodology that is similar to OECD practices. However, with regard to the Cost Plus 
Method and Resale Price Method, instead of making use of comparable transactions, the law 
established fixed margins for gross profits and mark-up”. UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 358. 
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Production Cost Plus Margin 
(CPL) 
20% margins 
Acquisition or Production Cost 
Plus Taxes and Profit Margin 
(CAP) 
15% margins 
Cost Plus Method 
N/A 
Transactional Net Margin 
Method (TNMM) 
Profit Split Method 
 
The use of predetermined margins in the Brazilian transfer pricing legislation is considered 
to be a simplified methodology regarding the application of the ALP225 because such 
margins substitute the numbers that would be found through the comparability analysis 
employed in the OECD approach226. Since the determination of the profits and margins that 
independent parties would have in similar transactions is one of the main difficulties of the 
ALP227, the Brazilian solution of establishing predetermined margins seems to have 
recognized that it would not be possible to acquire this information from either taxpayers 
or tax authorities228.  
In this context, it is possible to maintain that the adoption of predetermined margins 
represents a “compromise between the arm’s length standard and practicability”, especially 
because the use of such margins is not mandatory229. Indeed, in order to lessen Brazilian 
                                                
225 Although the Brazilian rules may resemble the formulary apportionment system – particularly 
because of the use of formulas based on predetermined profit and mark up margins – it is important 
to elucidate that “the Brazilian methodology is indeed a simplification of the traditional transaction 
methods, and the worldwide unitary taxation are more like a transactional profit split method. Brazil 
does not adopt transactional profit methods”. Valadão, supra note 197 at 282. 
226 Ibid. 
227 The determination of profits and margins in these cases require extremely complex calculations, 
extensive market research and considerable market information, which is not always available at 
reasonable costs. Schoueri, “Brazil” supra note 168 at 63. 
228 Indeed, due to a large number of taxpayers and a relatively modest tax administration, 
practicality seems to be one of the motors of the Brazilian transfer pricing system. One example is 
that, because of the complexities of the regular tax system, almost 90% of taxpayers choose to 
apply a simplified taxation approach, in which the taxable profit is established through the 
application of predetermined margins to the gross income of the taxpayer, without allowing 
deductions. Schoueri, “Brazil” supra note 168 at 78-79. 
229 Schoueri, “Brazil” supra note 168 at 63. In the same sense, Marcos Valadão also understands 
that the Brazilian methodology is a simplification of the traditional arm’s length approach, mainly 
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transfer pricing rules departure from the ALP230, the legislator created a procedure for 
changing the predetermined margins in Article 20 and Article 21, Paragraph 2 of Law 
9,430, as it follows: 
Art. 20. In special circumstances, the Minister of Finance may change the 
percentages referred to in Articles 18 and 19, and Items II, III and IV of 
Paragraph 3. 
Art. 21. [...] Paragraph 2. Margins of profit other than those established in 
Articles 18 and 19 may be admitted, provided that the taxpayer proves them, 
based on publications, surveys or reports prepared in accordance with the 
provisions of this article231. 
Some authors have raised severe criticisms concerning the Brazilian system in the presence 
of so many rules that move the Brazilian transfer pricing law away from the ALP as 
established by the OECD Guidelines.. In this regard, Paulo Ayres Barreto understands that 
"the distance between transfer pricing discipline in Brazil and the regime adopted by the 
OECD member countries is abysmal", concluding that "there was no incorporation [in the 
Brazilian legal system] of the arm's length standard with the content attributed to it in 
Comparative Law"232. Another Brazilian author, Ricardo Mariz de Oliveira, argues that 
Law 9,430 did not fully adopt the ALP because the Brazilian legislator "wanted to 
                                                
because of the use of fixed margins for the resale price and cost plus methods. Valadão, supra note 
197 at 271. 
230 If taxpayers were not allowed to demonstrate that independent parties have different profit 
margins in similar conditions, Brazilian predetermined margins would assume an absolute and 
mandatory nature, which could lead to arbitrary parameter prices unrelated to the market reality. 
Therefore, considering that taxpayers are allowed to demonstrate that unrelated enterprises have 
different margins than those established in the law, it is possible to conclude that Brazilian transfer 
pricing rules meet the requirements of the arm’s length principle and practicability as well. 
Schoueri, “Brazil” supra note 168 at 64. 
231 Law 9,430, Brazil 1996, Article 20 and Article 21, Para 2. 
232 Paulo Ayres Barreto, Imposto sobre a Renda e Preços de Transferência (São Paulo: Dialética, 
2001) 153. 
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introduce and introduced much stricter rules, closed in their own criteria"233. This 
perception has been internationally supported as well: analyzing Law no. 9,430 after its 
promulgation, Alejandro Messineo affirmed that there was no general ALP on which 
Brazilian transfer pricing rules were based. According to the author, Brazilian rules seemed 
more like a minimum guarantee of revenue and its application would probably result in 
conflicts with the OECD and the US transfer pricing provisions234. 
The above-mentioned positions are quite insistent in sustaining that Brazilian rules do not 
completely embody the ALP. These opinions, nevertheless, are not fully accepted by other 
authors, who recognize practicality as an important element to be considered in establishing 
a transfer pricing regime. In this context, Alberto Xavier explains that, although the 
Brazilian methodology can lead to distinct results than the ALP, its characteristics bring 
more comfort to the taxpayer than the legal insecurity caused by the international 
methodology235. Similarly, Paulo Bento acknowledges that whereas "there is a clear 
detriment to the consistency of price determination based on the arm's length standard", 
Brazilian rules allow for "a greater degree of simplicity and certainty in relation to OECD 
rules"236.  
The understanding that Brazilian rules are compatible with the ALP is also shared by 
administrative courts237 in Brazil, according to two important administrative decisions. In 
                                                
233 Ricardo Mariz de Oliveira, Fundamentos do Imposto de Renda (São Paulo: Quartier Latin, 2008) 
843.  
234 Alejandro Messineo, “Transfer Pricing in Latin America: New Rules in Mexico and Brazil” 
(1997) International Transfer Pricing Journal 47.  
235 Xavier, supra note 164 at 390. 
236 The author adds that “the difficulties involved in determining prices based on the arm's length 
standard, associated with the Brazilian reality of information scarcity in the public domain and lack 
of resources for the fiscal authorities, lead us to the realization that a system as the one adopted by 
the OECD, does not seem feasible in Brazil”. Paulo Bento, “As Regras Brasileiras de Preços de 
Transferência e o Princípio — Arm’s Length – Uma Análise Multidisciplinar” (2006) 2 Revista de 
Direito Tributário Internacional 103 at 129.  
237 Judicial courts have not been involved in transfer pricing decisions because most cases resulted 
from administrative procedures conducted by Brazilian tax authorities in which the result was a 
notice of tax assessment. Therefore, according to the Brazilian administrative procedure, the 
taxpayer is allowed to present a defence to this notice of assessment, which is judged by an 
administrative judge. This administrative judge’s decision can be reviewed by the Administrative 
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the first case, regarding a Taxpayer Consultation Procedure in 2001, the administrative 
court ruled that there is no contradiction between Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty – 
which covers transfer pricing procedures – and Articles 18 to 24 of Law no. 9,430 – which 
introduced transfer pricing rules into Brazilian domestic law238. The second case was 
presented in 2005 and involved enterprises resident in Brazil and Germany and questioned 
the relationship between Article 9 of the Brazil-Germany double taxation agreement and 
the transfer pricing methods established in the Brazilian domestic law. In this circumstance, 
the Administrative Taxpayer’s Council decided that “although the Brazilian law’s option 
for specific closed methods allows, in some cases, that the arm’s length price is not 
achieved, there is no conflict between Article 9 of the double taxation agreement with 
Germany and the domestic legislation”239, i.e., Brazilian law did not oppose the ALP but 
rather adapted its methodology and application to the Brazilian tax system. 
4.1.4.2 Location-Specific Advantages 
As a developing country with an emerging economy, Brazil offers location-specific market 
features and factors of production that enable MNEs to achieve a superior financial 
outcome from the provision of the same product or service in comparison with alternative 
locations240. These location-specific advantages (LSAs) can include access to skilled labor, 
incentives, market premium, access to growing markets and cost savings241.  
                                                
Taxpayer’s Council. If not satisfied with this decision, the taxpayer can further appeal to the 
Superior Chamber of Tax Appeals and, after this instance, it is possible to appeal to judicial courts. 
Most of the transfer pricing cases, in practice, are decided in the administrative courts because it 
has lower costs to taxpayers and a final decision can be reached in a shorter period of time. Calich 
and Rolim, supra note 163 at 531-532. 
238 Coordenação-Geral de Tributação da Secretaria da Receita Federal do Brasil, 21 September 
2000 (2000) Diário Oficial da União (Brazil). 
239 Conselho Administrativo de Recursos Fiscais (2005) No. 16327.001319/2001-17, Diário Oficial 
da União (Brazil). 
240 Brazil not only offers low cost manufacturing opportunities to MNEs but it also provides market 
access to an expanding middle class that is willing to pay a premium price for foreign products. 
Richard Ainsworth, “Transfer Pricing: UN Guidelines Brazil” (2013) Boston University School of 
Law Working Paper No. 13-48 at 1. 
241 Although location advantages and location savings are generally common to MNE’s operations 
in developing countries, in practice, according to the typical transfer pricing methods, the location 
advantages are allocated associated enterprises in developed countries. Martjin Lange and Paul 
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According to the ALP – whose main goal is determining which conditions would be agreed 
between independent parties in comparable transactions – LSAs are only taken into account 
insofar as independent enterprises would consider them when negotiating and determining 
the prices of their transactions242. Under the Brazilian transfer pricing system, on the other 
hand, the predetermined profit margins may cause the transfer of the value of the LSAs out 
of Brazil through the transfer price. This happens because, as the fixed margin method is 
applied regardless of the cost structures of taxpayers, enterprises with low operating costs 
face lower tax burdens than identical enterprises with high operating costs243. Indeed, this 
is one of the main weaknesses of the predetermined profit margins approach used by Brazil: 
the fact that some enterprises may be taxed at profit margins – could be higher or lower – 
that are not compatible with their real profitability244.  
4.1.4.3 Intangibles 
Because of the difficulties in applying the traditional transfer pricing methods to intangible 
properties, Brazilian law provides special rules on royalties and technical assistance paid 
to foreign related persons245. As mentioned before, Brazil’s transfer pricing law expressly 
excluded royalties for the use of patents, trademarks and know-how as well as 
remuneration for technical, scientific or administrative assistance paid by a Brazilian 
enterprise to foreign related persons from its scope246. The applicable law for these 
                                                
Lankhorst, “The Impact of Location Advantages on the Transfer Pricing of Multinationals: On the 
Chinese Love for European Designer Handbags and Lower Production Costs in India” (2014) 
International Transfer Pricing Journal 223 at 224. 
242 Ibid. 
243 UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 371. 
244 Ibid. 
245 Before 2013, cross-border intercompany loans that were registered with the Central Bank of 
Brazil were not subject to the limitations of Law 9,430, i.e., there were no limits in the interest 
deductions under the transfer pricing system. However, with the promulgation of Law 12,715 in 
2012, cross-border loan transactions contracted with related persons, or with persons located in 
low-tax jurisdictions or privileged tax regimes are now subject to limitations regarding the interest 
deduction. Miyake and Tonanni, supra note 186. 
246 “Article 18. Para 9. The provisions of this article do not apply to cases of royalties and technical, 
scientific, administrative or similar assistance, which remain subject to the conditions of 
deductibility contained in the current legislation”. Law 9,430, Brazil 1996, Article 18, Para 9. 
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transactions (Income Tax Regulations – Article 355) establishes that only a fixed 
percentage – determined by the Brazilian Ministry of Finance – can be deducted as 
expenses for income tax. In relation to royalties, for instance, the percentage is 5% of the 
related revenue, regardless of the nature of the transaction in analysis247.   
Royalties and technical assistance payments received by a Brazilian enterprise from a 
foreign related party, on the other hand, are not mentioned in Brazil’s transfer pricing 
regulations. Thus, this foreign-source income is subject to the Brazilian transfer pricing 
rules for export transactions.  
4.1.5 Conclusion 
There is a significant gap between Brazilian domestic transfer pricing law and the 
international transfer pricing standards, particularly those established by the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the UN Practical Manual. One of the main reasons for this 
dissimilarity is that, while the OECD transfer pricing approach aims to identify the arm’s 
length price, Brazilian rules, as it is possible to observe from their development process, 
have the goal of combating schemes of tax avoidance involving the use of transfer prices248. 
The Brazilian concern with tax avoidance explains why the country chooses to establish 
parameters that determine maximum margins for deductible expenses on imports and 
minimum margins on export transactions.  
The Brazilian system of predetermined margins focuses on simplicity and practicality as it 
avoids the need for specific comparables, which is one of the main challenges in the 
application of the ALP, particularly for developing countries. Indeed, according to the 
international standards, the application of traditional transfer pricing methods requires the 
                                                
247 “Article 355. Sums of royalties related to the exploitation of patents for invention or use of 
industrial or trademarks and for technical, scientific, administrative or similar assistance may be 
deducted as operating expenses up to a maximum of 5% of net sales revenue from product 
manufactured or sold”. Income Tax Regulations, Brazil 1999, Article 355. 
248 Therefore, the significant deviations in Brazilian transfer pricing law from the international 
standards were not created in order to attract more foreign direct investment. Instead, these 
differences exist because Brazilian transfer pricing rules are an instrument to combat tax evasion 
and avoidance rather than to attract foreign investments. Calich and Rolim, supra note 163 at 552. 
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obtainability of precise and detailed data to empirically establish the gross profit margin of 
independent enterprises and this type of information is not always available for taxpayers 
or tax authorities. In this context, it can be argued that the Brazilian system also “stabilized 
the expectation of taxpayers with respect to their Brazilian tax liability associated with 
inter-company transactions”249, applying the same methodology for all enterprises. Because 
of its emphasis on practicability, transfer pricing law in Brazil developed a system with 
low compliance costs to taxpayers and to the tax administration as well, liberating the 
country’s scarce human resources to work on other relevant issues. 
One of the Brazilian transfer pricing system’s main disadvantages is that some enterprises 
are taxed at different profit margins – higher or lower – than their real profitability250. 
Because the fixed margin method is applied irrespective of the taxpayers’ costs, some 
relevant concepts such as location savings and market premium, present in the Brazilian 
economy, may be disregarded by the transfer pricing rules. Besides that, the Brazilian 
approach can cause economic double taxation251 in cases where there is no access to 
authorities to negotiate the relief of double taxation, especially considering that Brazil has 
reservations in its double taxation agreements on clauses to resolve double taxation 
situations derived from transfer pricing adjustments. 
In general, it is possible to observe that Brazilian transfer pricing rules diverge from 
relevant aspects of transfer pricing control existent in the international standards. In this 
sense, it is important to note that the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, although 
authoritative, are not binding in OECD member countries252. For this reason, it is 
permissible for a non-member country, such as Brazil, to develop a transfer pricing regime 
                                                
249 UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 371. 
250 Ibid. 
251 In the transfer pricing case, the double taxation is economic rather than juridical because it is 
not the same taxpayer that is being doubly taxed, but rather the same economic fact that is being 
doubly taxed in the sphere of property of two different taxpayers. 
252 A soft law approach to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines seems to offer the most 
appropriate description for these rules, since they are not “law” – which would mean that states are 
legally bound by it – neither “not law at all” – which would overlook the evidence that countries 
do comply with the rules, frequently against their self-interest. Allison Christians, “Hard Law, Soft 
Law, and International Taxation” (2007) 25:2 Wisconsin International Law Journal 325. 
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that is quite dissimilar from the international norm. Therefore, although the country, i.e., 
Brazil, must consider whether it is worth disregarding all the knowledge accumulated over 
many years of transfer pricing studies within the OECD, care should be taken in simply 
transposing international recommendations into its domestic legislation. 
 
4.2 Russia 
The Russian transfer pricing rules and the Russian tax system continue to 
evolve in response to the increasing integration of Russia into the world 
economy. (…) It can be expected that the Russian approach will continue to 
evolve in the future closer to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
However, the practical implementation will still likely have distinct features 
of the Russia legal system, and is unlikely to be 100 per cent identical to the 
approaches suggested by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines253. 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The fall of communism in Russia completely transformed the country’s economic and 
business environment. With the exposure of Russia to the forces of globalization, 
predetermined regulated prices were replace by free market reforms, foreign trade was 
opened up and no longer monopolized by the government and a modern tax system was 
introduced in the country254.  
In this context, transfer pricing assumed a greater importance, the first rules being enacted 
in 1991, which were replaced by a new transfer pricing law in 2012. This new law 
represented an attempt to bring Russian transfer pricing rules closer to the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines, introducing the ALP – modeled after Article 9 of the OECD Model 
                                                
253 Andrey Shpak, “Transfer Pricing Disputes in the Russian Federation” in Eduardo Baistrocchi 
and Ian Roxan, eds, Resolving Transfer Pricing Disputes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015) 555 at 580. 
254 Ibid at 555. 
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Treaty – into Russian tax law. At that time, Russia was negotiating to become a member 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and of the OECD255, and compliance with 
international transfer pricing standards was an important aspect in its accession 
negotiations, especially with the latter256. 
At present, transfer pricing is one of the most popular topics among tax specialists in 
Russia, especially considering the major relevance of commodities for the Russian 
economy257. This section covers the following topics: a) historical background of transfer 
pricing rules in the Russian Federation; b) current transfer pricing rules in Russia; and c) 
peculiarities and challenges in Russian transfer pricing practice.       
4.2.2 Historical Background: The Development of Transfer Pricing 
Rules in the Russian Federation 
Until 1991, when Russia – as part of the Soviet Union – was still a socialist economy, the 
manipulation of transfer prices was not a concern because, in the Soviet system, prices 
were controlled by the government and, furthermore, the public finance system was 
developed to centralize and redistribute all the profits that were not immediately necessary 
                                                
255 The Russian Federation has become a member of WTO in August 2012. Regarding the OECD, 
Russia has made an official request for the organization’s membership in 1996 and, in 2007, the 
OECD Council at Ministerial level adopted a resolution to open discussions concerning the 
country’s accession. OECD, The Russian Federation and the OECD, Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development online: < 
http://www.oecd.org/russia/therussianfederationandtheoecd.htm>. 
256 During the period Russia was drafting its new transfer pricing rules, the OECD Secretary-
General, Angel Gurría, noted that the proposed law would “bring Russia into alignment with the 
internationally accepted OECD standards, thereby providing more legal certainty, a reduced risk of 
double taxation and a more investment-friendly business environment for multinational 
enterprises”. In this context, the Secretary-General also affirmed that he was “pleased to see that 
the Russian Federation is upgrading its legal framework in the area of transfer pricing in order to 
bring it in line with leading international practice”. Evgenia Veter, Henrik Hansen and Rusian 
Radzhabov, “Russia: New Transfer Pricing Rules” (2011) 18:5 International Transfer Pricing 
Journal.  
257 Alexey Besfamilnyy, “The concept of transfer pricing system in Russian Federation” (2016) 3 
Statistika i Ekonomika 10 at 10. 
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for the enterprise258. This apparent irrelevance of transfer pricing in the Russian Federation 
changed with the fall of communism in 1991 and the consequent adoption of a free market 
economy. Therefore, in December 1991, a Western-inspired tax system was established in 
Russia, which, among other provisions, introduced in Article 4(1) the possibility to adjust 
the tax base of companies based on market prices259. According to this provision, taxpayers 
selling products or performing services at prices below cost had to calculate the VAT tax 
based on the market prices for similar transactions, but never less than the actual cost260.  
One problem with these transfer pricing rules was that they were usually applied without 
considering the actual circumstances of a transaction, not distinguishing between taxpayers 
who were manipulating transfer prices for tax purposes and those who, acting in good faith, 
had to sell below costs because of a damaging market situation261. Moreover, tax experts 
argue that the 1991 Russian tax system as a whole was not efficient, having a great number 
of isolated laws as well as ambiguous and conflicting provisions262. For this reason, in 1999, 
the Russian Federation developed a new Tax Code, which remains in force today.  
4.2.2.1 The Russian Tax Code: Transfer Pricing Rules from 1999 to 
2011 
The Tax Code represented a codification of the principles existent in the previous Russian 
tax system and a transition of the country to a tax system based on the rule of law, 
establishing more precise boundaries for government authorities in determining tax 
liabilities and interpreting statutes263. With respect to transfer pricing, the Tax Code, in its 
Articles 20 and 40, introduced more comprehensive rules enabling tax authorities to adjust 
                                                
258 Considering that 90% of Russian total government revenue was from payments collected from 
state-owned enterprises, there was an almost complete government control over transfer prices. 
Shpak, supra note 242 at 557. 
259 Law no. 1992-1 on Value Added Tax, Russian Federation 1991, Article 4(1).  
260 Law no. 1992-1 on Value Added Tax, Russian Federation 1991, Article 4(1). 
261 Shpak, supra note 242 at 558. 
262 Shpak, supra note 242 at 558. 
263 The main principles of the Russian tax system included: the obligation for everyone to pay the 
legally established taxes; no retroactive effect for laws creating new taxes; no discriminatory 
elements in imposing taxes. Ibid at 559. 
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prices for tax reasons. These rules “were originally intended to be a temporary compromise 
between rudimentary provisions that existed prior to that (the ‘sales below cost’ rules) and 
OECD-type rules”264. As a result, although the Tax Code rules were based on the ALP, 
there were considerable deviations from the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in terms 
of definitions and procedures. 
First of all, the transfer pricing rules of the Tax Code were used by tax authorities as anti-
avoidance measures, covering not only transactions between associated parties, but also 
transactions between unrelated enterprises, under specific circumstances265. Article 40.2 
authorized the transfer pricing administration to check the proper use of prices in the 
following circumstances: a) transactions between interdependent persons; b) goods 
exchange (barter) transactions; c) foreign trade transactions; and d) if there was a 
fluctuation of more than 20 per cent in the prices practices by the taxpayer for identical or 
similar goods or services over a short period of time266.  
The scope of transactions covered by the transfer pricing rules effective during this period 
was also significantly narrower as compared to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
Only prices referring to payments for products or services were subject to Russian transfer 
pricing control. Consequently, interest – not being a payment for goods or services – was 
exempt from transfer pricing rules. Accordingly, Russian courts tended to maintain the idea 
that prices for intangible property, such as royalty or shares in Russian companies, could 
not be adjusted for tax purposes267. 
The Tax Code also established a “20 per cent safe-harbor deviation”, according to which 
tax authorities could only adjust the price of controlled transactions for tax purposes if they 
                                                
264 Ibid at 560. 
265 In this regard, the transfer pricing rules present in the Russian Tax Code deviated from the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (according to which the main goal is to identify the price that 
would have been agreed between independent enterprises (see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 
supra note 8 at 31) and are more similar to the Brazilian rules, which were introduced as 
mechanisms to reduce tax avoidance schemes.  
266 Tax Code, Russian Federation 1999, Article 40(2). 
267 Shpak, supra note 242 at 561. 
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could prove that the price practiced by the taxpayer was different from the market price268 
by more than 20 per cent as prescribed in Article 40(3): 
In the instances envisaged by clause 2 of this Article where the prices of 
goods, work or services which are applied by the parties to a transaction 
deviate upwards or downwards by more than 20 per cent against the market 
price of identical (homogeneous) goods (work and services), the tax 
authority shall have the right to issue a substantiated decision to charge 
additional tax and penalties calculated as if the results of that transaction 
had been assessed on the basis of market prices for the goods, work or 
services in question269. 
Considering that this 20 per cent ‘safe-harbor’ was not reproduced in Russian tax treaties270, 
there were discussions about which norm should be applied: the treaty provisions or Article 
40(3) of the Russian Tax Code. This debate took place because, since the main goal of tax 
treaties is to ameliorate or eliminate double taxation by limiting countries’ tax 
jurisdictions271, it could be assumed that the tax authorities could not apply tax treaty rules 
that are less favourable for the taxpayer than the domestic provisions272. Indeed, although 
Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty allows the adjustments to the taxable income of 
associated enterprises when the prices between the two companies differ from those that 
would have been stipulated between independent companies, the method used for these 
                                                
268 “The market price of a good (work, service) shall be understood to be the price prevailing on 
the basis of the interaction of supply and demand on the market for identical (or, where these do 
not exist, homogeneous) goods (work, services) under comparable economic (commercial) 
conditions”. Tax Code, Russian Federation 1999, Article 40(4). 
269 Tax Code, Russian Federation 1999, Article 40(3). 
270 Russian tax treaties usually follow the OECD Model Treaty, using also some provisions of the 
UN Model Convention in the treaties with some of its tax partners. Danil Vinnitskiy, “Russia” in 
Yariv Brauner and Pasquale Pistone, eds, BRICS and the Emergence of International Tax 
Coordination (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2015) 81 at 84. 
271 Rebecca Kysar, “Interpreting Tax Treaties” (2016) 101:4 Iowa Law Review 1387 at 1393. 
272 Vinnitskiy, supra note 239 at 102. 
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adjustments needs to be prescribed in the domestic laws of the country in which the transfer 
pricing changes are made273. 
Only the three traditional transaction transfer pricing methods were allowed to be applied: 
the comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method, the resale price method and the cost plus 
method. These methods were required to be used in the exact order as they were listed and, 
in order to use the next method, it was necessary to prove that the previous one either was 
impossible to be applied or did not allow the establishment of a fair market price274.  
4.2.2.2 Post-2012 Transfer Pricing Rules 
On July 2011, the Russian Parliament approved a new transfer pricing law in an effort to 
bring Russian transfer pricing rules closer to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. This 
reform, described as the biggest change in Russian tax law since the enactment of the Tax 
Code, introduced a variety of amendments to Russian tax law, such as the application of 
the ALP and the removal of the so called “safe-harbor provision”  in transfer pricing275.  As 
declared by the Russian government, the main purpose of this new law was to combat tax 
avoidance through the use of transfer prices276. This convergence towards OECD’s 
international standards on transfer pricing was enacted in a moment when the Russian 
economy was not in its greatest position, representing an effort to attract more foreign 
business and investments to the country277. The next section discusses details of these new 
rules. 
4.2.3       Transfer Pricing Rules in the Russian Federation 
With effect from January 2012, Russia has included new transfer pricing rules applicable 
to both domestic and international transactions in Chapters 14.1 to 14.6 (Tax Control) of 
                                                
273 Ibid at 103. 
274 Tax Code, Russian Federation 1999, Article 40(3). 
275 Aleksei Hanninen, “To what extent business restrucuturing fall within the scope of transfer 
pricing regulations in Russia” (2015) 43:11 Intertax 742 at 743. 
276 Shpak, supra note 242 at 563. 
277 “Transfer Pricing Brings Russia onto The World Stage” (2009) 19 International Tax Review 20. 
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the Russian Tax Code278. Articles 20 and 40 of the Russian Tax Code continue to be applied 
regarding transactions, income and expenses reported by taxpayers prior to the entry of the 
new transfer pricing law into force279. 
4.2.3.1 Arm’s Length Principle 
The previously accepted 20 per cent safe harbor rule was replaced by a market price/profit 
range, expanding the extent of transactions between related parties potentially covered by 
transfer pricing controls: 
As this market price/profit range will serve as a safe harbor, the essence is 
to establish the lower and upper quartiles as any actual price charged or 
profitability level achieved by a taxpayer will be deemed to be in line with 
market values (i.e. arm’s length) and therefore will not be subject to 
adjustment, assuming of course that the tax authorities agree with the 
taxpayer's general characterization of the related parties, the intercompany 
transaction and the transfer pricing method and data applied280. 
Regarding the sources of information, the previous rules provided in the Russian Tax Code 
required the use of “official sources” of information in identifying the market price of a 
transaction. Although the term “official sources” was not properly defined in the Tax Code, 
according to court cases and other documents issued by Russian tax authorities, this 
requirement meant that only Russian data were accepted281. The new transfer pricing law, 
on the other hand, has allowed the use of foreign data in establishing the arm’s length price; 
however, Russia data is still the first priority282. 
                                                
278 The new transfer pricing rules were introduced by Federal Law no. 227-FZ (“On amendments 
to certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation relating to the development of the Rules for 
Price Determination for Taxation Purposes”) approved in July 18 2011 and entered into force in 
January 1 2012. 
279 “Transfer Pricing Brings Russia onto The World Stage” (2009) 19 International Tax Review 20. 
280 Veter, Hansen and Radzhabov, supra note 245..  
281 Ibid. 
282 Ibid. 
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4.2.3.2 Scope of Application of the Transfer Pricing Rules 
Russian transfer pricing rules can be applied to transactions between related entities and, 
under certain circumstances, between unrelated parties as well. Therefore, all cross-border 
transactions between related parties283 are covered by transfer pricing rules. Domestic 
transactions between related parties can only be controlled if the revenues generated in 
such transactions in a calendar year exceed a certain amount (in 2014, the amount was 
approximately $33 million; however, lower thresholds are established for mineral 
extraction and entities using beneficial tax regimes). Other than that, transactions between 
unrelated parties are only subject to transfer pricing rules when they are made with regard 
to certain traded commodities or with residents of listed low-tax jurisdiction, both subject 
to the threshold of $2 million in a calendar year284. In this context, Joint Resolution of the 
Supreme Court no. 9 of June 1999 emphasized that Russian transfer pricing control can 
only be applied to the four types of transactions expressly listed in the law285. 
Additionally, Russian courts are allowed to consider a transaction controlled, and 
consequently subject it to transfer pricing control, when the referred transaction does not 
meet the above-mentioned criteria due to conditions artificially created by taxpayer286.  
4.2.3.3 Transfer Pricing Methods 
The new transfer pricing law expands the number of methods used for determining the 
arm’s length price of controlled transactions, allowing five methods to be used by tax 
authorities and taxpayers: a) comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method; b) resale price 
method; c) cost plus method; d) transactional net margin method (TNMM); and e) profit 
                                                
283  “The rules provide an extensive list of what constitutes a “related party”, including: a) legal 
entities if one (in)directly has a participation of 25% in the other; b) an individual and a legal entity 
if the individual (in)directly has a participation of 25% in the legal entity; c) two legal entities if a 
third legal entity (in)directly has a participation of 25% in both of them; and d) legal entities where 
not less than 50% of the directors are appointed by the same individual.” Tatiana Kogut, Russia - 
Corporate Taxation sec. 7, Country Surveys IBFD. 
284 Ibid. 
285 Shpak, supra note 242 at 573. 
286 Veter, Hansen and Radzhabov, supra note 245. 
  
74 
split method. In this context, Russian transfer pricing rules followed the methods 
prescribed in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Nevertheless, the new law maintained 
the notion of hierarchy of methods, treating the CUP method as the preferred methodology, 
so tax authorities and taxpayers can only choose other methods when the CUP method 
cannot be applied. The only exception is when a company purchases goods from a related 
party and resells them to independent parties; in this case, priority is given for the resale 
price method287. 
4.2.4 Peculiarities and Challenges in Russia’s Transfer Pricing 
Practices 
The new Russian transfer pricing rules were designed to bring the country’s international 
taxation practices closer to the standards adopted by the OECD and by other jurisdictions 
with older and more developed tax systems. In this sense, although the new transfer pricing 
law is closer to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines – particularly in comparison with 
the country’s previous transfer pricing system – this does not mean that these provisions 
will be interpreted in the same way as they would be according to the OECD transfer 
pricing approach. Indeed, Russia is not a member of the OECD and, for this reason, the 
country is not obliged to follow by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines288: 
The current transfer pricing provisions of the Russian Tax Code correspond 
to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines’ provisions to a great extent – at 
least compared to the previous regulations. As mentioned earlier, the Tax 
Code’s new rules are also widely based on the OECD’s Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines. Nonetheless, Russia is not an OECD Member State, and 
Russian tax authorities, as well as courts making decisions on tax matters, 
                                                
287Adam Kosmala, Andrew Joshi, Ilarion Lemetyuynen and Svetlana Stroykova, “Russia: 
Overview of Russia’s new transfer pricing rules” (2012) International Tax Review. 
288 Even though Russia is not a member of the OECD, it is influenced by OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines and other tax treaty models. In December 2007, the Ministry of Finance of the Russian 
Federation initiated discussions with OECD officials regarding the possibility of Russia becoming 
an OECD member country. Nevertheless, at present, Russia maintains an observer status in some 
OECD committees. 
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are not obliged to follow the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Therefore, 
it should be noted that, while the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines may 
provide interpretive help in situations where the Tax Code’s transfer pricing 
rules are ambiguous and difficult to apply in practice, there is no surety of 
that the tax authorities would interpret the unclear provisions in accordance 
with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines289. 
Furthermore, Russia still deviates from the OECD approach in significant ways in its new 
rules290. For instance, the Russian Tax Code subjects, under certain circumstances, cross-
border transactions between unrelated persons to transfer pricing controls, treating these 
transactions as controlled, which is not prescribed in the OECD guidelines and not common 
in most OECD members. Also, contrary to what is prescribed in the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines, Russia transfer pricing law establishes a formal hierarchy in the 
application of the methods for determining the arm’s length price of controlled 
transactions.  
4.2.4.1 Intangibles 
The majority of Russia’s transfer pricing provisions refer to transactions involving goods, 
works and services. As a result, some tax experts argue that, according to the interpretation 
of Russian courts of the terms ‘goods, works and services’, the new transfer pricing rules 
do not cover interest, royalties as well as any other transactions involving intangible 
property: 
According to the Tax Code, transfer pricing regulations are applied only to 
related party transaction where commodities, services and/or work are being 
transferred from one related party to another. As interpretation of Russian 
law and overall judicial discretion in Russia are based on legal norms in 
essence, it is very difficult to validate an argument according to which 
                                                
289 Hanninen, supra note 264 at 754. 
290 Kosmala, Joshi, Lemetyuynen and Stroykova, supra note 276. 
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transfer of intangibles assets would fall within the scope of transfer pricing 
regulations291. 
On the other hand, there are more generic references in Russia’s transfer pricing law that 
may lead to a different interpretation regarding intangible assets. In this context, the 
Russian Ministry of Finance has claimed in a published written clarification that “both 
royalties and interest should also be included in the scope of transfer pricing rules (as well 
as any other transaction that has an impact on the tax base)”292. Although the Ministry of 
Finance’s written clarification is not legally binding but rather informative – taxpayers and 
tax authorities do not have to follow its arguments – it is a helpful interpretive guideline 
regarding Russian transfer pricing provisions293.  
Therefore, taxpayers usually comply with the Ministry of Finance’s clarifications because 
it is difficult to forecast when Russian tax authorities will follow this understanding or not. 
4.2.5 Conclusion 
Russian transfer pricing rules have evolved alongside the country’s increasing integration 
into the world economy. In this respect, it is possible to observe that, in conjunction with 
Russia’s efforts to become a member of the OECD, its transfer pricing rules have also been 
transformed in order to resemble the practices of more developed jurisdictions and those 
recommended in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Although Russia’s new transfer 
pricing law may minimize the risks of double taxation and reduce the compliance burden 
for MNEs operating in the country, there are still some peculiarities in its practices, 
particularly those developed in Russian courts under the Tax Code. 
Nonetheless, in comparison with the other BRICS, Russia seems to be the country most 
aligned with the OECD standards regarding transfer pricing. Indeed, either because its 
transfer pricing rules are fairly recent and still under development or because of a 
                                                
291 Hanninen, supra note 264 at 743. 
292 Shpak, supra note 242 at 563. 
293 Hanninen, supra note 264 at 745. 
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compromise with the OECD’s standards, Russia was the only country among the BRICS 
that did not have a representative participating in the UN Committee of Experts on 
International Cooperation in Tax Matters, which was responsible for the UN Practical 
Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries294.  
 
4.3 India 
In the case of Transfer Pricing, although it is governed by domestic legislation of 
each country, the OECD countries have agreed on a common transfer pricing 
guidelines known as OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrations. These guidelines on transfer pricing only 
reflect the agreements amongst Government of those countries that are members of 
OECD (developed countries) and accordingly tend to take care of interest of only 
developed countries. The guidelines do not give right of taxation to source countries 
accordingly eroding taxing rights of developing countries295. 
4.3.1 Introduction 
The increasing participation of MNEs in economic activities in India, due to the country’s 
robust economic growth and consumer base, has given rise to complex challenges in 
determining the transfer price of transactions between associated enterprises. In light of 
these difficulties, India introduced in 2001, through Sections 92A to 92F of the Indian 
Income Tax Act, comprehensive transfer pricing legislation, in which the country 
established mechanisms for determining reasonable arm’s length prices and profits 
                                                
294 In the United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries, 
administrative practices of Brazil, China, India and South Africa as well as its 
peculiarities regarding transfer pricing interpretations and regulations – particularly in relation to 
OECD’s approaches – are explained by representatives of these countries. 
295 Sanjay Kumar Mishra, Joint Secretary and Permanent Representative of India to the United 
Nations, in “Letter to the United Nations Conveying Government of India’s Views on the Advance 
Unedited Version of the Report on the Work of the Committee of Experts on International 
Cooperation in Tax Matters” (2012). 
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regarding controlled transactions. Since the introduction of this law, transfer pricing has 
become the most important international tax issue affecting MNEs conducting their 
business in India296, especially because, although Indian transfer pricing rules are broadly 
based on OECD guidelines, they also deviate in some respects. 
This section provides an overview on transfer pricing rules in India, focusing on the 
challenges found by the country in applying the ALP and on the practical solutions it 
applies. Therefore, this section is structured as follows: a) historical background of Indian 
transfer pricing rules; b) transfer pricing regulations in India; and c) peculiarities and 
challenges in India’s transfer pricing rules and practices, particularly those concerning 
comparability analysis, location-specific advantages and intangible assets. 
4.3.2 Historical Background 
Until 1991, India’s economy was highly regulated, having elevated tariffs and a series of 
exchange controls and obstacles to the process of integration with the world market297. Due 
to the country’s economic isolation, although the erosion of its tax base through the 
manipulation of the prices of goods and services was a possibility, the low number of cross-
border transactions made the risk of transfer pricing abuse low298. Nevertheless, since 1991, 
with the liberalization of trade and foreign exchange policy, India has been working on the 
promotion of foreign investment and technical collaboration in order to grow in 
productivity and achieve higher international competitiveness through the advantages of 
                                                
296 PwC, “International Transfer Pricing 2015/2016”, PwC Network, online: <www.pwc.com/ 
internationaltp>. 
297 Although India had already been through economic reforms in the 1980s, the 1990s reforms 
were systematic and systemic, representing a broad acceptance of the idea that entrepreneurs should 
be given priority over the government in the conduct of economic activity and that economic 
interventions from the government should be made only with proper justification and not by default. 
Wanda Tseng and David Cowen, India’s and China’s Recent Experience with Reform and Growth 
(New York, Palgrave Macmilan, 2005). 
298 Mukesh Butani, “Transfer Pricing Disputes in India” in Eduardo Baistrocchi and Ian Roxan, 
eds, Resolving Transfer Pricing Disputes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 584 at 
585. 
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technology and marketing expertise transfers299. As the inflow of foreign direct investment 
to India increased300, Indian tax authorities became more concerned with the possibilities 
of transfer pricing abuse generated by the growth in the number of international 
transactions. 
Therefore, in 1999, the Indian government created an Expert Group to study global transfer 
pricing practices and develop a framework for India’s transfer pricing law301. The Expert 
Group considered the laws of several countries and especially the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines in drafting recommendations for India’s transfer pricing rules302, which were 
the basis for the legislation subsequently enacted in 2001. Thus, in April 2001, India’s 
Parliament enacted new provisions to the Indian Income Tax Act from 1961303, introducing 
with the “Finance Act” the first legislation establishing India’s comprehensive transfer 
pricing regime. According to the Finance Bill Explanatory Memorandum, the legislation 
was created to control transfer pricing abuse and to prevent the erosion of Indian tax 
revenues: 
The increasing participation of multinational groups in economic activities 
in the country has given rise to new and complex issues emerging from 
transactions entered into between two or more enterprises belonging to the 
                                                
299 Samir Gandhi, Minal Sharma and Rakesh Alshi, “Transfer Pricing Rules and Practice in India” 
(2010) 39:7 Tax Management International Journal 371. 
300 “The cumulative amount of FDI has amounted to US$153,209 million from August 1991 to 
March 2011. In the financial year ending 31 March 201, the figure for FDI has been US$20,304 
million. Butani, supra note 287 at 585. 
301 Gandhi, Sharma and Alshi, supra note 288. 
302 Even though India is not a member of the OECD, the Expert Group gave great importance for 
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines mainly because most of India’s trading partners are OECD 
member-countries. Gandhi, Sharma and Alshi, supra note 288. 
303 Before 2001, the Indian Income Tax Act, in its Section 92, contained provisions allowing tax 
authorities to determine an appropriate transfer price in cases where the tax administrators believed 
that the prices were not appropriate due to the close connection between the parties. In these cases, 
the assessing officer was able to estimate the reasonable profit for the Indian resident party. 
Nonetheless, this provision was not found to be effective in controlling the manipulation of transfer 
prices and, for this reason, it was replaced by the new provisions that came into effect in 2001. 
Pradeep Gupta, “Transfer Pricing: Impact of Taxes and Tariffs in India” (2012) 37: 4 Vikalpa 29 
at 43. 
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same multinational group. The profits derived by such enterprises carrying 
on business in India can be controlled by the multinational group, by 
manipulating the prices charged and paid in such intra-group transactions, 
thereby leading to erosion of tax revenues. With a view to providing a 
statutory framework which can lead to the computation of reasonable, fair, 
and equitable profits and tax in India in the case of such multinational 
enterprises, new provisions are proposed to be introduced in the Income Tax 
Act304 
Hence, the legislators’ idea behind the Finance Act was to provide a statutory framework 
that could facilitate the determination of a reasonable, fair and arm’s length transfer price 
for controlled transactions305. 
4.3.3 Transfer Pricing Rules in India 
4.3.3.1 The Arm’s Length Principle 
As mentioned above, the Indian comprehensive transfer pricing legislation was introduced 
in the form of Chapter X – sections 92 to 92F – of the Indian Income Tax Act. These 
transfer pricing regulations were further elucidated in rules 10A to 10E of the Indian 
Income Tax Rules. The Income Tax Act and the Income Tax Rules relate to the 
determination of income from an international transaction having regard to the arm’s length 
price; the concept of associated enterprise; the concept of information and documents; and 
other important transfer pricing definitions.  
According to Section 92.1, “any income arising from an international transaction shall be 
computed having regard to the arm’s length price”306. The Section further specifies that, in 
                                                
304 Paragraph 176 of the Budget Speech: 2001 (248) ITR 34 Statues as cited in Har Govind, 
“Transfer Pricing” (2003) 9:1 Asia Pacific Tax Bulletin 14. 
305 Butani, supra note 287 at 588. 
306 The Section also clarifies that the allowance for any expense or interest arising from an 
international transaction shall also be determined according to an arm’s length price. Income Tax 
Act, India 1961, Section 92.1. 
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an international transaction between two or more associated enterprises, when there is a 
mutual agreement or arrangement for the allocation of any contribution, any cost or 
expenses in connection with a benefit, service or facility provided to any one of such 
enterprises, the allocation of costs and expenses shall be established having regard to the 
arm’s length price of such benefit, service or facility307. Likewise, the price received for 
services rendered to associated enterprises must also be determined based on the arm’s 
length standard308. From these provisions, it is possible to observe that the foundation for 
transfer pricing rules in India is the ALP. Accordingly, the Indian transfer pricing assessing 
officer has extensive powers to establish what is the arm’s length price for the above-
mentioned transactions and to make adjustments for the computation of income309.  
4.3.3.2 The Concept of Associated Enterprise International 
Transactions 
Section 92A defines that enterprises are “associated enterprises” when one enterprise is 
controlled by the other or when both enterprises are controlled by a common third person310. 
The concept of control in Indian transfer pricing law is not limited to control through 
holding shares or voting power, but it is also extended to control through debt, blood 
relationships and management over a series of components of the business activity 
performed by the taxpayer, such as power over raw materials, sales and intangibles311. 
Section 92B provides the meaning for “international transaction”, which is basically 
defined as a cross border transaction between associated enterprises regarding any property 
– tangible or intangible – as well as the provision of services, lending or borrowing of 
money or any other transaction having a bearing on the profits, income, losses or assets of 
such enterprises312. According to Sub-section (2) of Section 92B, the scope of the definition 
                                                
307 Income Tax Act, India 1961, Section 92.2. 
308 Income Tax Act, India 1961, Section 92.2. 
309 In cases where the application of the arm’s length principle decreases the tax incidence in India, 
these provisions are not applicable. Gupta, supra note 292 at 43-44. 
310 Income Tax Act, India 1961, Section 92A. 
311 Income Tax Act, India 1961, Section 92A. 
312 Income Tax Act, India 1961, Section 92B. 
  
82 
of international transaction is also extended to “deemed to be international transactions”, 
which are transactions between unrelated persons where there is a prior agreement in 
relation to the transaction between such person and an associated enterprise or when the 
relevant terms of the transaction are determined by the associated enterprise313. Even 
though no international transactions or industries are excluded from the possibility of a 
transfer pricing investigation, recently, the focus of Indian transfer pricing officers have 
been the software development, business process outsourcing banking, 
telecommunications, pharmaceutical and automobile industries314. 
As transfer pricing provisions are only applied to the general concept of “international 
transactions”, there have been several cases in India discussing the meaning of such 
expression. Under the decided cases, the common understanding is that two requirements 
must be met so a transaction is considered an international transaction: first, the transaction 
must have occurred between associated enterprises and, second, one of the associated 
enterprises must be non-resident in India315.  
4.3.3.3 Transfer Pricing Methods 
The Indian Income Tax Act, in Section 92C, provides six methods for the determination of 
the arm’s length price regarding an international transaction: a) comparable uncontrolled 
price (CUP) method; b) resale price method; c) cost-plus method; d) profit split method; e) 
transactional net margin method (TNMM); and f) any other method as may be 
prescribed316. As Indian law does not establish a hierarchy in the selection of the methods, 
the method that is best suited to the facts and circumstances and that provides the most 
                                                
313 Income Tax Act, India 1961, Section 92B. 
314 PwC, “International Transfer Pricing 2015/2016”, PwC Network, online: <www.pwc.com/ 
internationaltp>. 
315 D.P. Sengupta, “India” in Yariv Brauner and Pasquale Pistone, eds, BRICS and the Emergence 
of International Tax Coordination (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2015) 115 at 152. 
316 According to Pradeep Gupta, until 2012, no other method has been prescribed by Indian tax 
authorities. Gupta, supra note 292 at 44. 
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reliable measure of an arm’s length result is the one that should be adopted317, as prescribed 
in Section 92C: 
The arm's length price in relation to an international transaction or specified 
domestic transaction shall be determined by any of the following methods, 
being the most appropriate method, having regard to the nature of 
transaction or class of transaction or class of associated persons or functions 
performed by such persons or such other relevant factors as the Board may 
prescribe, namely: (a) comparable uncontrolled price method; (b) resale 
price method; (c)  cost plus method; (d) profit split method; (e) transactional 
net margin method; (f)  such other method as may be prescribed by the 
Board318. 
In addition to the above methods, the taxpayer can establish the arm’s length price 
regarding an international transaction using any other method as long as it takes into 
account the price that would have been charged or paid for the same or similar uncontrolled 
transaction, with or between associated enterprises, under similar circumstances319. 
Furthermore, transfer pricing provisions will not be applied when the application of the 
ALP would result in a downward adjustment in the income taxable in India320. 
4.3.4 Peculiarities and Challenges in India’s Transfer Pricing 
Practices 
According to Sanjay Mishra, member of the United Nations Subcommittee on Transfer 
Pricing, over the past fifteen years, Indian tax authorities have witnessed several challenges 
in the administration of transfer pricing law, with transfer pricing audits causing numerous 
                                                
317 There have been numerous cases concerning whether the application of a particular method was 
appropriated to the facts and circumstances of the case; however, both taxpayers and Indian tax 
authorities seem to have chosen the transnational net margin method (TNMM) as the most suitable, 
since this is, by far, the most used method. Sengupta, supra note 304 at 152. 
318 Income Tax Act, India 1961, Section 92C. 
319 Shreyas Shah, India - Corporate Taxation sec. 7.2, Country Surveys IBFD. 
320 PwC, “International Transfer Pricing 2015/2016”, PwC Network, online: <www.pwc.com/ 
internationaltp>. 
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disputes and litigation321. Services rendered by Indian subsidiaries or Indian branches of 
multinational companies to its foreign affiliates, for instance, have been thoroughly 
examined by Indian transfer pricing officers in order to establish the appropriate level of 
compensation received by the Indian taxpayer322. This section focuses on some of these 
transfer pricing issues and challenges in the implementation of the ALP in India. 
4.3.4.1 Challenges Regarding Comparability Analysis and 
Adjustments 
Comparability is a key feature for the Indian Tax Administration in establishing the arm’s 
length price of international transactions323. Indian transfer pricing rules provide that an 
uncontrolled transaction is comparable to an international transaction when the 
dissimilarities between the two will not substantially affect their prices or profits or when 
reasonably precise adjustments can be made to eliminate the outcomes of such 
dissimilarities324. To the extent possible, Indian transfer pricing administration maintains 
that local Indian comparables should be used and generally does not accept the use of 
foreign comparables325.  However, due to the increasing market unpredictability and 
complexity in intra-group international transactions, India has been facing several 
challenges in its comparability analysis326, particularly regarding the evaluation of risks.  
Since the basis of any comparability analysis, according to Indian transfer pricing 
administration, consists in a “comparison of functions performed, assets employed and 
                                                
321 UN Practical Manual supra note 3. 
322 In many of these cases, the Indian transfer pricing officer determined that the Indian taxpayer 
was not compensated according to the arm’s length principle and, for this reason, adjustments were 
necessary. Gandhi, Sharma and Alshi, supra note 288. 
323 This is a contrary position to the Brazilian approach, where the comparability analysis is 
basically replaced by predetermined fixed margins. See the Section “Brazil”.  
324 Gandhi, Sharma and Alshi, supra note 288. 
325 PwC, “International Transfer Pricing 2015/2016”, PwC Network, online: <www.pwc.com/ 
internationaltp>. 
326 The problem of the lack of comparables and the problem of comparability adjustments, 
according to David Spencer, are some of the main difficulties of developing countries regarding 
transfer pricing regulations and the application of the arm’s length standard. See Spencer, “BRICS, 
BEPS and the UN Manual Part 1” supra note 65 at 38. 
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risks assumed”, the country’s practice is to evaluate the risks of an associated enterprise in 
combination with its functions and assets327. Essentially, India’s tax authorities 
understanding is that the effective risks328 assumed by an Indian subsidiary must be given 
its due importance in determining the arm’s length price of an international transaction.  
One central problem experienced by India is that MNEs claim that Indian subsidiaries 
engaged in contract services – especially in research and development – are “risk-free” 
entities and, for this reason, are entitled to low cost plus remuneration329. In such cases, the 
Indian Tax Administration does not agree “with the notion that risk can be controlled 
remotely by the parent company and that the Indian subsidiaries or related party engaged 
in core functions, such as carrying out research and development activities or providing 
services are risk free entities”330. Indeed, in many circumstances, MNE’s core functions of 
performing research and development activities or providing services are located in India, 
which involves the making of critical strategic decisions – regarding, for instance, the 
designing of a product or software or the monitoring of research activities – by the 
management and employees of Indian subsidiaries331. Consequently, the Indian subsidiary 
has control over the operational activities and other risks, while the parent company has a 
more limited control over risks remotely located332. 
As the margin earned by the above-mentioned “risk-free” Indian subsidiaries cannot be 
compared with other independent enterprises’ margins – because there would be a 
                                                
327 UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 584. 
328 India’s approach to risk adjustments is more focused on the reality of the MNE as an 
economically integrated group as opposed to the OECD Transfer Pricing Regulations, which seem 
to give more importance to legal structures, such as contractual risk allocations.  
329 A great number of MNEs have established captive outsourcing units in India that perform 
services such as research and development, software development, call centres and other 
outsourced services. These units generally operate on a cost plus mark-up basis, which means that 
the associated enterprises pay the Indian subsidiaries a “mark-up over the total operating costs 
incurred by the unit”. Butani, supra note 287 at 623. 
330 UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 391. 
331 Ibid at 584. 
332 Ibid at 585. 
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discrepancy between the risks undertaken by them333 – economic adjustments to account 
for the differences in risk profiles are usually necessary. In this context, Indian transfer 
pricing law require “reasonably accurate comparability adjustments”; nevertheless, “the 
Indian transfer pricing administration finds it difficult to make risk adjustments in the 
absence of any reliable, robust and internationally agreed methodology to provide risk 
adjustment”334. 
Case law involving issues in transfer pricing and enterprises’ risks assessment demonstrate 
how this is a controversial matter in Indian transfer pricing law. In Li and Fung India Pvt 
v. CIT335, for example, the taxpayer company was resident in India and was a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of a Mauritius company, providing sourcing services to an associated enterprise. 
The associated enterprise entered into services contracts with third-party customers and 
subcontracted the work to the taxpayer, which was remunerated at a cost plus 5 percent 
mark-up (claiming it was a low risk service provider performing limited functions with 
minimal risks). The Indian tax authorities recommended a transfer pricing adjustment to 
this transfer price arguing that the Indian subsidiary was a risk bearing entity as well as an 
independent entrepreneur and, for this reason, it could not be considered a risk-free entity. 
However, the Court decision considered the transfer pricing adjustment unjustified 
because, among other reasons, it was not proved that the Indian company assumed 
significant risks. According to the decision, the Indian subsidiary made no investment in 
the plant, inventory, working capital nor assumed the risk for manufacturing and exporting 
goods, merely rendering support services in relation to these exported goods. Therefore, 
the court sustained that Indian tax authorities must assess the risks on specific facts and not 
on vague terms, such as ‘significant risk’, ‘functional risk’, ‘enterprise risk’ without 
material records to establish such conclusions.   
                                                
333 The captive units are expected to continue earning a mark-up over costs regarding the provision 
of the services. Comparable independent enterprises, on the other hand, undertake a broader set of 
risks and, for this reason, generally earn super profits or significant losses. Butani, supra note 287 
at 623. 
333 UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 391. 
334 Ibid at 586. 
335 Li and Fung India Pvt v CIT, (2013), (Delhi High Court, India). 
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In another relevant ruling, Deloitte Consulting India Pvt Ltd v CIT336, the Income-Tax 
Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal) rejected adjustments claimed for lower risk borne by a 
captive “risk free” service provider. In this case, the Indian subsidiary entered into a 
software development service agreement with Deloitte Consulting USA to provide 
software related services. The Indian subsidiary provided a warranty to its parent company 
to deliver its work free of errors, which according to the Tribunal’s decision amounted to 
undertaking a broader set of risks. Therefore, there were no differences between the risk 
profiles of the taxpayer and comparable independent enterprises and, consequently, no 
economic adjustments were needed. 
4.3.4.2 Location-Specific Advantages 
India, as a low-cost jurisdiction, provides numerous Location-Specific Advantages (LSAs) 
to MNEs performing economic activities in the country. These advantages include but are 
not limited to the availability of a highly skilled, specialized and knowledgeable workforce 
at a low-cost; lower raw material and infrastructure costs; reasonably priced rental spaces; 
direct and indirect tax incentives; access and proximity to large and growing local/regional 
markets; large customer base with increasing spending power, etc337. As MNEs are 
increasingly outsourcing their manufacturing and service functions to captive units in 
India, LSAs arising from the relatively lowers costs of Indian operations have become a 
concern for the country’s transfer pricing administration338. 
The main issue regarding LSAs involves their quantification and allocation among the 
associated enterprises. Under an arm’s length approach, this allocation should be done in 
accordance to what independent parties would have agreed in comparable circumstances. 
                                                
336 Deloitte Consulting India Pvt Ltd v CIT (2011), (Mumbai Bench Tribunal, India). 
337 UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 587. 
338 “The Indian tax authorities are increasingly recognizing the concept of location savings and 
attributing high returns to location savings, particularly in the BPO and IT sectors. During the 
course of audits, TPOs have been adjusting captive subsidiary income upwards due to location 
savings. Though the standard markup for captive service providers is normally in the range of cost 
plus 10%- 16%, in some cases TPOs have been raising the markup to 25%-34% on the grounds 
that the Indian entity is realizing location savings.” Gandhi, Sharma and Alshi, supra note 288. 
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In this context, the current position of the Indian transfer pricing administration – as stated 
in the 2017 UN Practical Manual – is that, where comparable uncontrolled transactions are 
available, the comparability analysis and benchmarking by using the results/profit margins 
of such local comparable companies will determine the arm’s length price of a transaction 
with a related party in a low-cost jurisdiction339. Therefore, on one hand, if reliable local 
comparables are available, the benefits of LSAs will be properly captured in the arm’s 
length price; on the other hand, if reliable local comparables are not available, the 
consideration of LSAs’ benefits will still be an issue340.  
The above Indian transfer pricing administration’s position departs from the previous 
Indian considerations on the subject in the previous UN Practical Manual version. In the 
2013 UN Manual edition, India maintained the view that an arm’s length price determined 
on the basis of local comparables would not adequately allocate LSAs341 because it would 
not compute the cost difference between a low-cost country and a high-cost country from 
where the business operations were relocated. The current Indian views are more aligned 
with the position advocated in the BEPS Actions 8-10 report as explored in Chapter 5342. 
Even before the revision of its position in the UN Practical Manual, the latest Indian 
approach was already being applied in judicial cases involving location savings. In Watson 
                                                
339 UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 587. 
340 Ibid. 
341 In the previous 2013 version of the UN Practical Manual, Indian representatives stated that 
“Comparability analysis and benchmarking by taking local comparables will determine the price 
of a transaction with a related party in a low-cost jurisdiction. However, it will not take into account 
the benefit of location savings which can be computed by taking into account the cost difference 
between costs in the low-cost country and in the high-cost country from where the business activity 
was relocated. In view of this, the price determined on the basis of local comparables is not 
consistent with the arm’s length price because any arm’s length transaction between two unrelated 
parties would not be possible without benefiting both parties to the transaction”. Ibid at 395. 
342 There was a more expressive divergence between the previous Indian understanding and the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which state that the location savings may be shared between 
related parties on the basis of what independent parties would have negotiated in similar 
circumstances. In this sense, the OECD approach recommends the use of local market comparables 
in order to establish the arm’s length price instead of comparability adjustments for location 
savings. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines supra note 8 at para 9149. 
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Pharma Pvt Ltd v CIT343, the taxpayer was engaged in contract manufacturing for its 
associated enterprises and provided them contract research and development services, 
being compensated on a total operating cost plus arm’s length mark-up basis. Indian 
transfer pricing officers made an adjustment in the taxpayer’s profits because of the 
location savings the associated enterprises had in transferring the referred activities from 
the United States of America to India. Nonetheless, the Tribunal deleted this location 
savings adjustment because, in this case, the taxpayer did not have exclusive access to 
factor leading to LSAs344 and, consequently, did not have a unique advantage that could 
generate a super profit arising in the entire supply chain. This way, the Tribunal ruled that, 
when local market comparables are available and used, specific adjustments for location 
savings are not required. 
4.3.4.3 Intangibles 
Transfer pricing of intangibles has been a challenging area for the Indian tax administration 
because, not only are intangible assets difficult to detect, but they are also rarely traded in 
the external market, which makes it hard to find reliable comparables in the public domain. 
Some of the main issues regarding the transfer price of intangible property involve the 
determination of the arm’s length price of royalties, the remuneration for research and 
development intangibles and the allocation of the cost of development of the market and 
brand in a new country345.   
With regard to the payment of royalties346, serious challenges have been encountered in 
determining the arm’s length rate in relation to the price charged for the use of brands and 
trademarks in certain cases. Indian tax authorities argue that the “royalty rate charged by 
the MNE should depend upon the cost borne by the subsidiary or related party to promote 
                                                
343 Watson Pharma Pvt Ltd v CIT (2015), (Mumbai Tribunal, India). 
344 According to the decision, the associated enterprises operated in a completely competitive 
market and, for this reason, the taxpayer did not have exclusive location-specific advantages or 
unique advantages over its competitors. 
345 UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 588. 
346 Intangible assets, such as intellectual property, which is owned by one entity and used by another 
entity, generally requires a royalty payment as a compensation for its use. Ibid at 588. 
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the brand and trademark and to develop customer loyalty for that brand and product”347. 
Indeed, the Indian view is that, in an emerging market such as India, in many cases, the 
local subsidiary should be entitled to receive an arm’s length compensation for the 
economic ownership of the brand and trademark developed by the subsidiary in the country 
and for improving the value of the brand and trademark legally owned by the parent 
company348. 
The Indian transfer pricing administration has also noticed that Indian subsidiaries using 
the technical know-how of their parent companies have incurred significant costs to 
customize such know-how and to increase its value. In these cases, in determining the 
arm’s length price of royalties for the use of technical know-how, Indian tax authorities 
take into consideration the costs of activities – research and development activities, for 
instance – that have contributed to enhancing the value of the know-how owned by the 
foreign parent company349.  
Marketing intangibles have also been a focus area for Indian tax authorities, especially 
because of the unique market characteristics of the country regarding location advantages, 
market accessibility, large consumer base, market premium, etc. Indian subsidiaries usually 
have substantial marketing activities – including adding value to brands, trademarks and 
trade names owned by parent companies as well as creating marketing intangibles such as 
costumer lists and dealer networks – and the expenditure regarding these marketing 
functions has been the subject of transfer pricing adjustments in India350. These adjustments 
have been questioned in the judicial instance in India and, while the matter is still not finally 
decided by the Indian Supreme Court, the decisions of the High Courts and Tribunals have 
elucidated that: a) the existence of an international transaction regarding any service or 
                                                
347 Intangible assets, such as intellectual property, which is owned by one entity and used by another 
entity, generally requires a royalty payment as a compensation for its use. Ibid. 
348 Ibid. 
349 Ibid at 589. 
350 According to Indian transfer pricing administration, these functions carried out by Indian 
subsidiaries, which promoted the brands and developed marketing intangibles for their parent 
companies outside India, deserve a compensation. Ibid at 591. 
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benefit must be established before transfer pricing provisions can be applied; and b) the 
mere excessive expenditure of an associated enterprise with advertisement, marketing and 
promotion is not enough to establish the existence of such a transaction351. 
One noteworthy case is Maruti Suzuki India Ltd v CIT352, in which the taxpayer, who 
manufactured and sold cars, had a license agreement with its associated enterprise for use 
of licensed information and a licensed trademark for the manufacture and sale of the 
products. According to these agreements, the taxpayer paid royalties for the licensed 
trademarks and for the technology license. The Indian transfer pricing officer made an 
adjustment by disallowing the royalties paid by the taxpayer and imputing as 
reimbursement with mark-up on the customized advertising, marketing and promotion 
expenses incurred in promoting the associated enterprise’s brand in India. The Indian court 
decided in favor of the taxpayer, ruling that the excessive advertisement, sales and 
promotion expenditure incurred by licensed manufacturers cannot be used as the basis for 
inferring the existence of an international transaction that could warrant a transfer pricing 
adjustment. 
4.3.5 Conclusion 
As it is the case with other emerging economies, India has a relatively recent transfer 
pricing comprehensive law, which was significantly influenced by the practices and 
experiences of the OECD353 and its member countries. Nonetheless, the implementation of 
transfer pricing rules that were established according to developed countries’ realities may 
not always reflect the necessities and challenges encountered in a country with a different 
stage of development, such as India. For this reason, India – which has constantly pointed 
                                                
351 Ibid at 592. 
352 Maruti Suzuki India Ltd v CIT (2015), (Delhi High Court, India). 
353 Although India is not a member of the OECD, it has been invited to participate as an observer 
in the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs, which is responsible for setting international tax 
standards, including in the area of transfer pricing. In general, India’s tax regulations adopt the 
OECD principles and follow the OECD guidelines. PwC, “International Transfer Pricing 
2015/2016”, PwC Network, online: <www.pwc.com/internationaltp>. 
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out the “unfairness of the extant international order relating to international taxation”354 – 
maintains some views contrary to the international standard rules in the area of transfer 
pricing, particularly regarding issues such as comparability analysis, risks, location savings 
and intangible property.   
Although the Indian transfer pricing law was introduced more than fifteen years ago, it is 
constantly evolving. Recent transfer pricing audits have brought some controversial issues 
to light and resulted in a number of disputes between taxpayers and Indian tax authorities. 
Thus, India currently has a mass of jurisprudence regarding the international taxation of 
MNEs and, more specifically, transfer pricing. In this context, since the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines play a supplementary role in transfer pricing on cases where the Indian 
legislation is silent355, in many situations, there is a divergence between the Indian transfer 
pricing administration – the positions that Indian representatives expressed in the UN 
Practical Manual, for instance – and the decisions of Indian courts on transfer pricing 
issues. 
 
4.4 China 
As the world economy becomes increasingly globalized, transfer pricing is an issue 
faced not only by developed countries, but is increasingly a critical matter for 
developing countries. Such nations face a set of unique issues that have not been 
addressed, or at least not sufficiently or practically addressed by the OECD 
Guidelines356.  
                                                
354 According to D.P. Sengupta, “despite being a populous, poor and fractious democracy for the 
majority of its independent existence, when negotiating international agreements, India has never 
been completely dominated by any other party. To borrow an analogy from economics, it has never 
behaved like a typical price taker”. Sengupta, supra note 304 at 115. 
355 Indian jurisprudence has a variety of examples in which the courts have endorsed reference to 
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and Commentary in interpreting and applying Indian 
transfer pricing law. Butani, supra note 287 at 632. 
356 Tizhong Liao, Deputy Director of the International Taxation Department of the State 
Administration of Taxaton (People’s Republic of China) and Wang Xiaoyue, Director of Anti-
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4.4.1 Introduction 
China is regarded as a relative “late-comer” in the global transfer pricing area358, having 
followed the international tax experience of other countries to create its own transfer 
pricing system360. Today, transfer pricing is one of Chinese tax authorities main focus, 
especially due to the following factors: 1) the growing relevance of imports and exports as 
a proportion of China’s GDP; 2) the propensity for Chinese affiliates to rely on intellectual 
property and services provided by foreign-related parties; 3) the institution of rigorous 
transfer pricing rules in some of China’s strategic trading partners; 4) the accession of the 
country to the World Trade Organization, which resulted in a reduction in its tariff rates 
and, consequently, created pressure for greater revenues; 5) the inclination for Chinese 
affiliates to declare operating losses; and 6) policy changes that eliminated some tax 
incentives for foreign invested enterprises and may motivate MNEs to use transfer pricing 
strategies to reduce their tax liability in the country361.  
While China has accepted the ALP and OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines methodologies, 
its transfer pricing system is still in a process of development. This is because, although 
China deals with the same transfer pricing problems faced by developed countries, it also 
encounters particular challenges related to its nature as a developing country with an 
emerging economy. Therefore, this section will analyze how China applies and reconciles 
the ALP with its unique national market features as well as the challenges the country faces 
in employing international transfer pricing regulations in practical situations. In order to 
understand these concepts, the development of transfer pricing rules in China will be 
reviewed as well as the current Chinese transfer pricing law.  
                                                
Avoidance Division of the International Taxation Department of the State Administration of 
Taxation in UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 374. 
358 Only from the 1980s onwards, China began to create its own unique transfer pricing system. 
Michelle Markham and Yixin Liao, “The Development of Transfer Pricing in China” (2014) 29:4 
Australian Tax Forum 715. 
360 According to Michele Markham and Yixin Liao, “China’s basic transfer pricing principles and 
methods, including the use of comparable factors and a comparability analysis, are the result of a 
direct transplantation of the relevant provisions from the OECD TPG”. Ibid at 742. 
361 Chris Devonshire-Ellis, Andy Scott and Sam Woollard, Transfer Pricing in China 2nd ed 
(Heildelberg: Springer, 2011) at 4-5. 
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4.4.2 Historical Background 
4.4.2.1.1 China’s Open Door Policies and Pre-2008 Transfer 
Pricing Regulations 
China has begun opening up to foreign investments in 1979, with the implementation of 
kaifang zhengce362: a series of open door policies directed to increasing the country’s 
participation in the world market and promoting technological modernization, especially 
through the diffusion of foreign technology363. As a result, multinational enterprises were 
allowed to invest in China as joint ventures or wholly-owned subsidiaries364, thus 
facilitating foreign investments. Consequently, the country started to experience 
international transactions of goods, services and intangibles between related enterprises as 
well as the associated transfer pricing issues.  
Following China’s opening-up policy, a variety of laws were drafted to regulate foreign 
investments, including the Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China Concerning 
Joint Ventures with Chinese and Foreign Investment365, promulgated on September 10, 
1980 and the Income Tax Law applicable to Foreign Enterprises366, promulgated in 1981. 
The former was focused on equity joint ventures composed of a foreign investor and a 
Chinese partner. The latter was focused on other categories of foreign investments, such as 
contractual joint ventures, joint explorations and wholly foreign-owned enterprises. Since 
China’s main objective was to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and the export of 
                                                
362 According to Roger Hayter and Sun Sheng Han, kaifang zhengce was formally introduced by 
the “Act of Joint Venture Enterprises”, which regulated principles related to Chinese national 
sovereignty and international practices of foreign enterprises, permitting the approval of foreign 
investments if they were beneficial for China. Roger Hayter and Sun Sheng Han, “Reflections on 
China’s Open Policy Towards Foreign Direct Investment” (1997) 32:1 Regional Studies 1 at 6-7. 
363 Xiaowen Tian, “China’s Open-door Policy in Development Perspective” (1996) 17:1 Canadian 
Journal of Development Studies 75 at 76-78. 
364 Hayter and Han, supra note 349 at 9. 
365 Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China Concerning Joint Ventures with Chinese and 
Foreign Investment, People’s Republic of China 1980. 
366 Income Tax Law Applicable to Foreign Enterprises, People’s Republic of China 1981. 
  
95 
Chinese-made products into the international market, both laws contained substantial tax 
incentives, especially for joint ventures operating with a local equity partner367. 
None of these tax laws established transfer pricing rules, creating a favourable environment 
for foreign investors to design strategies to reallocate their profits from China to other 
jurisdictions. Therefore, from the 1980s to the early 1990s, Chinese tax authorities did not 
challenge transfer pricing practices368. The lack of transfer pricing rules and investigations 
demonstrates how, at that time, rather than being a major concern for Chinese authorities, 
aggressive transfer pricing was perceived as an inherent part of the new MNE’s businesses 
in the country. In the case of joint ventures, for instance, since the Chinese partners were 
not experienced in dealing with the world market – due to decades of closed-door policies 
in China – the foreign partner was usually responsible for selling the products to the 
international market and for purchasing technology, equipment and materials. This type of 
arrangement provided the foreign partner with the ability to control the prices of the 
transactions between the related enterprises369. Furthermore, Chinese tax incentive 
measures encouraged foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) to export all or greater part of 
their products370. Maintaining low prices for these products made them more competitive 
in the international market and shifted profits from the Chinese affiliates to its related 
enterprises overseas.  
                                                
367 According to Jinyan Li, during the 1980s and 1990s, tax incentives in the form of special 
preferential tax regimes were thriving in China. The author explains that “granting tax preference 
was a key strategy from political, cultural and economic perspective. Politically, granting tax 
preferences to FDI sent a clear signal to foreign investors China’s desire for their investment. This 
signaling effect was historically important because China suffered from serious image problems 
due to its previous hostile policies to foreign investors”. Jinyan Li, “The Rise and Fall of Chinese 
Tax Incentives and Implications for International Tax Debates” (2007) 8:7 Florida Tax Review 670 
at 673 [Li, “Rise and Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives”]. 
368 Ibid at 635. 
369 Ibid. 
370 Article 6 of the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign 
Investment and Foreign Enterprises prescribes that “the State shall, in accordance with the 
industrial policies, guide the orientation of foreign investment and encourage the establishment of 
enterprises with foreign investment which adopt advanced technology and equipment and export 
all or greater part of their products”. Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China for 
Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises, People’s Republic of China 1991, 
Article 6. 
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By the end of the 1980s, three quarters of the FIEs operating in China were reporting tax 
losses, mainly due to transfer pricing371. Besides representing a potential loss of tax revenue 
for the country, transfer pricing also caused a loss of profit to the Chinese partner – usually 
state-owned enterprises – in the joint venture372. In response, the National People’s 
Congress enacted in April 1991 the Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China for 
Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises (the “ITEF”), introducing in 
its Article 13 the first Chinese transfer pricing legislation373. Article 13 established the 
ALP374 as the Chinese standard to define the appropriate transfer price in transactions 
between FIEs and their associated enterprises.    
In June 1991, the Rules for the Implementation of the ITEF375 were promulgated. These 
rules, in its Chapter IV (Dealings between Associated Enterprises), detailed the application 
of Article 13 of the ITEF. Subsequently, the State Administration of Taxation (SAT)376 
published a circular entitled The Implementation Measures for the Tax Administration of 
                                                
371 Jinyan Li, “Transfer Pricing Disputes in China” in Eduardo Baistrocchi and Ian Roxan, eds, 
Resolving Transfer Pricing Disputes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 2012 at 637 
[Li, “Transfer Pricing Disputes in China”]. 
372 Ibid at 638. 
373 Article 13 of the Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign 
Investment and Foreign Enterprises provides that the payment or receipt of charges or fees in 
business transactions between an enterprise with foreign investment, or an establishment or a place 
set up in China by a foreign enterprise to engage in production or business operations, and its 
associated enterprises, shall be made in the same manner as the payment or receipt of charges or 
fees in business transactions between independent enterprises. Where the payment or receipt of 
charges or fees is not made in the same manner as in business transactions between independent 
enterprises and results in a reduction of the taxable income, the tax authorities shall have the right 
to make reasonable adjustments. Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China for Enterprises 
with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises, People’s Republic of China 1991, Article 13. 
374 The establishment of the arm’s length principle in China was not seen as a surprise: the country 
had been following international tax norms, with the necessary modifications to suit local 
conditions and the principle had already been included in a great number of Chinese tax treaties, 
being viewed as “the only realistic solution to the transfer pricing problem”. Li, “Transfer Pricing 
Disputes in China” supra note 358 at 638. 
375 Rules for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises, People’s republic of China 1991. 
376 The State Administration of Taxation (SAT) is the primary tax authority in China. It consists in 
a ministry-level organization that regulates taxation from a strategic, regulatory and oversight 
perspective. Inside the SAT, there is the International Tax Department, which controls anti-tax 
evasion. Devonshire-Ellis, Scott and Woollard, supra note 348 at 2. 
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Transactions between Associated Enterprises in 1992 as well as a series of comprehensive 
operative measures to implement the general transfer pricing rules377. During this period, 
considered the “second stage of development for Chinese transfer pricing legislation”378,  
China progressively created a comprehensive transfer pricing system, formed by tax laws, 
administrative regulations and departmental rules.  
4.4.2.2 The 2008 Enterprise Income Law 
After China’s accession to the WTO in 2001379, Chinese internal markets were opened to 
goods produced by FIEs and Chinese companies were encouraged to invest overseas380. 
This increase in the integration between China and the global economy intensified the 
complexity of transfer pricing issues in the country. China’s accession to the WTO has also 
resulted in a reduction in the country’s tariff rates, creating concerns about raising revenues 
for the country. In this context, transfer pricing issues have become one of China’s SAT 
main focus, particularly because of the tendency for Chinese subsidiaries of MNEs to rely 
on intellectual property and services provided by overseas related parties, as well as to 
declare operating losses: over 50% of enterprises’ losses in China in 2011 were generated 
by foreign owned enterprises381.  
                                                
377 These included the Implementing Measures of the State Administration of Taxation for the Tax 
Administration of Business Transactions between Associated Enterprises (Guoshuifa [1992] 
No.237), 1992, Notice on Several Specific Issues in the Implementation of the Implementing 
Measures of the State Administration of Taxation for the Tax Administration of Business 
Transactions between Associated Enterprises (Guoshuifa [1992] No. 242), 1992, the 
Administrative Regulations on the Taxation of Business Transactions between Associated 
Enterprises (Guoshuifa [1998] No. 59) 1998, Notice of the State Administration of Taxation on 
Distributing the (Trial) Implementing Rules for Negotiated Pricing for the Transactions Among 
Associated Enterprises (Guoshuifa [2004] No. 118), 2004 and Rules for the Administration of 
Business Transactions between A liated Enterprises (Guoshuifa [2004] No.143) 2004. Markham 
and Liao, supra note 346 at 718. 
378 Ibid. 
379 World Trade Organization, “Accessions: China”, online: World Trade Organization <https:// 
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_chine_e.htm> 
380 In order to be formally admitted to the WTO, China had to follow concession commitments 
related to market access to goods, foreign trade liberalization and tariff barrier reduction under 
GATT. Ling-Ling He and Razeen Sappideen, “Reflections on China’s WTO Accession 
Commitments and Their Observance” (2009) 43:4 Journal of World Trade 847 at 851. 
381 Devonshire-Ellis, Scott and Woollard, supra note 348 at 4-5. 
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Therefore, a new stage in the development of transfer pricing began in March 2007, with 
the introduction of the Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China382 
(the EIT Law) by the National People’s Congress383. The EIT Law eliminated most of the 
previous preferential tax regimes and established a harmonized tax rate of 25 per cent384, 
resulting in a substantially higher tax burden to most foreign investors. With the 
elimination of tax incentives, MNE’s tax planning shifted from seeing China “as a low-tax 
location where it is desirable to recognize profits to a relatively high-tax jurisdiction in 
which the goal is to minimize taxable profits”385, turning transfer pricing into an even more 
relevant issue for the country. This new phase is characterized by a rigorous 
implementation of the Chinese transfer pricing regulations and strengthening tax 
investigations of transactions between related enterprises386. Since the beginning of this 
new stage in 2008, the number of enterprises being investigated in China increased 
annually, which consequently increased the amount of tax collected from MNEs387.  
                                                
382 Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China, People’s Republic of China 2007 
(hereinafter ‘EIT Law’).  
383 In November 2007, the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Implementation of 
the Enterprise Income Tax Law were published, detailing important transfer pricing rules in its 
Articles 109 to 115. 
384 Before the new EIT Law, many foreign invested companies were subject to 15 per cent or 24 
per cent tax rates, combined with tax holidays to eliminate or reduce by half the applicable tax rate 
for a certain number of years. Jon Eichelberger and Brendan Kelly, “Tax Planning Strategies in 
Response to China’s Changing Tax Landscape: Issues and Structures to be Considered in a Post-
Tax Unification China” (2008) 36:5 Intertax 221 at 221. 
385 Ibid. 
386 Markham and Liao, supra note 346 at 720. 
387 In 2007, China was the eighth most aggressive tax authority in regards to transfer pricing. 
(Transfer Pricing Week, “Top 10 toughest tax authorities for transfer pricing in 2007” (2007), 
online: TP Week: <https://www.tpweek.com/articles/top-10-toughest-tax-authorities-for-transfer-
pricing-in-2007/arejkape>). Three years later, because of this new severer phase in its transfer 
pricing investigations, the country was ranked the third most aggressive tax authority in 2010. 
(Transfer Pricing Week, “Asian Countries Top Aggressive Tax Authorities Poll”, (2010), online: 
TP Week: <https://www.tpweek.com/articles/asian-countries-top-aggressive-tax-authority-
poll/arddwcch>.) 
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4.4.3 Transfer Pricing Regulations in China 
4.4.3.1.1 The Arm’s Length Principle 
Chinese tax treaties commonly follow Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty concerning the 
ALP388. At present, the main Chinese transfer pricing regulations are the EIT Law (Articles 
41 to 44), the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Implementation of the 
Enterprise Income Tax Law389 (Article 109-115), the Rules for the Implementation of the 
Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of Tax Collection390(the “EIT 
Regulations”) (Articles 51-56), administrative regulations and guidelines issued by the 
SAT and tax treaties. Article 41 of the EIT Law codifies the ALP as follows:  
Article 41. As regards a transaction between an enterprise and its affiliated 
parties, in case the taxable revenue or income of the enterprise or its 
affiliated parties reduces by virtue of the failure to conform to the arm’s 
length principle, the tax organ may, through a reasonable method, make an 
adjustment. As regards the costs of an enterprise and its affiliated parties for 
jointly developing or accepting intangible assets, or jointly providing or 
accepting labor services, they shall, when calculating the taxable income 
amount, apportion them according to the arm’s length principle391. 
Thus, enterprises must conduct business transactions with their affiliated parties observing 
the ALP, which, according to Article 110 of the EIT Regulations, refers to “the principle 
adopted by unrelated parties in carrying out transactions with each other according to a fair 
                                                
388 China has signed tax treaties with 102 countries and Article 9 of the OECD Model is included 
in the majority of them. The Chinese treaties that do not include Article 9 are older agreements 
signed before 1991, such as the ones with Austria, Brazil, Canada, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Norway, 
Poland, Spain and Thailand. In new treaties signed after 2007 – replacing older treaties where 
Article 9 was not included, such as those with Belgium, France, Germany, Singapore, Switzerland 
and the United Kingdom – Article 9 was incorporated in accordance to the OECD Model. 
389 Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Implementation of the Enterprise Income 
Tax Law, People’s Republic of China 2007. 
390 Rules for the Implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration 
of Tax Collection, People’s Republic of China 2002. 
391 EIT Law, Article 41. 
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price and a normal business practice”392. The main goal of transfer pricing rules is to ensure 
that related parties are pricing their transactions using the ALP, making sure that these 
transactions have a fair market value price and that the Chinese tax base is protected. In 
cases where the transactions between related enterprises are not conducted at arm’s length 
and, as a result, the amount of taxable income in China is reduced, the EIT Law allows 
Chinese tax authorities to make reasonable adjustments.  
4.4.3.2 The Concept of Related Party Transactions 
Chinese transfer pricing rules are applied to transactions between related parties or 
associated parties393. The concept of “related parties” is provided in Article 109 of the EIT 
Regulations, according to which “related parties, as cited in Article 41 of the EIT Law, 
refer to enterprises, other entities and individuals, which have any of the following 
relationships with an enterprise: 1) direct or indirect control over such matters as finance, 
business operations, purchases and sales, etc.; 2) both directly or indirectly controlled by a 
third party; 3) other relationship due to associated interests”394. In regards to the criteria for 
determining if an enterprise is considered to be related to another enterprise, economic 
organization or individual, Chinese tax authorities adopt a substance test as opposed to a 
legalistic and formal approach395. Although the scope of the transfer pricing law is broad, 
comprehending all forms of related party transactions, international transactions are, in 
                                                
392 Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Implementation of the Enterprise Income 
Tax Law, People’s Republic of China 2007, Article 110. 
393 The usage of the term “related parties” or “associated parties” in the Chinese transfer pricing 
legislation corresponds to the use of the term “associated enterprises” in Article 9 of the OECD 
Model Convention and in Article 9 of the United Nations Model Convention. The different choice 
of words is important because, in Chinese transfer pricing law, a related party does not have to be 
an ‘enterprise’: it can be a partnership or an individual. The determination of the relationship is 
based on a “substance-over-form approach” Li, “Transfer Pricing Disputes in China” supra note 
358 at 645. 
394 Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Implementation of the Enterprise Income 
Tax Law, People’s Republic of China 2007, Article 109. 
395 Li, “Transfer Pricing Disputes in China” supra note 358 at 638. 
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practice, the SAT’s main targets of investigation396. If the parties of a transaction are not 
related, even if the transaction involves parties in tax havens, transfer pricing rules are not 
applied. In this case, the General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) may be applied. 
According to Article 10 of The Administrative Measures of Special Tax Adjustments 
(Circular [2009] No. 2), related party transactions include the following categories: 1) the 
sale, purchase, transfer and use of tangible property; 2) the transfer and use of intangible 
property, including providing the right to use licenses as well as industrial property rights; 
3) financing, including all types of interest-bearing advances and deferred payments, loans 
and security; and 4) the provision of services397. The focus of early transfer pricing 
investigations by the SAT was generally on transactions of tangible goods, including 
selling, purchasing, assigning and leasing tangible property such as buildings, means of 
transport, machinery, tools and products398. Recently, the Chinese revenue authorities have 
been more concentrated on transactions involving intangible property399 and the provision 
of services400.  
4.4.3.3 Transfer Pricing Methods 
Under the EIT Law and the EIT Regulations, the transfer pricing methods used to calculate 
the arm’s length price of a transactions include, but are not limited to the internationally 
recognized methods. Therefore, taxpayers and tax authorities may use the comparable 
uncontrolled price method (CUP), the resale price method, the cost-plus method, the 
transactional net margin method (TNMM), the profit split method as well as any “other 
                                                
396 Tianlong Hu and Na Li, “China Tax Treaty and Policy: Developments and Updates” in Yariv 
Brauner and Pasquale Pistone, eds, BRICS and the Emergence of International Tax Coordination 
(Amsterdam: IBFD, 2015) 181 at 204. 
397 The Administrative Measures of Special Tax Adjustments, Circular [2009] 2, People’s Republic 
of China 2009, Article 10. 
398 Markham and Liao, supra note 346 at 727. 
399 According to a former SAT official, Shanwu Yuan, Chinese tax authorities believe that foreign 
parent companies usually overprice intangible property provided to its Chinese related enterprises. 
K A Bell “China Believes Developed Countries Often Overprice Intangibles, Former Official 
 says” (2014) 22 Tax Management Transfer Pricing Report 1506.    
400 UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 374. 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reasonable method” to evaluate if the ALP was followed401. The definition of other 
reasonable methods, in this case, seems to be dictated more by the “right outcome”, i.e., 
what the Chinese tax authorities want, rather than the right process or methodology”, 
according to the Chinese “substance-over-form” pragmatic and holistic approach to tax 
avoidance402. 
China follows the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines recommendation with regards to the 
selection of the most appropriate transfer pricing method – whether it is one of the 
traditional transaction methods or one of the transactional profit methods – to the 
circumstances of the case in analysis403. Similar to the OECD, Chinese tax authorities have 
also reviewed their position of recommending a hierarchy between transfer pricing 
methodologies and currently allow the most reasonable applicable method to be used404. 
Chapter 4 of Circular [2009] No. 2 provides detailed instructions regarding the selection 
of the appropriate transfer pricing method, based on the different types of existing 
transactions and their characteristics405.  
When the taxpayer fails to provide information on its transactions with associated 
enterprises or provides false or incomplete information, Article 44 of the EIT Law 
authorizes tax authorities to assess the taxable profit on the taxpayer’s income in relation 
to the related party transaction on a deemed basis406. The reason for allowing this power to 
the SAT – which increases the revenue authorities control in regulating transfer pricing 
abuses –  is the perceived information asymmetry existent between the taxpayer and the 
Chinese tax authorities407. Since this discretion to tax on a deemed basis may damage 
legitimate interests of taxpayers, the exercise of this power needs to comply with the 
                                                
401 Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Implementation of the Enterprise Income 
Tax Law, People’s Republic of China 2007, Article 111. 
402 Li, “Transfer Pricing Disputes in China”, supra note 358 at 638-639. 
403 Markham and Liao, supra note 346 at 729-730. 
404 The former Detailed Implementing Rules of 1991, in its Article 54, established a hierarchy for 
the application of transfer pricing methods. 
405 Supra note 385. 
406 EIT Law, Article 44. 
407 Markham and Liao, supra note 346 at 731. 
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prescribed procedures defined in Article 115 of the EIT Regulations, which prescribes that 
the determination of the acceptable transfer price can be assessed: 1) by reference to the 
profit rate level of identical or similar enterprises; 2) based on the cost of the enterprise 
plus a reasonable amount of expenses and profit margin; 3) based on a reasonable 
proportion out of the total profits earned by the related party group; or 4) based on any 
other reasonable method408. Article 115 also establishes that the burden to prove the deemed 
tax payable lies with the tax authority and that, if the taxpayer does not agree with the 
result, it may provide opposing evidence409. Although these rules limit the power of the 
SAT, the condition that allows the imposition of taxes on a deemed basis – in cases of false 
or incomplete information provided by the taxpayer – is considered vague and, 
consequently, may induce the SAT to skip the need to “collect sufficient information and 
conduct a careful comparability analysis” and proceed straightforwardly to taxing in 
accordance to what they deem the taxpayer’s income to be410. 
4.4.4 Peculiarities and Challenges in China’s Transfer Pricing 
Practices 
During the implementation of transfer pricing rules in China, the ALP was ‘transplanted’ 
from Western countries into an extremely different legal culture in China411. Although 
China has unique economic and legal features, years of closed-door policies – resulting in 
a lack of experience in regulating international transactions – led the country to base great 
                                                
408 Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Implementation of the Enterprise Income 
Tax Law, People’s Republic of China 2007, Article 115. 
409 Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Implementation of the Enterprise Income 
Tax Law, People’s Republic of China 2007, Article 115. 
410 Markham and Liao, supra note 346 at 731-732. 
411 Contrary to Western legal culture, which, generally stating, has a system based on the principle 
of the rule of law and separation of powers (having a judiciary independent of the government and 
legislature in which, before the court, the taxpayer and the government are equal), China is a 
socialist country ruled by law, having no separation of powers . Therefore, in the area of taxation, 
the Chinese Ministry of Finance and the SAT have the power to make, interpret and enforce the 
laws and the judiciary has little power to interpret the meaning of these laws. For this reason, it is 
very difficult for the taxpayer in China to disagree with the tax authorities. The result, in transfer 
pricing, is that there was only one case in China regarding the topic, in which the taxpayer went to 
the Chinese curt, lost the case and withdrew its appeal. Li, “Transfer Pricing Disputes in China”, 
supra note 358 at 641-644. 
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part of its transfer pricing system on the knowledge and practices from developed 
countries. In comparison with developed countries, China is still at an early stage of 
development and, while the transfer pricing problems the country faces may be similar to 
those encountered by more developed economies, it also has to deal with particular 
challenges prevalent in developing countries412.  
The ALP, to a large extent, clashes with important elements of Chinese legal and political 
approaches as explained by Jinyan Li: 
The notion of ‘arm’s length’ is ‘foreign’ to the Chinese cultural emphasis 
on ‘guanxi’ or ‘relationships’. In the Chinese culture, ‘insiders’ are expected 
to treat each other differently from ‘outsiders’. Insiders value the long-term 
relationship and may not care about immediate cost or benefits. Expecting 
‘insiders’ to behave like strangers in the eyes of law may require a cultural 
shift. Furthermore, the rules-based application of the arm’s length principle 
is not an easy fit with the Chinese holistic, pragmatic approach to problem-
solving. The Chinese approach is exemplified by Deng Xiaoping’s famous 
saying that ‘It doesn’t matter if a cat is black or white, so long as it catches 
mice413. 
In this context, important aspects in the Chinese transfer pricing system demonstrate how 
the Chinese adaptation of the ALP seems to be guided by regarding the principle as “a 
means to an end, not the end by itself”414. For example, while Article 41 of the EIT Law 
proclaims the ALP as the guiding standard in transfer pricing adjustments, Article 111 of 
the EIT Regulations prescribes “other reasonable methods” that can be used in establishing 
the arm’s length price of a transaction. There is also the provision of Article 115 of the EIT 
Regulations, which allows the taxpayer’s profit to be assessed on a deemed basis in cases 
                                                
412 China’s views on the challenges it has in applying the arm’s length principle and transfer pricing 
methods established by the OECD Guidelines are officially exposed in the UN Practical Manual. 
UN Practical Manual, supra note 3. 
413 Li, “Transfer Pricing Disputes in China”, supra note 358 at 661. 
414 Ibid at 660. 
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where the taxpayer has failed to provide complete information on transfer pricing. These 
are some of the Chinese transfer pricing developments that indicate how the ALP, although 
formally enacted in China within the framework of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 
is applied in substance with respect to country’s specific practices.  
4.4.4.1 The Issue of Finding Reliable Comparables 
The ALP is generally applied by comparing the conditions in transactions between related 
parties with conditions in transactions between independent parties in order to determine 
whether the prices of these transactions are different. According to the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines, these comparisons are only useful if the economically relevant 
characteristics of the situations being compared are “sufficiently comparable”, i.e., if none 
of the differences between the situations being compared substantially affects the 
conditions being examined, such as the price or margin, or if precise adjustments can be 
made to remove the outcomes of any such differences 415. In this context, China follows the 
recommendation made by the OECD Guidelines and requires the performance of a 
comparability analysis416 in determining acceptable comparable transactions. Article 22 of 
the Circular [2009] No. 2, for example, provides that a comparability analysis should 
consider five factors: characteristics of assets transacted or services provided, functions 
performed and risks assumed by each party to a transaction, contractual terms and 
conditions, economic circumstances, and business strategies417. 
As a developing country and an emerging market economy, one of the key challenges for 
the SAT and taxpayers in applying the ALP is finding reliable and public information on 
comparables as well as comparable independent transactions which are able to satisfy all 
                                                
415 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra note 8. 
416 The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines state that “an analysis of the controlled and uncontrolled 
transactions, which is referred to as a “comparability analysis”, is at the heart of the application of 
the arm’s length principle”. Ibid at 33. 
417 When determining comparability, the OECD Guidelines establish the same five factors in the 
analysis: characteristics of property or services, functional analysis, contractual terms, economic 
circumstances and business strategies. Ibid. 
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the requirements of the comparability analysis418. Developing and emerging countries 
usually have only a small number of public companies419 and the information on domestic 
private companies420 can be either inadequate or non-existent421. For this reason, the amount 
of publicly available information on domestic companies that can be used for transfer 
pricing comparability analysis is limited in China422. As a result, foreign companies – 
usually companies in developed countries, where there is a larger number of public 
companies – need to be used as substitutes to domestic comparables423. Because of this lack 
of information and difficulty in obtaining reliable data, there are no provisions in Chinese 
transfer pricing rules prohibiting the use of foreign comparables424. Therefore, tax 
authorities and taxpayers are able to select either internal or external comparables 
according to which of these can provide a better comparability analysis. 
China’s understanding is that substantial comparability adjustments must be done in order 
to enable the use of companies in developed countries as comparables for companies in 
developing countries425. These adjustments are necessary to eliminate price or profit 
                                                
418 UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 375. 
419 Particularly in China, the domestic securities market is considered to be in a very initial stage: 
although more than 1,600 companies have listed in the Chinese domestic stock market since 2000, 
this is still a small number compared to the size of the country’s economy. Carl Walter and Fraser 
Howie, “Taking Stock of China’s Reforms” (2014) Wall Street Journal, online: 
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/walter-and-howie-taking-stock-of-chinas-reforms-1392828606>. 
420 According to Michelle Markham and Yoxon Liao, “it is not easy to get information from Chinese 
private companies for the purpose of comparability analysis, as these usually keep their information 
confidential or only disclose minimal information”. Markham and Liao, supra note 346 at 729. 
421 In 2013, there were only around 2000 public companies in China and the information on private 
company is lacking or inadequate, limiting the amount of publically available information that can 
be used for transfer pricing analysis. Besides that, China is a manufacture-based economy with 
significant vertical simple-function FDI, which makes even more difficult to compare a Chinese 
manufacturer with a company that has full functions. Tizhong Liao, Deputy Director General of 
China’s State Administration of Taxation’s International Taxation Department in Transfer Pricing 
Week, “SAT’S Liao Tizhong discusses China’s transfer pricing position: Part One” (2013), online: 
TP Week: <https://www.tpweek.com/articles/sats-liao-tizhong-discusses-chinas-transfer-pricing-
position-part-one/araejlcu>. 
422 UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 375. 
423 Ibid at 376. 
424  Markham and Liao, supra note 346 at 728. 
425 UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 376. 
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differences attributable to different conditions in the market environment of these 
countries: 
One of the most common adjustments in China is accounting for differences 
in geographic comparability when applying profit-based transfer pricing 
methods, such as the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM), to 
determine an arm’s length price. For example, when an Asia Pacific set of 
companies is used to benchmark the transfer prices of a Chinese taxpayer, 
as often being the case, it often includes companies from both developed 
countries (such as Japan and Korea), as well as developing countries (such 
as Indonesia and Vietnam). Generally speaking, the Asia Pacific set is more 
likely to contain companies from developed countries, due to a greater 
number of listed companies in those countries and hence there is a greater 
volume of publicly available financial information426. 
Therefore, China takes the view that there are situations in which geographical market 
differences between foreign and domestic comparables will require an appropriate 
adjustment to balance the differences. This approach, nevertheless, can create uncertainties 
in the Chinese process of establishing the applicable transfer price for a related party 
transaction, increasing potential tax disputes between authorities and taxpayers427.  
4.4.4.2 Location-Specific Advantages 
Location-Specific Advantages (LSAs) are advantages that companies have in their 
production arising from assets, resource endowments, government policies or other 
incentives that exist in specific localities428. The concept of LSAs, which is not explored in 
                                                
426 Ibid. 
427 Markham and Liao, supra note 346 at 729. 
428 “For example, household electronics manufacturers invest in China to take advantage of a large 
pool of well-educated low-cost labour and a well-developed network of suppliers. Likewise, global 
automotive companies set up joint ventures (JVs) in China to assemble automobiles locally to be 
close to the market and the customers and to take advantage of lower costs.” UN Practical Manual 
supra note 3 at 376. 
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the  2010 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines429, can refer to “location savings”, which are 
the net costs savings derived by a multinational enterprise when it moves its operations to 
a low-cost jurisdiction, such as China and other developing countries, which usually offer 
inexpensive rents, transportation, labour and raw materials430. Another concept 
encompassed in LSAs refers to “market premium”, i.e., the additional profit earned by a 
multinational enterprise that operates in a jurisdiction with unique characteristics that 
positively impact on the sale and demand of services or products431. 
Tax authorities in China have argued that LSAs – resulting from the country’s unique 
market features – deserve proper recognition and compensation through appropriate 
transfer prices. In the SAT’s view, due to the low cost and higher selling prices found in 
China, a great number of foreign corporations should have higher profit margins because 
of location savings and market premiums, particularly in the automotive432, pharmaceutical 
and luxury industries433. In order to determine LSAs and their impact on transfer pricing, 
Chinese tax authorities follow a four-step approach: 1) identify the existence of a LSA; 2) 
determine if the LSA generates additional profits; 3) measure the additional profits 
                                                
429 The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines only explore the idea of geographic markets, which can 
affect comparability analysis, establishing that: “the identification of the relevant market is a factual 
question. For a number of industries, large regional markets encompassing more than one country 
may prove to be reasonably homogenous, while for other, differences among domestic markets (or 
even within domestic markets) are very significant”. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra 
note 8 at 49. 
430 These countries, however, may also involve higher costs, such as those related to poor 
infrastructure and to the training costs for hiring less skilled labour. Location savings are only 
considered when the net reduction in these costs from moving to the low-cost jurisdiction is 
positive. Shanto Ghosh, Wei Shu and Rahul Tomar, “Location-Specific Advantages: India and 
China” (2014) International Tax Review. 
431 UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 376. 
432 In the automotive industry, LSAs have provided extraordinarily high profits and include: 1) the 
general preference of Chinese consumers for foreign brands and imported products, which creates 
the possibility for MNEs to charge higher prices; 2) massive demand for automotive vehicles in 
China because of the growing wealth of its large population; 3) capacity limitations on the supply 
of automotive vehicles domestically assembled; 4) large supply of high quality and low cost parts 
produced by Chinese suppliers. UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 378. 
433 Ghosh, Shu and Tomar, supra note 416. 
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generated by the LSA; and 4) define the applicable transfer pricing method to allocate the 
profits arising from the LSA434.  
The concepts of location savings and market premiums have recently been used by the 
SAT in its transfer pricing audits: 
For instance, a foreign company’s Chinese subsidiary was determined to 
adjust its income tax for more than RMB 100 million for 10 years. LSAs 
also have been used in self-adjustments, which are similar to transfer pricing 
audits although not legally official and conducted by state bureaus. The 
SAT has also used LSAs in bilateral APA cases, especially in negotiations 
with Japan’s National Tax Authority. Chinese courts have adjudicated very 
few transfer pricing cases, and none of them involve LSAs435. 
Therefore, since many Chinese LSAs generate high profits that are rightly earned by 
Chinese taxpayers, these LSAs are expected to result in profit allocations to Chinese 
parties. In this context, Tizhong Liao, Deputy Director General of China’s SAT 
International Taxation Department, argues that the world needs to start taking LSAs 
seriously as China will continue to apply it in both transfer pricing investigations and 
Advanced Pricing Agreements (APAs) negotiations, adding that taxpayers and competent 
authorities’ counterparts have been understanding and accepting this concept436. 
4.4.4.3 Intangibles 
One of the main challenges in the application of the ALP, both for developed and 
developing countries437, consists in determining the appropriate transfer price for 
                                                
434 UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 377. 
435 Ghosh, Shu and Tomar, supra note 416. 
436 Transfer Pricing Week, “SAT’S Liao Tizhong discusses China’s transfer pricing position: Part 
One” (2013), online: TP Week: <https://www.tpweek.com/articles/sats-liao-tizhong-discusses-
chinas-transfer-pricing-position-part-one/araejlcu>. 
437 The Chinese view is that “while MNEs in developed countries often have superior technology 
intangibles, they need the fast growing market in the developing countries to develop these markets 
in order to monetize the value in such intangibles”. UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 380. 
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transactions involving intangible property438 transactions. In the case of China, the issue 
assumes greater relevance because, as almost all important MNEs currently have 
subsidiaries in the country – making China the ‘factory of the world’ – it is common to see 
related parties charging excessive royalties and shifting away taxable profits of the Chinese 
enterprise439. In this context, the SAT’s understanding is that foreign parent enterprises 
usually overprice intangibles provided to its Chinese-related parties and, for this reason, 
ensuring that Chinese subsidiaries are appropriately remunerated is one of the SAT’s main 
goals440. Article 41 of the EIT Law establishes that: 
As regards the costs of an enterprise and its affiliated parties for jointly 
developing or accepting intangible assets, or jointly providing or accepting 
labour services, they shall, when calculating the taxable income amount, 
apportion them according to the arm’s length principle441.  
Since intangibles can assume different forms, the SAT recognizes intangible properties for 
manufacturing purposes – including manufacturing technologies, technical designs, 
production molds, information technologies, various patents and non-patent technologies, 
business administration software, commercial secrets and proprietary technologies – and 
intangible properties for marketing and sales purposes – including trademarks, brands, 
logos, product packaging, customer information and customer relation management442. One 
important aspect is that, in order to be recognized by the SAT, intangible property 
transactions must be able to create consistent and effective benefits for the transferee 
taxpayer443. 
                                                
438 Intangible property is a taxpayer’s asset that, although has no physical form, it is legally 
protected and can be transferred between different taxpayers. Liao, Tizhong, “P. R. China’s 
Experience of Tax Administration on Transfer Pricing of Intangible Property Transactions” (United 
Nations Group of Experts Meeting on Tax Aspects of Domestic Resource Mobilization – A 
Discussion of Enduring and Emerging Issues, Rome, 4-5 September 2007), online: 
<www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/2007DRM_SEG/12TransferPricingChina.doc>. 
439 Ibid. 
440 Markham and Liao, supra note 346 at 727. 
441 EIL Law, Article 41. 
442 Supra note 424. 
443 Ibid. 
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Intangibles, generally in the form of global brand names, technical know-how or business 
processes, are commonly provided by MNEs to their Chinese affiliates during the initial 
stages of the local operation as a way of helping the establishment of the business in the 
country444. However, over time, the Chinese parties gain the skills and experience from 
operations in China and may even improve the MNE’s original intangibles445. In such cases, 
China understands that, instead of continuing to pay royalties for the parent company, 
Chinese affiliates should receive a return on the intangibles that they have developed and 
shared with the group companies, being entitled to an additional profit446. 
Besides that, in determining whether royalties are deductible or not for a Chinese 
enterprise, the SAT performs a ‘contribution-based value creation analysis’. According to 
this analysis, royalty payments to non-resident related parties that only have legal 
ownership of the intangible property but do not contribute to value creation are not 
deductible in computing taxable income447. The idea behind this analysis is that royalties – 
the economic benefit arising from the value creation – should reproduce the extent of 
contributions made by each related party to the value creation of the intangible property448. 
4.4.5 Conclusion 
Since their development in 1987, Chinese transfer pricing rules have evolved in a series of 
improvements that have produced the current complete transfer pricing system formed by 
tax laws, administrative regulations issued by the SAT and tax treaties. However, China’s 
mere ‘transplantation’ of the ALP and transfer pricing methodologies established by the 
                                                
444 UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 380. 
445 For instance, if the foreign parent company charged a 3 per cent royalty fee for the use of a 
manufacturing process to the Chinese affiliate when the operations were established in China in 
2002, it may not be appropriate for the Chinese affiliate to remain paying the same royalty fee in 
2012 because there should be a readjustment as to whether the intangible has continued to provide 
the same value in these ten years. In this case, it is possible that the Chinese affiliate has improved 
the manufacturing process provided by the foreign company by a process of trial and error over 
time. UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 380. 
446 Ibid. 
447 Jinyan Li, “China and BEPS: From Norm-Taker to Norm-Shaker” (2015) 69:6/7 Bulletin for 
International Taxation [Li, “China and BEPS”]. 
448 Ibid. 
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OECD into its tax system – due to the its lack of experience in dealing with international 
transactions after years of closed door policies – has left many of the country’s 
particularities unaddressed. China is a large developing country with an emerging economy 
and unique market features. This gives rise to singular problems in its international transfer 
pricing regulations, which are not addressed by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.  
Chinese particularities in applying the ALP involve a number of challenges endemic to 
developing countries. First, there is a lack of reliable comparables, which is occasioned by 
the absence of public information in China regarding domestic comparable transactions. 
Because of this difficulty, the SAT and taxpayers need to choose foreign comparables in 
order to determine the appropriate arm’s length price or profit; however, in this case, 
adjustments are required to eliminate eventual geographical differences. Furthermore, 
China provides Location Specific Advantages (LSAs) – location savings and market 
premium – and, according to the SAT, the additional profits it generates should be taken 
into account in establishing the profits of Chinese affiliates. Finally, China also faces the 
challenge of evaluating the contribution of its Chinese companies to intangible transactions 
with foreign related companies. 
 
4.5 South Africa 
As Africa continues to grow and become more integrated into the global economy, 
it is anticipated that more African nations will adopt transfer pricing regulations based on 
the ALS. Although transfer pricing regimes in Africa are expected to be based on the OECD 
Guidelines and the UN Practical Manual, African governments’ desire to protect revenues 
from natural resources will probably influence future transfer pricing legislation449.  
                                                
449 Anthony Curtis and Ogniana Todorova, “Spotlight on Africa’s transfer pricing landscape”, PwC 
Transfer Pricing Perspectives: Special Edition, online: <https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/transfer-
pricing/management-strategy/assets/pwc-transfer-pricing-africa-pdf.pdf>. 
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4.5.1 Introduction 
During the era of apartheid, South Africa experienced a period of economic, social and 
political isolation from the international market, which was reflected in the country’s tax 
system and transfer pricing rules. Transfer pricing rules were introduced into the South 
African Income Tax Act in 1995 and were revised and updated in 2012. For years, as part 
of South Africa’s efforts in integrating its tax system into the international scenario, the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines were closely followed. However, over time, several 
challenges have arisen in the application of South African transfer pricing rules, especially 
because, according to its tax authorities, although the OECD guidelines may be useful in 
providing an understanding about the ALP, they do not sufficiently respond to practical 
issues in the application of the principle450. At present, transfer pricing is a key area for 
South African tax authorities and an integral part of the “Compliance Programme” 
announced by South Africa’s Minister of Finance451.  
This section will analyze how South Africa applies its transfer pricing rules and what are 
the main challenges the country faces in following the ALP and the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines. In order to comprehend these concepts, this section will review the historical 
background of South African transfer pricing rules, the contemporary regulations on the 
subject and the most relevant challenges and peculiarities in its transfer pricing practices.  
4.5.2 Historical Background 
In the early 1990s, after years of isolation during the apartheid452 period, South Africa re-
emerged in the international market, experiencing an expansion of its international trade 
                                                
450 UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 410. 
451 The Compliance Programme has the goal of protecting the depletion of the South African tax 
base as a result of base erosion and profit shifting. The Davis Tax Committee Interim Report, 
“Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in South Africa”, The Davis Tax Committee, online: 
<http://www.taxcom.org.za>.  
452 The apartheid was an institutionalized system – created by law and enforced by legal institutions 
– structured in three pillars: discrimination, territorial fragmentation and political repression. This 
ideology was formalized as an official state policy in 1948 with the assumption of power by the 
National Party and lasted until 1994. John Dugard and John Reynolds, “Apartheid, International 
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and commerce453. Considering that a great share of this international economic activity 
occurs between members of multinational enterprises, protecting the South African tax 
base from transfer pricing strategies used to transfer profits from South Africa to lower tax 
jurisdictions has become a significant concern regarding the country’s wealth and 
development. For this reason, in 1994, the “Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects 
of the Tax Structure of South Africa” (the Commission) recommended, in its first report, 
the introduction of transfer pricing provisions into the South African Income Tax Act454. 
Before this period, the manipulation of transfer prices was avoided by rigid exchange 
controls; however, with the relaxation of these regulations, the Commission envisaged a 
negative effect on the South African tax base455. The Commission also recommended that 
South Africa should follow the international consensus in the application of the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines. According to the Commission, since the Guidelines were the 
common language among a relevant group of trading and investment countries, following 
them would be useful in helping South Africa to integrate its tax system into the 
international scenario456.  
Therefore, in 1995, transfer pricing rules were introduced into the South African Income 
Tax Act and, until 2012, when Nigeria implemented its transfer pricing system, South 
Africa was the only African country with a comprehensive transfer pricing system in 
                                                
Law, and the Occupied Palestinian Territory” (2013) 24:3 The European Journal of International 
Law 867 AT 872-873. 
453 As a country isolated during the apartheid, an African country and a developing country, South 
Africa considers its integration into the global political, economic and social system as a priority. 
The building of political and economic links with the countries and regions of the world – working 
for an international system that is more favourable to the development across the world – was one 
of South Africa’s main goals in its first decade of freedom after the apartheid period. South African 
Government, “History”, South African Government, online: < http://www.gov.za/about-
sa/history#decade_freedom>. 
454 Lee Corrick, “Transfer Pricing Disputes in Africa” in Eduardo Baistrocchi and Ian Roxan, eds, 
Resolving Transfer Pricing Disputes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 790 at 797. 
455 South African Revenue Service Practice Note no. 7, “Section 31 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 
(the Act): Determination of the Taxable Income of Certain Persons from International Transactions: 
Transfer Pricing”, South Africa 1999, 2.5. 
456 Katz Commission: First and Second Interim Reports of the Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the 
Tax Structure of South Africa (1995) 3. 
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practice457. The enactment of Section 31 of the Income Tax Act, which covered both 
transfer pricing and thin capitalization regulations, allowed the adjustments of transaction 
prices for tax purposes based on the ALP458. This legislation was considered “discretionary 
in nature” and did not provide detailed assistance in the application of the ALP460. For this 
reason, the South African Revenue Service (SARS)462 published in 1999 the Practice Note 
no. 7463 establishing the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as the transfer pricing standard 
in interpreting the application of the ALP464:  
Because of the international importance of the OECD Guidelines, this 
Practice Note is based on, inter alia, those guidelines. Although South 
Africa is not a member country of the OECD, the OECD Guidelines are 
acknowledged as an important, influential document that reflects 
unanimous agreement amongst the member countries, reached after an 
extensive process of consultation with industry and tax practitioners in 
many countries. The OECD Guidelines are also followed by many countries 
which are not OECD members and are therefore becoming a globally 
accepted standard. […] The OECD Guidelines should be followed in the 
                                                
457 Johann Hattingh, “South Africa” in Yariv Brauner and Pasquale Pistone, eds, BRICS and the 
Emergence of International Tax Coordination (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2015) 234 at 256 [Hattingh, 
“South Africa”]. 
458 Income Tax Act, South Africa 1962, Section 31. 
460 Hattingh, “South Africa”, supra note 443 at 255. 
462 The SARS is South Africa’s tax collection authority. According to the South African Revenue 
Service Act 34 of 1997, the SARS is an autonomous agency – it was established as an “organ of 
state within the public administration, but as an institution outside the public service” – which is 
responsible for the administration of the country’s tax system and customs service. South African 
Revenue Service Act no. 34, South Africa 1997, Part 1.  
463 The SARS usually publishes Practice Notes that provide guidance on their interpretation and 
practical application of the Income Tax Act. Corrick, supra note 440 at 800. 
464 Hattingh, “South Africa”, supra note 443 at 255. 
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absence of specific guidance in terms of this Practice Note, the provisions 
of section 31 or the tax treaties entered into by South Africa466. 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines were rigorously followed during the first years of 
the South African transfer pricing system467. Nevertheless, over time, the practical 
application of the ALP according to the OECD guidelines as well as the discretionary 
nature of the domestic legislation generated several issues in the enforcement of South 
Africa’s transfer pricing rules468. These developments resulted in some changes in South 
Africa’s transfer pricing legislation, which – through an amended version of Section 31 of 
the Income Tax Act that became effective after January 2013 –  had its scope broadened, 
becoming more aligned to Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention469.  
4.5.3 Transfer Pricing Rules in South Africa 
South Africa’s current relevant transfer pricing law is in Section 31 of the Income Tax Act. 
The Section provides terminology definitions necessary to its application, including the 
meanings of goods, services and international agreements. Additional transfer pricing 
sources include SARS’ Practice Note no. 7, which was issued to establish guidelines 
regarding the procedures to be followed in the determination arm’s length prices, taking 
into account the South African business environment, and to publish the views of the SARS 
on practical issues in dealing with transfer prices470.  
Since Practice Note no. 7 was drafted as a practical guide, it is not intended to be a 
prescriptive or exhaustive discussion of every transfer pricing issue neither to override 
                                                
466 South African Revenue Service Practice Note no. 7, “Section 31 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 
(the Act): Determination of the Taxable Income of Certain Persons from International Transactions: 
Transfer Pricing”, South Africa 1999, 3.2. 
467 Hattingh, “South Africa”, supra note 443 at 256. 
468 Ibid. 
469 Corrick, supra note 440 at 800. 
470 Ibid. 
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provisions of the Income Tax Act, when properly interpreted471. Also, according to the 
South African Constitution, which provides in Section 232 that “customary international 
law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the constitution of an act of 
Parliament”472, customary international law may also be applied in transfer pricing cases. 
4.5.3.1 The arm’s Length Principle 
South African transfer pricing rules adopt the ALP as the standard for determining the 
prices of cross-border transactions entered into by its residents473. In this context, according 
to Section 31.1, where any transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding 
falls within the further explored concept of “affected transaction” and results in any tax 
benefit, the taxable income must be calculated as if the transaction had been entered into 
according to the terms and conditions that would exist between independent parties dealing 
at arm’s length474.   
Therefore, when taxpayers enter into transactions with connected persons outside South 
Africa on terms or conditions that are not in accordance to the ALP and obtain a tax benefit 
from such terms or conditions, they are required to adjust their taxable income.  
4.5.3.2 The Concept of Affected Transactions and Connected 
Persons 
South Africa’s transfer pricing provisions are applied to affected transactions, meaning any 
transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding that: a) have been entered into 
                                                
471 South African Revenue Service Practice Note no. 7, “Section 31 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 
(the Act): Determination of the Taxable Income of Certain Persons from International Transactions: 
Transfer Pricing”, South Africa 1999, 3.1. 
472 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, South Africa 1996, S. 232. 
473 “The fundamental principle underpinning South African transfer pricing legislation, since 
inception, is the arm’s length principle as set out in Article 9 of both the United Nations Model 
Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries and the OECD Model 
Tax Convention on Income and on Capital. The principle is reinforced by the UN Practical Manual 
on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines)”. UN 
Practical Manual supra note 3 at 617-618. 
474 Income Tax Act, South Africa 1962, Section 31.2. 
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between a resident and non-resident connected person, or between non-resident connected 
persons where either has a permanent establishment in the country, or between two resident 
persons where either has a permanent establishment outside the country to which the 
transaction is related475 and  b) “where any term or condition of that transaction, operation, 
scheme, agreement or understanding is different from any term or condition that would 
have existed had those persons been independent persons dealing at arm’s length”476.  In 
this context, a connected person in relation to a company, as defined in Section 1 of the 
Income Tax Act, is: 
a) any other company that forms part of the same group of two or more 
companies in which one company directly or indirectly holds shares in at 
least one other company with the effect that more than 50% of the shares of 
each controlled group are directly held by the controlling group company, 
one or more controlled group companies or any combination thereof and the 
controlling group companies or any combination thereof and the controlling 
group company directly hold more than 50% of the shares in at least one 
controlled group; b) any other company with a minimum 20% holding in 
the equity share capital in the company; c) any person, excluding a 
company, who individually or jointly with a connected person directly or 
indirectly holds at least 20% of the company’s equity share capital or voting 
rights; or d) a company managed or controlled by connected persons of the 
company477. 
4.5.3.3 Transfer Pricing Methods 
South Africa’s transfer pricing law does not explicitly provide any transfer pricing 
methodologies. Therefore, taxpayers and tax authorities rely on the SARS’ Practice Note 
no. 7, which incorporates the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, prescribing the following 
                                                
475 Johann Hattingh, South Africa - Corporate Taxation sec. 7.2, Country Surveys IBFD [Hattingh, 
“Country Surveys”]. 
476 Income Tax Act, South Africa 1962, Section 31.1. 
477 Hattingh, “Country Surveys”, supra note 458. 
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methods: a) the comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method; b) the resale price method; 
c) the cost plus method; d) the transactional net margin (TNMM) method; and e) the profit 
split method478. Nevertheless, since Practice Note no. 7 does not constitute law, the SARS’s 
Commissioner has to take into consideration the facts of each case individually in order to 
determine whether an arm’s length price has been applied479. 
In order to select the most appropriate method, i.e., the method resulting in the maximum 
level of comparability and the least necessity of adjustments, it is indispensable to perform 
an analysis of the facts of each case, taking into account the availability of reliable data480. 
Although Practice Note no. 7 does not prescribe a hierarchy of transfer pricing methods to 
be applied, the CUP method is preferred over the other methods481. 
4.5.4 Peculiarities and Challenges in South Africa’s Transfer Pricing 
Practices 
The key principle underpinning South African transfer pricing law is the arm’s length 
standard as established in Article 9 of both the UN Model Treaty and the OECD Model 
Treaty. Nevertheless, the application of the ALP in South Africa has presented some 
challenges since its inception. Indeed, South Africa is one of the five countries, including 
Brazil, China and India, that informed its transfer pricing practices – focusing on its 
challenges and particularities – in the 2017 version of the UN Practical Manual on Transfer 
Pricing for Developing Countries482. Additionally, in regards to its tax treaty network, 
                                                
478 South African Revenue Service Practice Note no. 7, “Section 31 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 
(the Act): Determination of the Taxable Income of Certain Persons from International Transactions: 
Transfer Pricing”, South Africa 1999, 9.1.1 and 9.2.2. 
479 Lynette Olivier and Michael Honiball, International Tax: A South African Perspective 5ed (Cape 
Town: Siber Ink, 2011) 400. 
480 South African Revenue Service Practice Note no. 7, “Section 31 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 
(the Act): Determination of the Taxable Income of Certain Persons from International Transactions: 
Transfer Pricing”, South Africa 1999, 9.1.2 and 9.3.2. 
481 Ibid at 9.1.2 and 9.3.4. 
482 In this respect, it is important to notice that South African commentaries demonstrate a more 
moderate approach than those of Brazil, India and China. 
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South Africa has reservations in Article 9(2), reserving the right to making corresponding 
arm’s length adjustments non-compulsory483.  
4.5.4.1 Challenges in Finding Reliable Comparables 
One of the main challenges in South Africa’s transfer pricing practice is the difficulty in 
finding domestic reliable comparables. In this sense, South African transfer pricing 
officials argue that they lack the data on comparables necessary to complete an appropriate 
transfer pricing analysis484. Therefore, since databases containing South African or even 
African specific comparable data are not available, taxpayers and tax authorities have to 
use foreign comparables – mostly from European databases – to determine arm’s length 
levels of profitability485.  
In order to account for geographical differences (for instance, market, economic or political 
differences) and improve the degree of reliability of the comparable data, the SARS usually 
attempts to perform comparability adjustments486. For example, the SARS has made 
country-risk adjustments based on publicly available ratings and government bond rates; 
nonetheless, the SARS recognize that this analysis is often complex and, for this reason, 
comparability adjustments are applied with caution and only in certain circumstances487. 
Because of this lack of reliable comparables, South Africa adopts a more holistic approach 
in determining whether or not the ALP has been followed by taxpayers488. According to 
this holistic approach, instead of just considering the comparable data and not taking into 
considerations other relevant commercial factors, the SARS attempts to understand the 
“business model of taxpayers across the whole value chain, gaining an in-depth 
understanding of the commercial sensibilities and rationalities governing intra-group 
                                                
483 Hattingh, “South Africa” supra note 443 at 239. 
484 Robert Feinschreiber and Margaret Kent, “South Africa would modify OECD transfer pricing 
procedures” (2014) 15:5 Corporate Business Taxation Monthly 29. 
485 UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 624. 
486 Ibid at 625. 
487 Feinschreiber and Kent, supra note 467. 
488 UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 625. 
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transactions and agreements” in order to establish the appropriate arm’s length level of 
profit489. 
As it is the case in India490, risk also plays an important role in the comparability analysis 
performed by South African tax authorities. Foreign parent companies, when comparing 
the higher profits earned in South Africa to comparable companies in other markets, do not 
take into account the actual functional and risk profile of the South African subsidiary and, 
therefore, are increasingly shifting profits via year-end adjustments to bring the South 
African subsidiary in line with comparable companies491. In this respect, South African 
transfer pricing administration has also noted that there appears to be an increasing 
tendency for South African subsidiaries to be classified as limited risk distributors or 
limited risk manufacturers, when, in reality, these companies assume considerable risks in 
performing their activities492.   
4.5.4.2 Location-Specific Advantages 
In many circumstances, the South African market, as it happens with the other BRICS 
countries, has unique features that enable South African subsidiaries to earn higher profits 
than comparable data from foreign databases would suggest or than their related party 
partners earn in other parts of the world. One example is the South African pharmaceutical 
industry, which is still not saturated and, as a result, offers significant opportunities for 
MNEs to obtain higher profits493. Furthermore, South Africa has been experiencing 
                                                
489 Ibid. 
490 See India Section for a comprehensive analysis of the country’s practices regarding the 
evaluation of risks in its transfer pricing practices. 
491 “What occurs is usually a global policy change by the parent company aimed at limiting the 
return of its subsidiaries (including those based in South Africa) to a guaranteed return (determined 
by way of a comparable search). The change in policy is often followed by an introduction of year-
end transfer pricing adjustments to ensure that South African entities achieve the often low targeted 
net margin while the residual profit is returned to the parent or holding company”. UN Practical 
Manual supra note 3 at 628. 
492 Feinschreiber and Kent, supra note 467. 
493 UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 628. 
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increasing participation and spending power of the middle class segment of its economy, 
which also provides important market opportunities for MNEs494. 
The South African approach regarding LSAs is still being developed by the country’s tax 
authorities: 
Building on the practice followed in India and China, SARS is currently 
considering its approach to location savings, location specific advantages 
and market premiums within certain industries and those factors will be 
addressed when conducting audits495. 
4.5.4.3 Intangibles 
Because of its unique nature, intangibles present a series of challenges for South Africa’s 
transfer pricing administration496. South Africa experiences disputes regarding the 
existence of local marketing intangibles, cases involving economic versus legal ownership 
and also the valuation of intangible property497. 
South African transfer pricing rules involving intangibles are applied in conjunction with 
the country’s exchange control rules. In this context, royalties payable by a South African 
enterprise to a foreign related party must be approved under the exchange control rules498. 
Furthermore, in comparison to the rest of the world, there is one relevant particularity in 
the treatment of transfer prices of intangibles in South Africa: the country’s exchange 
                                                
494 Spencer, “BRICS BEPS and the UN Manual Part 1” supra note 65. 
495 UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 628. 
496 “There is a level of ambiguity present in the nature of these transactions as well as the values 
associated with it. In this ambiguous domain, non goods transactions are rife and pricing 
mechanisms overly complex, with multiple layers attached to them”. The Davis Tax Committee 
Interim Report, supra note 437. 
497 UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 628. 
498 There are two categories of royalties: royalties associated with a process of manufacture and 
other royalties. Regarding the first category, royalties exceeding 8% are rarely approved. As 
regards other royalties, the South African Reserve Bank is more flexible: related parties applying 
for approval have to submit an opinion from an independent transfer pricing specialist 
demonstrating that the proposed royalty rate is acceptable. The Davis Tax Committee Interim 
Report, supra note 437. 
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control regulations prohibit the relicensing of intangible property back into South Africa499. 
Accordingly, once the intangible assets are sold to a foreign related party, the latter 
becomes its legal owner, licensing the intangible property worldwide (except for South 
Africa) and earning royalties as compensation500. This peculiarity generally inhibits the 
potential for transactions involving transfers of intangibles as those described in the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
The restrictions in South Africa’s exchange control regulations often allow a royalty rate 
regarding manufacturing royalties lower than the rates usually considered to be in 
accordance to the ALP in global transfer pricing studies of MNEs501. Besides that, one of 
the main transfer pricing strategies used by MNEs – the transfer of valuable intangible 
property to a low tax jurisdiction in order to ensure a flow of royalty income to that 
jurisdiction – is, to a great extent, prevented by South African rules because there are 
punitive tax consequences for South African taxpayers who pay royalties that were 
previously owned by them502. 
4.5.5 Conclusion 
Transfer pricing is an area that is to be under a “policy flux”503 in South Africa. Initially, 
the country completely followed the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines; however, in 
recent years, some fundamental aspects of the OECD standards are being questioned in 
South African transfer pricing practices. These include the practical application of the 
concept of comparability and its feasibility in an African context as well as deviations 
replacing the traditional ALP for a more subjective and holistic approach.  
 
 
                                                
499 UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at 628. 
500 Ibid at 629. 
501 The Davis Tax Committee Interim Report, supra note 437. 
502 Ibid. 
503 Hattingh, “South Africa” supra note 443 at 266. 
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Chapter 5  
5 BRICS: Potential for Cooperation 
The grouping of the BRICS countries as an informal association of emerging economies in 
the beginning of the 21st century was a response to the rapid growth of these countries and 
to the misbalance of power in global politics and economics. In recent years, the 
involvement of the BRICS in international organizations and leading informal unions, as 
well as their growing economic power, have elevated their political and economic 
significance. This allowed possibilities of cooperation between the BRICS in favor of new 
international tax and transfer pricing policies: 
On transfer pricing, the BRICS assume a particular relevance instead of the 
developing countries. The latter cannot be considered an influential player 
either in defining the set of rules for transfer pricing, nor in choosing policy-
maker leader(s), basically because it is more a residence than source country 
topic. Instead, the BRICS, because of their strong economies and attractive 
investment opportunities, are moving from being developing to developed 
economies and over the last years they have acquired enough status to 
influence matters in transfer pricing and to justify their presence in the 
OECD discussions504. 
Nevertheless, considering the differences between the BRICS countries’ economies, tax 
systems and international tax policies, there is no clear evidence demonstrating how these 
countries are organizing themselves in order to influence the international transfer pricing 
landscape. Therefore, this chapter considers the potential for cooperation between the 
BRICS and how they may influence or provide solutions for the problems experienced by 
emerging economies in applying the ALP and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. The 
chapter is organized in three sections, which analyze the convergence and divergence 
                                                
504 Elio Palmitessa, “The Major Players in Recent and Future Tax Policy” in Raffaele Petruzzi and 
Karoline Spies, eds, Tax Policy Challenges in the 21st Century (Vienna: Linde, 2014) 27 at 40. 
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aspects present in the BRICS transfer pricing legislations; the impact and influence the 
BRICS have on international organizations, particularly the UN and the OECD; and the 
limits these countries face in their role of shaping the international transfer pricing scenario. 
5.1 Points of Convergence and Divergence in the BRICS 
Transfer Pricing Policies 
The BRICS, as most countries with transfer pricing regimes in force, have adopted – at 
least formally – the ALP as the standard method to allocate income originating from 
transactions between related parties. Nevertheless, the BRICS countries have different 
approaches when it comes to pragmatically interpreting and applying the theory of the ALP 
designed by the OECD in their domestic transfer pricing systems. 
Brazil 
The Brazilian transfer pricing rules, established in 1997, have the most distinctive approach 
in determining the prices of cross-border transactions between related parties505. Brazil’s 
transfer pricing law includes only the CUP method, the cost-plus method and resale price 
method, excluding the profit-based methods recommended in the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines and adopted by other BRICS countries. In addition, in order to facilitate the 
application of the ALP in regard to the cost-plus and resale price methods, Brazil applies a 
system of predetermined profit margins and formulas, in which taxpayers are allowed to 
present counterproof when the predetermined margins diverge from the margins practiced 
between independent parties.  
Russia 
Russia’s first transfer pricing legislation – in force from 1999 until 2011 – was only applied 
if the transfer prices deviated more than 20% from the prices practiced between unrelated 
parties. However, in 2012, Russia revised its transfer pricing rules and currently follows 
                                                
505 See Section 4.1. 
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the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines506. Contrary to Brazil, Russia seems to be the 
BRICS member with the transfer pricing system most aligned with the OECD standards. 
Although the country’s transfer pricing legislation diverged in some aspects from the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines507, Russian tax authorities are not as concerned about 
these peculiarities as the other BRICS representatives508. Russian compliance with OECD’s 
transfer pricing policies are related to the country’s interest in becoming a member of the 
organization. Indeed, Russia has made an official request for the OECD membership in 
1996 and, in 2007, the OECD Council at Ministerial level adopted a resolution to open 
discussions concerning the country’s accession509. 
India 
Indian transfer pricing legislation, introduced in 2001, follows the arm’s length standard 
and is generally consistent with the approach recommended by the OECD, including all 
the methods prescribed in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines510. Nevertheless, India 
argues that the OECD transfer pricing approach does not effectively considers specific 
market circumstances of the country, such as location savings realized in India or the actual 
risks borne by local Indian subsidiaries.  
China 
The transfer pricing legislation in China follows the ALP and the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines methods, including other reasonable methods when necessary511. As it is the 
                                                
506 See Section 4.2. 
507 See Section 4.2.4, page 57. 
508 Russia was the only member of the BRICS that did not participate on the UN Practical Manual 
on Transfer Pricing. Therefore, no contribution regarding the country’s transfer pricing practices 
was presented. Regarding its participation in the OECD, “Russia is a much less vocal observer at 
the OECD, yet in terms of actual policies it is closer than the other BRICS countries to OECD 
norms”. Yariv Brauner and Pasquale Pistone, “The BRICS and the Future of International 
Taxation” in Yariv Brauner and Pasquale Pistone, eds, BRICS and the Emergence of International 
Tax Coordination (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2015) 495 at 513. 
509 OECD, The Russian Federation and the OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, online: < http://www.oecd.org/russia/therussianfederationandtheoecd.htm>. 
510 See Section 4.3. 
511 See Section 4.4. 
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case in India, Chinese tax authorities also understand that the OECD approach is not 
completely adequate to the country’s peculiarities. China argues, for instance, that location-
specific advantages – location savings and market premiums – should be taken into account 
when determining the arm’s length price of a related party transaction. Another Chinese 
particularity in applying the ALP is the difficulty in finding reliable comparables, 
especially because of the lack of public information regarding domestic comparable 
transactions.  
South Africa 
South Africa, which enacted its transfer pricing rules in 1995 and then revised in 2013, 
follows the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, as elucidated in a South African Revenue 
Service practice note issued in 1999512. Although having recent transfer pricing legislation, 
South Africa’s experience with the application of the ALP aligns with the transfer pricing 
challenges encountered by other BRICS countries. These challenges include location-
specific advantages as well as the lack of domestic reliable comparables and the consequent 
difficulty in performing an effective comparability analysis. This leads to the application 
of a more subjective and holistic approach by South African tax authorities. 
Therefore, although all the BRICS have adopted transfer pricing rules in their domestic 
legislation that, at least theoretically follow the ALP, the application of these rules 
according to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines present pragmatic challenges for them, 
specifically for Brazil, India, China and South Africa. These challenges and the BRICS 
countries’ practices regarding them are compared and analyzed in the next sections.  
5.1.1 Lack of Reliable Comparables: A Common Difficulty with 
Distinctive Solutions 
Some of these challenges, such as the difficulty in finding local reliable comparables, are 
not particular to only one member of the BRICS. Brazil, China and South Africa have all 
manifested problems in this respect, demonstrating concerns with the availability and 
                                                
512 See Section 4.5. 
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quality of domestic information regarding transactions between independent parties that 
can be used for comparisons. However, the treatment each of these countries gives to the 
lack of reliable comparables is completely different.  
While Brazil has focused on a more pragmatic transfer pricing system with the use of 
predetermined margins, South Africa tax authorities have opted for a more holistic 
approach in determining the appropriate transfer price of transactions between related 
parties. The Chinese transfer pricing policies concerning the lack of local comparables, on 
the other hand, seem to be the more aligned with the ALP, having influenced international 
initiatives related to the issue. In June 2017, the Platform for Collaboration on Tax (PCT), 
a joint initiative of the IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank Group – has developed a “Toolkit 
for Addressing Difficulties in Accessing Comparables Data for Transfer Pricing 
Analyses”. This toolkit recommends Chinese practices, such as using geographic proximity 
as a criterion in the selection of foreign comparables513 or adjusting for differences in 
geographic market, are recommended for other tax administrations514. 
5.1.2 Location-Specific Advantages, Location Savings and Market 
Premium: A Shared Concern Among China and India 
The concept of location-specific advantages (LSAs) – which, in the last years, acquired a 
central position in the transfer pricing debate mainly due to the increasing foreign direct 
investments in emerging economies515 – has assumed particular importance in India and 
China. The basic idea behind LSAs is that investments made by MNEs in these countries, 
because of their unique market features, such as inexpensive and skilled labour force, 
                                                
513 In dealing with the lack of reliable local comparables, when there are no Chinese publicly listed 
comparables, China accepts pan-Asian comparables, which have economic similarities and relevant 
regional trade and capital flows. 
514 World Bank, “The Platform for Collaboration on Tax: A Toolkit for Addressing Difficulties in 
Accessing Comparables Data for Transfer Pricing Analyses” (Washington, 2017) World Bank 
Group, online: <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/447901498066167863/The-platform-
for-collaboration-on-tax-a-toolkit-for-addressing-difficulties-in-accessing-comparables-data-for-
transfer-pricing-analyses>. 
515 Sébastien Gonnet, Makoto Ikeya and Vladimir Starkov, “Location Specific Advantages – Case 
Studies” (2011) Transfer Pricing International Journal at 1.  
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access to large consumer markets, cost savings and incentives, are more profitable than the 
same investments in other countries.  
The tax authorities of China and India manifested their positions on LSAs in the UN 
Practical Manual516, raising awareness to LSAs as important aspects that should be 
considered when carrying out comparability analysis in transfer pricing audits. According 
to these countries, a portion of the LSAs should accrue to the Chinese and India entities 
and be subjected to tax there. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, on the other hand, 
provide examples that, although acknowledging the existence of LSAs in MNEs 
operations, argue that the entity that has the bargaining power is the one that should be able 
to claim the LSAs517. 
5.1.3 Intangibles and Risks 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the application of the ALP involves a comparability analysis 
that takes into account functions, assets and risks. Nevertheless, intangible assets and risks 
are easier to move than functions and tangible assets, which gives MNEs the opportunity 
to use artificially shift them to jurisdictions where they will receive a more favourable tax 
treatment518. Dealing with intangibles and risks in a transfer pricing context is a complex 
issue not only for developing and emerging economies but for developed countries as well. 
However, China and India express particular concerns with the fact that MNEs often shift 
the profits made in these countries to other jurisdictions by characterizing their Chinese 
                                                
516 South Africa also considers LSAs in its transfer pricing audits; however, the country still does 
not have a definitive position regarding this concept. As the South African representative stated in 
the UN Practical Manual, “building on the practice followed in India and China, SARS is currently 
considering its approach to location savings, location-specific advantages and market premiums 
within certain industries and those factors will be addressed when conducting audits”. UN Practical 
Manual supra note 3 at 628. 
517 “Where significant location savings are derived further to a business restructuring, the question 
arises of whether and if so how the location savings should be shared among the parties. The 
response should obviously depend on what independent parties would have agreed in similar 
circumstances. The conditions that would be agreed between independent parties would normally 
depend on the functions, assets and risks of each party and on their respective bargaining powers”. 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines supra note 8 at 285. 
518 See Chapter 2, page 19. 
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and Indian subsidiaries as utilizing foreign-owned intellectual property, on which they have 
to pay royalties.  
5.1.4 Formulary Apportionment 
Even though practices in some of the BRICS countries are undermining the idea that there 
is an international consensus on the ALP and on its traditional application, these countries 
do not go as far as to support a purely global formulary apportionment approach as an 
alternative to the arm’s length standard. None of the BRICS countries have incorporated 
the formulary apportionment system into their tax treaties or domestic transfer pricing 
legislations519. China, for example, joined the OECD in advising against a change from the 
ALP to formulary apportionment in the BEPS Action Plan520. The motive for this Chinese 
position is that the country anticipates huge complications in choosing an acceptable global 
allocation formula and in implementing the formulary apportionment in practice521. 
Some of the reasons for the non-adoption of the formulary apportionment system include 
the difficulty to find consensus in the international level about the criteria to be used for 
the apportionment and, particularly for the BRICS, there is no evidence that this 
methodology would be more favourable, considering the lower values that a potential 
formula would assign to emerging economies522. On the other hand, it is argued that 
formulary apportionment, besides being easier and cheaper to administer, avoids the 
allocation of income to tax havens as no income would be apportioned to haven intangibles 
holding companies under a formula mainly based on sales (there is no market in tax 
havens)523. 
                                                
519 As examined in Chapter 4, Section 4.1.3, even though Brazilian transfer pricing rules, with its 
predetermined profit margins, may bear resemblance to formulary apportionment, Brazil applies 
the arm’s length principle in its tax treaties and domestic law, using formulas only to simplify the 
application of the cost-plus and resale price traditional transaction methods. 
520 Hu and Li, supra note 383 at 205. 
521 David Spencer, “Formulary Apportionment is not a Panacea” (2014) 25:7 Journal of 
International Taxation 44. 
522 Prats, supra note 125 at 416. 
523 Lee Sheppard, “Is Transfer Pricing Worth Salvaging?” (2012) Tax Notes 467 at 473. 
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5.2 The Impact and Influence of the BRICS on Supranational 
Tax Bodies   
The BRICS individual positions and advocacy on particular transfer pricing issues have 
influenced the public discussions on international tax and transfer pricing policies, 
including the works of supranational tax bodies, such as the UN and the OECD524. This 
section reviews how this influence has been reflected in the works of the UN Committee 
of Tax Experts in International Tax Matters and in the OECD/G20 BEPS initiative. 
5.2.1 BRICS and the works of the UN Committee of Tax Experts in 
International Tax Matters and the UN Subcommittee on 
Transfer Pricing 
The UN Committee of Tax Experts in International Tax Matters (“UN Tax Committee”) is 
composed by 25 members – designated by governments but acting in their expert personal 
capacity – appointed by the Secretary General in accordance with an equitable 
geographical distribution and representing different tax systems525. The main difference 
between the UN Tax Committee and the OECD Fiscal Committee is that, as opposed to 
the latter, the UN does not recommend that all members use the UN Model as well as 
interpret and apply their treaties following the Group of Experts commentaries526. 
The BRICS527 are influential countries in the context of the UN Tax Committee, having 
constantly emphasized the necessity to adapt OECD international tax standards to the 
peculiarities and needs of less developed and developing countries528. Although the BRICS 
                                                
524 Ring, supra note 113 at 479. 
525 United Nations, “Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters”, Financing 
for Development, online: <http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/>. 
526 Prats, supra note 125 at 405. 
527 The BRICS countries that are member of the Committee are: Brazil, China, India and South 
Africa, while Russia usually participates as an observer. 
528 It is difficult to determine the exact influence of each country in the development of the 
Committee since its reports do not specifically mention any country position and, besides that, 
experts contribute in their own personal capacity and not representing their country. The only 
exception is India, which have made public statements and comments regarding its positions in the 
UN Tax Committee. Prats, supra note 125 at 405. 
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are gradually moving from a pure capital-importing position to a net capital exporter 
position, the inflow of foreign direct investment is still crucial for them and, for this reason, 
the BRICS generally recognize the UN Model Convention and Commentaries as a “starting 
point strengthening source state jurisdiction”529. The UN Tax Committee and its meetings, 
therefore, are a relevant platform for the BRICS countries as they are able to use their 
representatives to influence the UN work according to their international tax and transfer 
pricing policies, especially considering that there is a limited number of representatives 
from other developing countries that can attend the meetings and that these representatives 
can support the BRICS positions530. In addition, the UN is an international organization in 
which all countries in the world are members and the documents and publications it issues 
can attract the attention from the tax world, playing an important role in subsequent 
discussions on international tax issues531. 
Transfer pricing is one of the core international tax areas where the BRICS and other 
developing countries pressure the UN to diverge from the OECD traditional standards: 
The peculiarities of the UN Model vis-à-vis the OECD Model are somehow 
quite relevant, and have resulted not only in the establishment of a specific 
divergent clause in the text of the UN Model (specifically, article 9(3), but 
also in the formulation of the UN Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for 
Developing Countries in 2013, as a result of the work done by the 
Subcommittee on Transfer Pricing – Practical Issues532. 
The UN Practical Manual establishes guidance to developing countries and helps them in 
dealing with peculiar problems when applying the ALP to transfer pricing transactions. 
There is an agreement between the members of the UN Subcommittee on Transfer Pricing 
that the UN Practical Manual is not intended to depart from the international consensus 
                                                
529 Prats, supra note 125 at 407. 
530 Goede, supra note 116 at 427. 
531 Ibid. 
532 Prats, supra note 125 at 415-416. 
  
134 
and from the framework established in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines533. This idea 
is followed throughout most part of the UN Practical Manual; however, in the last part of 
the document (in the 2012 version, Chapter 10 and, in the 2017 version, Part D), the tax 
authorities of Brazil, China, India and South Africa have had the opportunity to present 
their national perspectives regarding the transfer pricing challenges and the practical 
solutions adopted by them534. These positions – which deviate in some forms from OECD 
considerations on the application of the ALP – do not necessarily reflected a consensus 
among the UN Subcommittee. 
According to Jan de Goede, who has been personally involved in the work of the UN as an 
IBFD (International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation) Senior Principal, “this area [transfer 
pricing] is the one where the BRICS countries present at the [UN Subcommittee on 
Transfer Pricing] operated in support of each other, even though their individual positions 
are not fully aligned”535. Indeed, although the UN emphasizes that the last part of the 
manual refers merely to the countries’ practices and experiences, the BRICS effectively 
used this space to outline their transfer pricing policies for countering MNEs’ strategies to 
have value not taxed in the country where it was created. Some of these transfer pricing 
policies were included in the BEPS measures, as discussed in Section 5.2.2. 
                                                
533 One of the guiding principles in the creation of the UN Practical Manual was “Consistency with 
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines5 has been sought, as provided for in the Subcommittee’s 
man- date and in accordance with the widespread reliance on those Guidelines by developing as 
well as developed countries”. UN Practical Manual supra note 3 at XI. 
534 During the UN Practical Manual discussions, participants referred to the experience of Brazil in 
using fixed margins for transfer pricing, acknowledging how this approach could eliminate the need 
to find comparables and provide a simple and low-cost system for taxpayers and tax authorities. 
This was the object of a great deal of controversy as other participants, among other arguments, 
found it difficult to conciliate the simplified margins with the arm’ length principle. This 
controversy was one of the reasons for the UN Subcommittee to decide to include a final 
Chapter/Part in the UN Practical Manual. United Nations Economic and Social Council, “Report 
on the Informal Meetings on Practical Transfer Pricing Issues for Developing Countries” (2011) 
United Nations, online: <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/C.18/2011 
/5&Lang=E>. See Chapter 4 for further details on the views and practices of the BRICS expressed 
on the UN Practical Manual.  
535 Goede, supra note 116 at 437. 
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The BRICS countries participation in UN Tax Committee and in the UN Subcommittee on 
Transfer Pricing shows that these countries have supported each other in having their 
positions considered and reproduced in the works of the UN. This mutual support was 
given even on matters where there was no common agreement between the BRICS 
regarding the individual tax policies taken by each one of them. The most notable example 
is the UN Practical Manual, where, even though the individual transfer pricing policies and 
methodologies of the BRICS countries were diverse, they all supported and contributed to 
the inclusion of a new chapter in the manual laying out their practices. 
5.2.2 BRICS and the BEPS Project 
Given the structure of the OECD, the organization’s initiatives are predominantly 
developed by representatives of its member countries. In the case of the BEPS project, in 
response to previous criticisms regarding the legitimacy of the OECD – as a body with 
exclusive membership – in articulating global consensus concerning international tax 
policy rules, selected non-member countries were invited to participate in developing the 
initiative536. The OECD members also have a strong interest in the inclusion of the BRICS 
and other developing countries in the BEPS initiative because, if these countries were not 
engaged in the project, the suggested anti-BEPS measures effectiveness would not be 
guaranteed, possibly leading to the relocation of MNEs to countries where the measures 
were not adopted537.  
The BRICS countries also have a strong interest in participating in the BEPS project, 
considering that base erosion and profit shifting are significant issues for their economies. 
In India, for instance, the analysis of case law suggests that base erosion usually occurs 
because of the distribution of taxing rights in favor of residence countries. In China, BEPS 
                                                
536 Allison Christians, “BEPS and the New International Tax Order”, supra note 40. 
537 According to Eva Eberhartinger, there is common understanding between the OECD countries 
that virtually all the countries should be included in the efforts to avoid base erosion and profit 
shifting. Nevertheless, the author emphasized that the views of stakeholders that were not 
completely involved in the development of the project – including the general public and, 
particularly, non-member countries of the OECD – did not receive significant consideration in the 
BEPS initiative. Eberhartinger and Petutschnig, supra note 117 at 9. 
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practices are considered by the SAT as major threats for the country’s tax administration538. 
Since BEPS refers to shifting profits from countries where the business activities occur to 
low-tax jurisdictions, China – as a major producer of goods and market for goods and 
services with a corporate income tax rate of 25% – is believed by some to be one of the 
main victims of BEPS539. 
More than that, for the BRICS countries, the BEPS project represents an opportunity for 
reforming the existent international tax system, including the transfer pricing area. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the BRICS have developed their transfer pricing legislations quite 
late in comparison with other developed economies and, most of them, had to enact 
domestic laws that did not deviate from the international norms, resulting in a mere implant 
of international standards to their domestic laws. These international transfer pricing 
norms, as established by the OECD member countries, have demonstrated to be inadequate 
for countries in different stages of development, such as the BRICS. For this reason, the 
BRICS – which were not involved in the decision-making process of the current 
international tax regime – see the BEPS initiative as an important opportunity to exert their 
influence regarding the matters that are significant for them540. 
As members of the G20, the BRICS contributed to putting BEPS on the global agenda. 
Also, the BRICS countries have been invited to participate in the Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs541 and in the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax 
                                                
538 State Administration of Taxation: The People’s Republic of China, “State Administration of 
Taxation People’s Republic of China Views on Service Fees and Management Fees”, UN, online: 
<http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/TransferPricing/CommentsPRC.pdf>. 
539 Li, “China and BEPS” supra note 433. 
540 However, the benefits of the BRICS countries participation in the such initiatives are questioned 
by Tsilly Dagan. The author argues that, because of their different economies structures, 
cooperation between the BRICS countries and the OECD in international tax matters is only in the 
interest of OECD member countries. Tsilly Dagan, “BRICS: Theoretical Framework and the 
Potential of Cooperation” in Yariv Brauner and Pasquale Pistone, eds, BRICS and the Emergence 
of International Tax Coordination (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2015) 15. 
541 The OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA), which is the steering body for the BEPS Project, 
brings together 44 countries on an equal footing: all OECD members and the BEPS Associates (8 
non-OECD G20) and OECD accession countries: Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, India, 
Indonesia, Latvia, Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. OECD, “BEPS Information Brief”, 
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Purposes, being active contributors to these initiatives. For example, China’s tax 
administration representatives, until 2015, had attended 42 BEPS meetings, submitted 52 
position papers to the OECD and made several other contributions to the project542. 
With respect to transfer pricing, the BEPS initiative has started as a challenge to the 
complete dominance of the arm’s length standard, recognizing the necessity of using other 
methods in cases where an arm’s length valuation is unmanageable. Although the ALP is 
still seen by the OECD as a practical and balanced standard for tax administrations and 
taxpayers to evaluate transfer prices, the way the OECD is moving towards transactional 
methods – accepting the profit split method as an appropriate method for intangibles – is 
consistent with the BRICS desire for a simpler transfer pricing system.  
More specifically, the influence of the BRICS on the BEPS initiative is evidenced by the 
inclusion of location savings and specific market advantages in Action 8 Final Report, 
according to which “difficult issues can arise in evaluating the differences between 
geographic markets and in determining appropriate comparability adjustments. Such issues 
may arise in connection with the consideration of cost savings attributable to operating in 
a particular market […] (location savings). In other situations comparability issues can 
arise in connection with […] local market advantages or disadvantages”543. The following 
guidance on the treatment of location savings given by BEPS Action 8 is generally in 
accordance with the Chinese and Indian perspectives544 on the issue: 
In determining how location savings are to be shared between two or more 
associated enterprises, it is necessary to consider (i) whether location 
savings exist; (ii) the amount of any location savings; (iii) the extent to 
which location savings are either retained by a member or members of the 
                                                
OECD online: <http://www.oecd.org.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/ctp/beps-2014-deliverables-information-
brief.pdf>. 
542 Li, “China and BEPS” supra note 433. 
543 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Aligning Transfer Pricing 
Outcomes with Value Creation, Actions 8-10 – 2015 Final Reports (Paris, OECD Publishing, 2015) 
at 43 [OECD, “Actions 8-10 Final Reports”]. 
544 See Chapter 4 for a detailed analysis of the Chinese and Indian practices regarding location 
savings. 
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MNE group or are passed on to independent customers or suppliers; and 
(iv) where location savings are not fully passed on to independent customers 
or suppliers, the manner in which independent enterprises operating under 
similar circumstances would allocate any retained net location savings. 
Where the functional analysis shows that location savings exist that are not 
passed on to customers or suppliers, and where comparable entities and 
transactions in the local market can be identified, those local market 
comparables will provide the most reliable indication regarding how the net 
location savings should be allocated […] When reliable local market 
comparables are not present, determinations regarding the existence and 
allocation of location savings among members of an MNE group, and any 
comparability adjustments required to take into account location savings, 
should be based on an analysis of all of the relevant facts and circumstances, 
including the functions performed, risks assumed, and assets used of the 
relevant associated enterprises545. 
The BEPS initiative emphasis on the value creation of intangibles, as articulated in Action 
8, is also in line with the BRICS – more specifically China and India – transfer pricing 
approach. The BEPS Final Report new guidance demands a careful analysis of the actual 
transaction between the related parties, by analyzing not only the contractual relations 
between them, but also their conduct, through an examination of the functions performed, 
assets used and risks assumed546. According to this revised guidance, the conduct of the 
related parties will supplement the contractual arrangements (if they are incomplete) or 
even replace them (when they are not supported by the conduct)547. This approach was 
already applied by Chinese tax authorities, which, when assessing the deduction of intra-
group royalties, performed a contribution-based value creation analysis548. Likewise, 
                                                
545 OECD, “Actions 8-10 Final Reports”, supra note 526 at 44. 
546 Ibid. 
547 Ibid. 
548 According to the Chinese approach, royalties paid to foreign related parties that only have the 
legal ownership of the intangible property but do not contribute to value creation regarding the 
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Indian transfer pricing rules also emphasize the conduct of the related parties rather than 
their contractual arrangements, especially regarding the allocation of risks. 
Another influential transfer pricing position from the BRICS can be found in the BEPS 
revised guidance on the application of the CUP method, usually appropriate for 
determining the prices of commodity transactions. This new guidance states that quoted 
prices – such as those from a commodity exchange market – may be useful in establishing 
arm’s length prices of related parties’ transactions. This practice has already been applied 
in Brazil, where it consists in specific transfer pricing methods for import transactions (PCI 
method)549 and export transactions (PECEX method)550. 
Therefore, important outcomes of the BEPS project regarding transfer pricing have been 
influenced by the participation of the BRICS countries in this initiative. The BRICS 
contributions to the BEPS initiative illustrate what these countries can realistically achieve 
at a global level. It is important to emphasize that the scope of the BEPS initiative was not 
to redesign all the basic international tax principles. Thus, the international tax regime 
continues to be biased in favor of developed capital exporting countries551. Also, the 
“possibilities for non-OECD countries to participate in the decision-making process on 
anti-BEPS measures have been limited and rarely acted on […] they [non-OECD countries] 
seem to serve the interests of OECD countries, rather than those of non-OECD 
countries”552. 
                                                
property, are not in accordance with the arm’s length principle. Li, “China and BEPS” supra note 
433. 
549 See Chapter 4, page 45. 
550 See Chapter 4, page 47. 
551 Analyzing the BEPS initiative bias in favor of developed countries, Yariv Brauner and Pasquale 
Pistone state that “had the BEPS developments been framed under the aegis of the UN, a much 
stronger shift towards taxation at source would have naturally occurred, which the world was 
perhaps not, or is not yet, ready to accept”. See Brauner and Pistone, supra note 491 at 503. 
552 Eberhartinger and Petutschnig, supra note 117 at 12. 
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 Nevertheless, the BEPS initiative represents the beginning of a discussion process that 
involves countries other than the OECD members and, to the extent that this initiative is 
reforming the existent transfer pricing regime, the BRICS are actively involved.   
5.2.2.1 BRICS Memorandum of Cooperation on Tax Matters 
In July 2017, the BRICS signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on Tax Matters (MoC) 
between their tax authorities as a recognition of the “significance of strengthening 
multilateral tax cooperation for BRICS countries in order to improve tax compliance and 
protect [their] tax base”553. The MoC aims to promote cooperation between the BRICS tax 
administrations on identified common areas of interest regarding tax matters. In this 
respect, the BRICS have reached the understanding of coordinating their positions on 
priority work of the G20 tax agenda, including the implementation of the standards of the 
BEPS initiative and improving their collective involvement in international tax issues 
under the framework of the UN554. 
The MoC prescribes the cooperation between the BRICS countries on capacity building by 
organizing expert visits between them in the form of seminars or workshops on 
international tax matters555. Within the available resources, the BRICS will also cooperate 
in providing technical assistance to developing countries.556 
Furthermore, the MoC reaffirms the BRICS countries’ support for the BEPS initiative. In 
a Communiqué issued after the BRICS meeting on 27 July 2017, the BRICS affirmed they 
“remain committed to the facilitation of economic growth, as well as the timely, consistent 
                                                
553 BRICS, “Communiqué of BRICS Heads of Tax Authorities Meeting issued in Hangzhou on 
July 2017”, online: <http://idg.receita.fazenda.gov.br/noticias/ascom/2017/julho/receita-federal-
participa-de-reuniao-dos-paises-brics/communique-meeting-of-brics-heads-of-tax-
authorites.pdf>. 
554 BRICS, “Memorandum of Cooperation Between Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa”, 
online: < http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/brics-mou-for-crs.pdf>. 
555 Ibid. 
556 Ibid. 
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and widespread implementation of the BEPS project outcomes and call upon all relevant 
jurisdictions to join the inclusive framework on BEPS on an equal footing”557. 
5.2.3 The Roles of the BRICS as Norm Takers and Norm Makers  
A considerable part of the literature relating to state influence over, or acceptance of, global 
governance arrangements describe states in simple and dyadic terms, labeling them as 
either norm makers – by imposing or playing an essential role in the norms that regulate a 
global governance issue area – or norm takers – by accepting the existing norms regulating 
a certain area or accepting norms proposed by other states558. European countries and the 
United States have usually been regarded as norm makers, or normative leaders; on the 
other hand, developing countries – including emerging economies – because they were 
socialized into an existing world order, have typically been seen as norm takers559. 
Nevertheless, with the rise of the BRICS countries in the 21st century, some authors now 
see these emerging economies in a position to be norm makers, particularly because of the 
economic relevance these countries assumed due to their growth, market size and regional 
influence560. Indeed, one of the shared characteristics among the BRICS is their aspiration 
to become norm makers instead of norm takers, challenging the dominant states at the 
center of global decision making and acting as a revisionist power within global economic 
governance561. 
                                                
557 BRICS, “Communiqué of BRICS Heads of Tax Authorities Meeting issued in Hangzhou on 
July 2017”, online: <http://idg.receita.fazenda.gov.br/noticias/ascom/2017/julho/receita-federal-
participa-de-reuniao-dos-paises-brics/communique-meeting-of-brics-heads-of-tax-
authorites.pdf>. 
558 Tristan Galloway, “Beyond the Norm-Maker/Norm-Taker Dyad: Political Roles & State 
Engagement with Global Governance” (2013) International Conference on Political Science, 
Sociology and International Relations (PSSIR) Proceedings 11. 
559 Sikina Jinnah, “Makers, Takers, Shakers, Shapers: Emerging Economies and Normative 
Engagement in Climate Governance” (2017) 23 Global Governance 285 at 287. 
560 Ibid. 
561 Duggan, supra note at 107 at 17. 
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In respect to the role of the BRICS as norm makers in the international tax regime, it is 
possible to note a critical attitude among the members of the group towards standard tax 
policies: 
The BRICS do not approach tax policy formation (including the negotiation 
of treaties) from the perspective of consumers satisfied with the off-the-
shelf, standard version of tax policy. They think critically about their needs, 
they review the models and guidance currently available and then they mix 
and match and innovate to the extent that their considerable negotiating 
power permits562. 
Acknowledging the BRICS as norm makers, however, does not mean that these countries 
would be able to transform the existing international tax regime, eliminating all the transfer 
pricing policies that are not convenient for them. Nor does it imply that the BRICS 
countries would dismiss all the tax policies designed by supranational tax bodies, such as 
the OECD and the UN563. The role of the BRICS as norm makers is rather an indication of 
how these countries have developed their unique international tax policies on certain 
matters that are important for them, such as transfer pricing.  
Brazil, for instance, has demonstrated resistance to being a norm taker in respect to the 
traditional arm’s length approach to transfer pricing established by the OECD in its 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Having adopted transfer pricing rules where predetermined 
profit margins are used in the cost-plus and resale price methods, the country has developed 
a transfer pricing system that is a “conciliation between the arm’s length standard and the 
practicability needs”564. However, even though Brazil departed from the traditional OECD 
arm’s length standard, the country manages to reconcile its unique approach with its tax 
treaty network, which include article 9(1) of the OECD Model Treaty. The Brazilian 
understanding is that the country’s transfer pricing legislation is compatible with the ALP 
and, as a consequence, with Brazil’s responsibilities under its tax treaties. 
                                                
562 Ring, supra note 108 at 479. 
563 Ibid. 
564 Schoueri, supra note 168 at 65. 
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The Brazilian transfer pricing treatment illustrates how the BRICS may perform their role 
as norm makers in the international tax regime. Brazil has had enough authority to design 
and enforce a domestic transfer pricing system that – although significantly different from 
the dominant transfer pricing regime – is regarded by the country’s tax administration as a 
more pragmatic and effective approach for an emerging economy reality. On the other 
hand, Brazil has not completely disregarded the ALP or the OECD’s influence on the 
international tax regime: the country’s tax treaties incorporate article 9(1) of the OECD 
Model Treaty and meet the ALP requirements in its transfer pricing law by allowing 
taxpayers, under certain circumstances, to use different profit margins than those 
established by the law.  
Resistance to merely accepting the OECD’s approach to transfer pricing was also 
expressed by India, which, in 2012, published a letter criticizing the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines and, essentially, emphasizing how these guidelines were prejudicial for 
developing (source) countries565. According to David Spencer, “the letter represented a 
seminal event, as it was the first significant argument by a major developing country 
against the Guidelines566”. The Indian role as a norm maker is further explained by Lee 
Sheppard: 
India is only an observer at the OECD, but its influence on the development 
and interpretation of treaties cannot be underestimated. India regards the 
OECD model commentary as a mere recommendation and the 1995 OECD 
transfer pricing guidelines as a document that takes care of the interests of 
developed (read capital-exporting) countries at the expense of the taxing 
rights of developing countries. India has lobbied the U.N. Financing and 
                                                
565 Sanjay Kumar Mishra, Joint Secretary and Permanent Representative of India to the United 
Nations, in “Letter to the United Nations Conveying Government of India’s Views on the Advance 
Unedited Version of the Report on the Work of the Committee of Experts on International 
Cooperation in Tax Matters” (2012), online: < 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/2012ICTM/LetterIndia.pdf> . 
566 Spencer, “BRICS, BEPS and the UN Manual Part 1”, supra note 65. 
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Development Office to devalue the guidelines as guidance for article 9 of 
the U.N. model treaty567. 
Correspondingly, as examined above, the participation of Brazil, India, China and South 
Africa in the UN Practical Manual provided “an ‘end run’ around the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines”568.  
5.3 Limits and Possibilities on the BRICS Role in 
Shaping the International Transfer Pricing Landscape 
The BRICS have been recognized as a relevant group in the tax community. As discussed 
in the previous sections, the grouping of the BRICS countries and their relevance in the 
international transfer pricing scenario derives mainly from their economic power and status 
as emerging economies. Moreover, the BRICS have common features and international tax 
practices that support them as a coalition seeking to shift the balance of global political 
influence towards the developing world569.  
Nevertheless, the BRICS also have significant historical, social, economic, geographic and 
political dissimilarities that challenge their performance as a unified group, which may 
reduce their impact on possible international tax and transfer pricing policy reforms. In a 
study conducted by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) on the impact of 
emerging economies on global governance, an analysis of the BRICS countries emphasized 
their differences as a significant barrier for their cooperation as a group: 
While cooperation between the BRICS countries is increasing, differences 
between them remain large as well. These differences include economic 
structure, level of economic development, external and internal security 
situation, level of democracy and so on. They create substantial barriers for 
finding true common ground and often limit cooperation among the BRICS 
                                                
567 Sheppard, supra note 506 at 468. 
568 Feinschreiber and Kent, supra note 467. 
569 Nikonov, supra note 141. 
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on many issues. The absence of a broadly shared positive agenda is the main 
reason why it is highly unlikely for these countries to grow into a geo-
economic, geopolitical alternative to the West within the next five to ten 
years570. 
Some authors argue that, having not much in common – and, in fact, having a great deal of 
rivalry between them – all the BRICS countries share is the challenge to Western 
hegemony571. Analyzing the uniqueness of the BRICS countries through a Brazilian 
perspective, Luís Schoueri argues that “the idiosyncrasies of the Brazilian tax environment 
mean that it may have different positions than the other BRICS countries. However, the 
BRICS countries may have common needs and claims that are not currently represented in 
the OECD”572. In this sense, assuming that these differences with the OECD are the main 
connection between the BRICS, the question that arise is whether this is a sufficient tie to 
unite these countries and their international tax policies. 
In the international transfer pricing area, considering that nearly all of the BRICS countries 
are becoming, or at least aspire to become capital exporter countries, their adoption of 
policies associated with residence jurisdictions may weaken their role as representative 
source countries and move them closer to the OECD approach573. This could lead to a 
transformation in the existing international tax landscape, where “perhaps the role currently 
                                                
570 Sijbren de Jong, Rem Korteweg, Joshua Polchar and Artur Usanov, New Players, New Game? 
The Impact of Emerging Economies on Global Governance (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press, 2012) 71. 
571 The author emphasizes the experiences of the BRICS regarding the Western hegemony: “India 
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occupied by the BRICS, as a vocal ‘counterpoint’ to the OECD and developed countries 
will be filled in the future by a new set of countries with a new acronym”574. Still, this close 
alignment with the OECD depends on the continuing economic development of the BRICS 
in the foreseeable future, which is not guaranteed. 
However, even in their present stage of economic development – in which the importance 
of source-based taxation is still a priority – the BRICS usually rely on OECD standards as 
the accepted baseline against which they advocate a different policy. The transfer pricing 
policies of the BRICS countries are not created in isolation but rather as a departure from 
established practices, demonstrating the significant influence that the supranational tax 
bodies (the OECD and the UN) have in these countries: 
An organization or, more precisely, a pair of organizations that provide a 
common starting point for negotiating (e.g. in the case of the two model 
treaties) or discussion (in the case of the OECD guidance and initiatives) 
can facilitate international tax policy conversations. If every discussion and 
every negotiation started ‘at the beginning’, coordination and agreement 
would likely be slower and the prospects for resolution likely diminished. 
Additionally, to the extent that many jurisdictions (beyond OECD countries 
and the BRICS) are not in a position to prepare their own models or draft 
regulations or guidelines, the ability to access a comprehensive set of tax 
materials can be valuable575. 
Although several transfer pricing practices and interests of the BRICS are distinct from 
those of the OECD countries, it is possible to note a general reliance on the OECD’s 
framework and on the ALP. For instance, Brazil’s predetermined profit margins 
methodology does not create a new system or principle, but rather reconciles the ALP 
(prescribed in Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty) with a more practical approach. 
Moreover, the Chinese and Indian dissonant transfer pricing policies examined above – 
                                                
574 Ring, supra note 108 at 490. 
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such as LSAs – and their recognition by the international community were not developed 
through a consensus between the BRICS, but through pressure on the UN to provide them 
a space in the UN Practical Manual to express their practices and on the OECD to 
incorporate some of these concepts in the BEPS initiative. 
5.4 Conclusion 
The BRICS have selected the ALP as the standard method in dealing with transfer pricing; 
however, the interpretation and the application of this principle in each of the BRICS 
countries is different. There are similarities in the challenges presented by the ALP for the 
BRICS, such as the difficulty in finding comparables and in establishing appropriate 
transfer prices for intangible transactions. Nonetheless, there is no coordination between 
the BRICS regarding the solutions they found for these challenges, except for China and 
India, which seem to cooperate and coordinate their positions on LSAs.  
The BRICS identification as a group as well as their resistance to being merely norm takers 
have influenced the public debate on international transfer pricing policies. Therefore, 
these countries have had an impact on the works of relevant tax organizations, such as the 
UN and the OECD. However, because of a series of limitations – particularly regarding the 
differences among them – the BRICS do not seem to be able to act as a ‘unified front’ or 
to dismantle the current international transfer pricing regime.  
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Chapter 6  
6 Conclusion 
This thesis has examined the role of the BRICS in the governance of the international 
transfer pricing regime as well as their potential for cooperation in rebalancing the existing 
power structures in international taxation. 
Transfer pricing is a complex issue for tax administrations and taxpayers across the world. 
The ALP and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines have frequently been adopted as the 
basis for transfer pricing systems, being considered by some scholars as the international 
consensus on transfer pricing. Nevertheless, over time, the ALP, as applied and interpreted 
under the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, has encountered a series of limitations and 
challenges in its practical application, especially for countries that are not members of the 
OECD, such as the BRICS. Recognizing these difficulties, in 2013, the UN developed a 
Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries. The contributions from 
four of the BRICS countries – Brazil, China, India and South Africa – to the last part of the 
UN Practical Manual were examined in Chapter 2, concentrating on the practices of these 
countries that were not aligned with the OECD’s approach.  
When the BRICS countries were grouped in 2001, they did not share a collective identity, 
but rather an identity that was established by others. Indeed, the BRICS have few common 
characteristics, differing from each other in terms of their political, legal, geographic, 
economic and cultural structures. Nonetheless, based on a common self-identity as 
emerging economies576, the BRICS have built an extensive network of interactions, having 
institutionalized important areas of cooperation where they share common interests. This 
overall perspective regarding relevant characteristics of the BRICS as individual countries 
and as a group were discussed in Chapter 3, which set the stage for an analysis of the 
                                                
576 This self-identity the BRICS have as emerging economies is accompanied by the idea that the 
existing governance of the international tax regime does not take into consideration the interests of 
emerging countries, which, consequently, may be an obstacle for their fully development.  
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potential for cooperation between these countries in Chapter 5. 
In particular, Chapter 3 focused on the BRICS performance as a group, where the BRICS 
countries representatives have agreed on the need for cooperation and coordination of their 
international tax policies for countering tax evasion and tax avoidance. In this respect, one 
of the areas identified by the BRICS heads of tax authorities577 for extending their 
cooperation was the development of international standards on transfer pricing considering 
the needs of developing countries in general and, more specifically, the aspirations of the 
BRICS countries. However, considering all the above-mentioned differences between 
these countries, the question that arises is if it is possible for the BRICS to coordinate their 
positions in order to develop a new (or reform the existing) international standard on 
transfer pricing. Chapter 4 – which essentially explores the transfer pricing rules of the five 
BRICS countries – addresses this question.  
A comparison between the transfer pricing rules of the BRICS countries demonstrates that 
all of them, explicitly or implicitly, follow the ALP in their domestic laws, at least in theory. 
Nevertheless, the practical application of the principle, particularly as designed by the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, presents challenges for the tax authorities of all the 
BRICS, to a lesser or greater extent. The commonalities and dissimilarities between their 
transfer pricing practices were extensively discussed in Chapter 5. Fundamentally, 
although these countries face similar difficulties, the solutions developed by each one of 
them are different. In this respect, this research did not find indications of a coordination 
between the five BRICS countries’ tax laws towards developing one common international 
transfer pricing standard. Only China and India have been able to coordinate their positions 
on transfer pricing matters such as LSAs and intangibles in order to achieve a greater global 
influence.   
Even though the BRICS have not developed a unified position regarding transfer pricing 
or a formal coordination between their practices, it is possible to observe a sense of 
                                                
577 As discussed in page 36, the BRICS heads of tax authorities held regular meetings – also called 
Heads of Revenue Meetings – where they discuss potential areas for cooperation and exchange 
opinions towards reaching a globally fair tax system. 
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cooperation and support among them. One evidence of this cooperation is found in their 
involvement in the UN Subcommittee on Transfer Pricing, where, while they did not agree 
with the individual practices expressed by each of them (i.e., their transfer pricing 
methodologies were dissimilar), they cooperated to have the inclusion of Chapter 10 (Part 
D in the 2017 version) in the UN Practical Manual as a space for them to describe their 
distinctive approaches to transfer pricing578. Thus, the most successful form of cooperation 
between the BRICS has been challenging international transfer pricing standards that are 
inadequate for their national interests as emerging economies. 
Individually, the aspiration for a stronger influence in the development of the international 
transfer pricing regime is also noticeable among the BRICS countries. The participation of 
the BRICS in supranational tax bodies – even acting only as observers – suggests how these 
countries attempt to use their status as members of the BRICS in order to, independently, 
achieve a more influential position in the international transfer pricing debate. In this 
respect, Chapter 5 reviewed some influences the BRICS countries had in the development 
of the UN Practical Manual and the G20/OECD BEPS initiative. A comparative analysis 
between the proposed BEPS Actions and the BRICS transfer pricing rules indicated that 
the BRICS countries had an individual impact on the outcomes of the BEPS initiative.  
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that, based on their differences and limitations, 
currently, the BRICS are not an imminent threat to the dominance of the existing power 
structures in international taxation, specifically the OECD. An analysis of the BRICS 
transfer pricing laws in combination with their latest institutional developments suggests 
that these countries do not sufficiently cooperate and coordinate their positions to oppose 
the OECD in an organized manner. Thus, the BRICS are unlikely to, as a cohesive group, 
                                                
578 The contributions from four of the five BRICS to the UN Practical Manual, more than merely 
describing their approaches to transfer pricing, represents one important step in their wish for a 
stronger voice in the international transfer pricing scenario. According to Diane Ring, “in a Manual 
targeted at developing countries, the decision to include a chapter highlighting the work of these 
four countries signals their role as leaders for developing countries seeking successful resolutions 
to tax problems. This message is particularly apparent given that some of the practices of the 
featured countries were not closely aligned with the arm’s length message that permeated the 
Manual”. 578 Ring, supra note 108 at 484. 
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create their own transfer pricing framework or model.  
Nevertheless, despite their difficulties in formally and cohesively developing a detailed 
transfer pricing policy as a group, it is clear that the BRICS have the potential ability to 
influence the direction of the international transfer pricing regime. Indeed, the BRICS 
countries individual positions as well as their participation in other international 
organizations and initiatives, such as the UN, the G20 and the G20/OECD BEPS, have 
added new perspectives to the international tax debate. In this respect, the OECD’s new 
international taxation approach regarding collaboration and multilateral action – as 
demonstrated in the BEPS initiative – was an important step in the BRICS quest for having 
a stronger voice in international tax governance. 
Even though the BRICS have been active in cooperating with supranational tax bodies, 
including the OECD, this does not mean that these countries are aligning with the 
traditional and dominant powers in international tax governance. Specifically in regards to 
the OECD, while there is the possibility that the BRICS reach sufficient levels of 
development and join the organization, this is not an opportunity expected to happen in the 
foreseeable future. However, even as non-member countries, the BRICS have acquired a 
significant voice and influence in the OECD, who is also interested in having them included 
in the organization’s decisions. 
According to the above analysis, one of the possible future outcomes for the BRICS 
countries in the international tax landscape is to continue to act as an informal group, 
focusing on their individual participation in organizations and initiatives in which they are 
already involved. This way, even not having a coordinated transfer pricing policy, they can 
use the power of their association and still be able to further increase their influence in the 
international tax regime.  
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